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Preface
Once again it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of Touche
Ross Foundation that has made it possible to continue this series of biennial
auditing symposia at the University of Kansas. The 1984 symposium was the
seventh of the series, and once again about fifty invited practitioners and
educators came together for two days to consider and discuss the eight papers
that were presented.
As the persons co-chairing the symposium, we selected the topics to be
presented as well as the persons who prepared the papers or served as the
designated discussants. The paper on the origins and development of mate
riality as an auditing concept continues the historical coverage of auditing that
has opened each of the symposia. The sole unifying theme or purpose of the
additional papers was, as always, that the topic addressed or the research
reported relate to current matters likely to be of interest and concern to the
invited participants from both practice and academe. Following the pattern
established with the first symposium, all papers, except for the traditional
evening address on a more general topic, were distributed in advance, making
it possible for the preparer to limit comments to summary remarks or
observations about the paper, and more than an hour was available for the
prepared response of the selected discussant and the ensuing open discussion.
Although these discussions have invariably been one of the highlights of the
symposia, it has not been feasible to attempt to capture and report these
discussions for the benefit of the wider readership of the proceedings. For
those who might like an opportunity to participate in the discussions at a future
symposium, we would be pleased to receive an indication of your interest.
The proceedings of each of the symposia except the first are still in print
and may be purchased from
KANSAS UNION BOOKSTORE
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045
Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The prepaid price covers
mailing costs with the exception of orders outside of the United States and
Canada, in which case an additional $2.00 should be included for surface
transportation. The papers included in each of the available proceedings, the
authors of those papers, and the prepaid price of each volume from the Kansas
Union Bookstore are given below for the benefit of those who may wish to
refer to a paper in one of the previous volumes.
Contemporary Auditing Problems (1974) $5.00
1. Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development and Some Proposals for Research
Glen Berryman
2. The New AICPA Audit Commission—Will the Real Questions Please Stand Up?
Stephen D. Harlan, Jr.
3. Controlling Audit Quality: A Responsibility of the Profession?
Andrew P. Marincovich
4. Relationship of Auditing Standards to Detection of Fraud
George R. Catlett
5. A Decision Theory View of Auditing
William L. Felix, Jr.

6. Setting Standards for Statistical Sampling in Auditing
John C. Broderick
7. The Sample of One: Indispensable or Indefensible?
Gregory M. Boni
8. The Case for Continuation of Mandatory Independent Audits for Publicly Held Companies
John C. Burton
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Richard L. Kramer
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Boyd Randall and Paul Frishkoff
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James K. Loebbecke
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Richard D. Fitzgerald

Auditing Symposium IV (1978) $6.00
1. Internal Auditing—A Historical Perspective and Future Directions
Victor Z. Brink
2. Analytical Auditing: A Status Report
Rodney J. Anderson
3. Sampling Risk vs. Nonsampling Risk in the Auditor's Logic Process
William L. Felix, Jr.
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Horton L. Sorkin
5. Has the Accounting Profession Lost Control of Its Destiny?
D. R. Carmichael
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Richard H. Murray
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Allen Ford
Howard Stettler
September, 1984
University of Kansas
Lawrence
An Added N o t e Auditing Symposium VII becomes the final offering of the symposia with
which I will be directly involved, inasmuch as I retired from the faculty of the
University of Kansas at the end of the 1984 spring semester after an
association of 37 years. The response to the symposia has been most
gratifying, especially in terms of the willingness of so many busy people to
prepare the 56 papers that have been presented and of others to serve as
discussants for those papers. Many persons have given their support to this
series since it began in 1972, but I particularly want to recognize with thanks
the assistance and encouragement of Jerry Jackson, previously of the Kansas
City office of Touche Ross & Co. and now in the national office, and Bob Long
of the Kansas City office of Arthur Andersen & Co.
Plans have been made to assure the continuation of the symposia, thanks to
Dean John Tollefson of the University of Kansas School of Business. To that
end, Allen Ford agreed to take time from his involvement in the income tax
area to be co-chairman on an interim basis, so as to be able to pass the reins to
a successor with an auditing specialty when such a person is appointed to the
faculty of the School of Business.
I do, however, plan to lend my assistance to subsequent symposia and to
participate in them if I can manage to be invited. I look forward to seeing some
of the many persons with whom I have become acquainted through the
symposia and in other ways, either at subsequent symposia or other profes
sional gatherings.
Howard Stettler
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1
The Origins and Development of
Materiality as an Auditing Concept
David C. Selley
Auditing Standards Director,
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants

Introduction
"Unimportant, of course, I meant," the King hastily said, and went on to himself in an
undertone, "important—unimportant—unimportant-important—" as if he were trying
which word sounded best.
— C . L . Dodgson, alias Lewis Carroll

The accounting and auditing professions and users offinancialstatements
are, of course, much more organized than the King. Or are they? Recently,
accounting professions in a number of countries, including the United States,
have issued authoritative pronouncements on the subject of materiality in
accounting, and the United States has issued a pronouncement on materiality in
an auditing context (AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 47,
"Materiality and Audit Risk," referred to hereafter as SAS 47). However, no
one pretends that all the problems have been resolved and, as will be outlined
in this paper, further work is underway in a number of areas.
Being asked to write a paper on materiality is rather like being asked to
write a love poem. If one were to research all love poems previously written
one would wonder how it was possible to come up with anything new or
different. The materiality situation is similar. There is an immense quantity of
material on the subject from standard-setting bodies and commissions, task
forces and study groups commissioned by such bodies, practising firms,
authors of text books and researchers in academe and elsewhere. This activity
has not been confined to the United States. One approach to a paper on the
history and development of the concept of materiality would be to write an
accountant's equivalent to a Whole Earth Catalogue, but that would be most
uninteresting for the writer and even more so for the reader. This paper
therefore is highly selective in the material that it covers and the issues that it
addresses.
Until the last several years, little of the work carried out on the subject of
materiality dealt specifically or at length with the auditor's use of this concept.
Most of the emphasis, and probably rightly so, was on what was material in the
context of annual financial statements and the users thereof. Nevertheless,
there was always some recognition that the auditor was concerned in this
process, even if only to indicate at the outset that the particular pronounce
ment, study or paper did not deal with the auditor's concern on the question.
The problem is that the auditor has to be concerned with understanding
1

how materiality is accounted for in the accounting sense and then has concerns
over and above that in determining how he can construct an audit program to
obtain reasonable assurance of detecting errors, if they exist, in financial
statements accumulating to the materiality levels determined in an accounting
context. It is this that has led to a supposed distinction between accounting
materiality and auditing materiality, which is one of the issues addressed in this
paper.
In this paper, I will make no attempt at a catalogue. I am not in a position to
do so. I will try to bring to the subject my experience which was until the early
1970s, that of a practising auditor wresting with day-to-day problems of
materiality and coping with materiality guidelines provided by the national office
of my firm, one of the largest public accounting firms in Canada. Next, I spent
several years in that same national office auditing standards department and
was therefore part of the firm's process of developing the auditing materiality
guidelines that then were wrestled with by those unfortunates in the field that I
had abandoned. For the last three years I was Director of Auditing Standards
for the firm. For the past seven months I have been Auditing Standards
Director at The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), respon
sible for staff support for the auditing standards-setting process in Canada. So I
will try to bring to bear the views of a practitioner (very rusty), a troubleshooter and a standard-setter.
I have no academic experience (except as a student) and I am not a
researcher. In preparing this paper I have read, I think, most of the key
authoritative pronouncements and studies, a selection of the research papers
and articles referred to in those studies and some other material that caught my
fancy. The background material referred to is heavily weighted towards North
America. However, I have taken into account developments at the authorita
tive level in other parts of the Anglo-Saxon accounting world.
I am, therefore, not going to find a new discovery in the literature. I am
treading well-trodden ground. Readers may think that all this sounds a little like
a restricted scope paragraph, and they may very well be right. I ask that you
wait for the conclusion before deciding whether such conclusion is an opinion, a
qualified opinion or a disclaimer of opinion.
I will make references in many cases in abbreviated form, which are then
described in detail in Appendix 1. In some cases, I will also identify quotations
taken second-hand from published material. Unless quotations are so identi
fied, they have been taken from the original material.
This paper is presented in the following sequence.

Section A—History of the Concept of Materiality in an Auditing Context
A very brief summary in chronological sequence of the major developments
since the 1950s and an even briefer summary of developments prior to that.

Section B—Where We are Now?
A very brief summary of where the profession is now with respect to
authoritative and semi-authoritative material.
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Section C—Key Issues
Commentary on selected key issues that have been a feature of develop
ments in this field since the 1950s. The following issues are covered:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Definition of materiality
Accounting versus auditing materiality
Materiality and the audit model
Quantitative versus qualitative materiality
Practical considerations when unrealistic materiality levels are demanded.
Professional judgment versus rules of thumb (by far the biggest issue, at
least in terms of volume of paper)
7. The user problem
8. Informing the user
9. Aggregation of individual materiality judgments

Section D—Concluding Comments
Appendices
1. List of Short-Form References used in the Paper
2. Apparent Status of Materiality Question with Authoritative Professional
Bodies
3. Definitions of Materiality. Elements of the Definition
4. Bibliography
A number of other issues have not been dealt with in this paper. These
include considerations of soft numbers (client estimates), dividing materiality
among locations, highly leveraged entities, materiality in low-profit or lossmaking entities, the carryover of immaterial unadjusted errors from one period
to the next, materiality for compliance procedures and changing materiality
from one year to the next. I have, however, attempted to identify the main
themes in the debate.

History of the Concept of Materiality in an Auditing Context
It is probably fair to say that materiality has always been a consideration in
presenting accounts and in auditing them. Even in 19th century Great Britain,
when audits were more of an investigative exercise, it would not have been
possible to work without some agreement between an auditor and his client
(but probably not the user) as to what was material and what was not, although
it is probable that the level was set very low at what we would now call a level
of triviality.
The best evidence of concerns in this area was a change in the form of the
auditor's report in the U.K. in 1900 from use of the phrase "true and correct"
to "true and fair." This appears to have taken longer to develop in the United
States. Agitation to drop the term "certify" and the phrase "true and
correct" occurred during the 1930s, as, of course, did the stock-market
collapse and securities legislation. As a result, in 1940 a new form of report was
developed which reads much like the current standard report and, in particular,
the phrase "present fairly . . . in accordance with generally accepted account
ing principles" appears. The reference to generally accepted auditing stand3

ards came in 1941 after the McKesson & Robbins scandal and the wording
used today was eventually adopted in 1949. Finally, with respect to events
prior to 1950, it is important to know that generally accepted auditing standards
were promulgated in October 1947, although they were not generally elabo
rated upon at that time.
The most important events subsequent to 1950 are outlined below.
• In 1954 the AICPA's Committee on Auditing Procedure issued a booklet
entitled Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, Their Significance and
Scope. Contained in this material (page 25) is the following under the heading
"Materiality":
There should be stronger grounds to sustain the auditor's informed
opinion in respect of those items which are relatively more important
and in respect of those in which the possibilities of material error are
greater. For example, in an enterprise with relatively few, but large,
accounts receivable, the individual items themselves are more
important, and the possibility of major error is also greater, than in
another enterprise which has a vast number of small accounts
aggregating the same total . . . Similarly, accounts receivable will
receive more attention than prepaid insurance. However put in
words, the principle of materiality is inherent in the work of the
auditor.
This paragraph was included in the 1963 codification of Statements on
Auditing Procedure (No. 33) published by the AICPA and is now with minor
amendment part of the AICPA's auditing standards, Section 150, "Gener
ally Accepted Auditing Standards" (paragraph .04). However unsophisti
cated this wording might seem in the light of all the subsequent research, it
is interesting to note that materiality was raised as an auditing issue at the
very inception of a codification of generally accepted auditing standards.
• Apart from various worthwhile research papers and articles and the
publication of a number of very specific materiality guidelines to cover
particular situations by the SEC and by the AICPA, the next major event
was the publication in 1965 by the CICA of what is known as an "Audit
Technique Study" with the title Materiality in Auditing (referred to
hereafter as the CICA Technique Study). While not an official auditing
standard, such a study does have a reasonably high degree of authority.*
Not only did this study address the entire issue of materiality from the
auditor's point of view, but it provided specific materiality guidelines and
rules of thumb based on varying percentages of gross profit. This study
sparked interest in the United States and resulted in an article by Douglas R.
Carmichael in the Journal of Accountancy in December 1969, which sug
gested that the study be considered by the U.S. profession.
• Then, in 1968, Accounting Statement V-10 was issued by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales entitled "The Interpretation of
'Material' in Relation to Accounts" (Statement V-10). This accounting
* The relevant wording is, in part, "This study is part of a series prepared by the Study Group on
Audit Techniques and published under the general authority of the Committee on Accounting and
Auditing Research . . . (It) expresses the views of the Study Group and does not reflect the
approval or endorsement of the Institute nor of the Committee."

4

pronouncement was highly significant because, while it emphasized profes
sional judgment, it outlined the factors to be taken into account and
suggested particular percentage guidelines:
In some circumstances a difference of about 10% might be acceptable
but in other circumstances a difference as low as 3% might be too
much. While percentage comparisons can, properly used, constitute
useful broad guides, it must be kept in mind that they are no more
than rough rules of thumb, and should not be applied indiscriminately
without regard to particular circumstances.
• At about the same time the Bar Chris case was decided in the United
States. In this case the judge made matters rather difficult for accountants by
specifically outlining two situations in detail and concluding in one that the
misstatement in question was not material and in the other that it was. This
did not really solve any problems because this case, like most other legal
cases, simply decides materiality on the basis of particular facts in a
particular case. Nevertheless it did focus the attention of auditors on the
issue of materiality.
1

• In 1972, AICPA SAS 2, "Reports on Audited Financial Statements" was
published and paragraph 16 provided some very general guidance to the
auditor in how to decide what was, or what was not, material at the
evaluation stage of the audit, when he was about to express his opinion.
• In 1974 the Accountants International Study Group (AISG—consisting of
representatives of the U.S., U.K. and Canadian professions) published a
study entitled Materiality in Accounting which described practices in the
three countries concerned. In addition to noting that materiality is essentially
a matter of professional judgment (this is a mandatory statement for anyone
to make dealing with the subject) this group suggested that:
'Quantitative guidelines within broad parameters are usually used in
practice and we believe they could be developed by the authoritative
bodies in the three nations' (paragraph 30).
In the same year, a Statement of Accounting Standards on "Materiality in
Financial Statements" was issued jointly by the two authoritative accounting
bodies in Australia. A similar standard was issued in New Zealand in 1977.
These statements provided guidance on determining materiality and specific
rules of thumb in more detail and with more encouragement than the earlier
British pronouncement (Statement V-10).
• We now come to 1975 and things were really warming up. The AICPA
issued SAS No. 5 "The Meaning of 'Present Fairly in Conformity with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles' in the Independent Auditor's
Report" which suggested that auditors should use their judgment as to
whether:
. . . the financial statements reflect the underlying assets and
transactions in a manner that presents the financial position . . .
stated within a range of acceptable limits, that is, limits that are
reasonable and practicable to attain infinancialstatements.(emphasis
added)
However, by far the most important event in 1975, and arguably the most
important event to date in the whole question of materiality from an
5

accounting (and therefore also from an auditing) point of view, was the
publication in March of the Financial Accounting Standards Board Discussion
Memorandum, "An Analysis of Issues Related to Criteria for Determining
Materiality." Henceforth, in this paper this will be referred to as
" F A S B . D M , " followed by a page reference. This synthesized an enormous
amount of the preceding work on materiality, including all of the items
previously mentioned* and many papers prepared on the subject by
practitioners and academics. It was, and is, a mammoth work. The
discussion memorandum generated much comment and public hearings were
held. To skip just a little in the chronology at this point, it should be noted
that, during the 1970s the FASB was unable to come to grips with the
concept of materiality, which ended up forming part of one of the conceptual
framework projects, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2
(SFAC No. 2), "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information,"
published in 1980. It is interesting to note that the 246 pages in the
discussion memorandum (including bibliographies, etc.) was boiled down to
an exposure draft with 18 paragraphs and to only 10 paragraphs in the final
pronouncement.
2

• In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a judicial definition of mate
riality, the key elements of which are noted in Appendix 3.
• In 1980, the year that SFAC No. 2 was issued as described above, two
research studies were published by the CICA. One, entitled "Financial
Reporting For Non-Profit Organizations" recommended specific rules of
thumb materiality guidelines for auditors of non-profit organizations, and the
second study, "Extent of Audit Testing," while it does not set specific
guidelines, assumes that a materiality level has been decided upon and
quantified and concludes that the materiality level used by the auditor at the
planning stage must be the same as that used by the preparers of financial
statements.
• The early 1980s saw considerable efforts on the part of the AICPA Auditing
Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) to deal with the question of
materiality as part of a project entitled "Materiality and Audit Risk." The
urgency for this became greater after June 1981 with the publication of SAS
39, "Audit Sampling," which required the auditor to come to a decision on
what was material when devising a sample.
• Eventually, in September 1983, the AICPA published SAS 47, which deals
squarely with the issue of materiality, although at the conceptual level. SAS
47 does not provide any rule of thumb guidelines, nor does it even require
the auditor to express his preliminary consideration of materiality in
quantified terms. SAS 47 also recognizes that certain qualitative aspects of
materiality decisions at the evaluation stage of the audit, might not be able to
be taken account of at the planning stage (this matter is discussed later in
this paper).
• Although SAS 47 contained no rule of thumb guidelines, the subject had been
considered by the committee during the process of developing the pro
nouncements. At present a Research Monograph is in the course of
preparation that will publish the information accumulated by the Task Force
formed to develop the material for SAS 47.
3

* For example, relevant portions describing the quantitative guidelines in the Canadian CICA
Technique Study, the British Statement V-10 and the Australian Statement are quoted in full.
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• The next event of significance, in my view, will be the probable publication
during 1984 of a research study by the CICA entitled Materiality—The
Concept and its Application to Auditing (referred to hereafter as The Leslie
Study). This study is authored by Donald A. Leslie, FCA, who has written
several papers on this subject and who is heavily involved in the subject of
statistical sampling. He was also a member of the SAS 47 Task Force
referred to above and of the Study Group which produced the CICA
Research Study Extent of Audit Testing. I have reviewed a draft version of
this research study and with the kind permission of the author have quoted
extracts (which may, of course, change). This study as presently drafted
deals with all the issues raised in this paper and a host of others as well. It
will be by far the most comprehensive study to date and is prepared from the
auditor's point of view.
While the above history takes into account only important authoritative
pronouncements, it should be remembered that throughout the period at least
from the 1950s, a considerable amount of empirical research was being carried
out, a number of legal decisions were made, and a few specific guidelines were
set out for specific situations by the SEC and by the AICPA. Much of this is
captured in the bibliography attached to the FASB Discussion Memorandum,
and the specific guidelines are described in pages 25 to 33 and 38 to 43. There
is also a more up-to-date list of relevant legal decisions in paragraphs 163 to
165 of SFAC No. 2 and of specific accounting and SEC rules in paragraph 166,
including Table 1.

Where Are We Now?
Before proceeding further, it would be well to summarize where the profes
sions, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, are in April 1984 on the question of
materiality in terms of setting standards.

UNITED STATES
Accounting
• SFAC No. 2 "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information" para
graphs 123 to 132 (an authoritative, conceptual pronouncement providing
general criteria for determining materiality but no rules of thumb or detailed
practical guidance).
• A few specific guidelines in quantitative form in pronouncements of the
AICPA's Accounting Principles Board and one by the FASB in respect to
segmented information.

Auditing
• Various references to materiality considerations in SAS's, together with
SAS 47 "Audit-Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit" (Authoritative,
conceptual and specific guidance but no rules of thumb and no requirement to
quantify at all).
• An AICPA Research Monograph underway which may illustrate rules of
thumb.
• SAS 39 "Audit Sampling," which provides guidance for the application of
materiality decisions in audit sampling.

7

CANADA
Accounting and Auditing
• The CICA Handbook contains only a definition and a statement that the
content of the Handbook applies only to material items.
• The Research Study, Financial Reporting for Non-Profit Organizations
(1980) provides general and quantitative guidelines.

Auditing
• An Audit Technique Study (1965) provides general guidance and rules of
thumb based on gross profit (these latter rules have probably not been
widely used in practice).
• The Research Study, Extent of Audit Testing, provides guidance on the
application of materiality decisions.
• A Research Study is in the final stages that will deal comprehensively with
the materiality issue from the viewpoint of the auditor.

UNITED KINGDOM
Accounting
• Statement V-10, published in 1970, "The Interpretation of 'Material' in
relation to accounts" provides extensive criteria and general guidance,
including a brief reference to rule of thumb percentages.

Auditing
• The Auditing Practices Committee has identified materiality as a topic but
has not commenced a project.
4

AUSTRALIA
Accounting
• The Australian profession (National Council of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in Australia and General Council of the Australian Society of
Accountants) has published Statement DS7: "Materiality in Financial Ac
counts," an authoritative statement providing general and detailed guidance,
including rules of thumb.

Auditing
• The Australian auditing profession relies heavily on the International Audit
ing Guidelines (IAGs) published by the International Auditing Practices
Committee (IAPC) in setting its own auditing guidelines. The IAPC has
commenced a project on "Materiality and Audit Risk" which Australia may
adopt.

NEW ZEALAND
Accounting
• A Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 6 was published in 1977 by
the New Zealand Society of Accountants entitled "Materiality in Financial
Statements." It contains general and specific guidance, including rules of
thumb.

8

INTERNATIONAL
Accounting (IASC)
• No guidance
Accounting (AISG)
• A study of Materiality in Accounting, published in 1974, recommended
specific guidance with quantitative parameters (i.e., rules of thumb).
Auditing (IAPC)
• Proposed IAG "Materiality and Audit Risk" in process.
A comparative summary of where the various standard-setting bodies stand
is contained in Appendix 2. It is interesting to note that, in the auditing field,
the US profession was first past the post with an authoritative pronouncement,
yet has hesitated to go as far with respect to the quantification and rules of
thumb as other professional bodies have in their accounting pronouncements or
less-than-authoritative material.

Key Issues
1. Definition of Materiality
In the dictionary, the word "material" is generally regarded as being
synonymous with "significant," and that is the end of it. The best short
definition I have found is: "in essence, 'materiality' means this: if it doesn't
really matter, don't bother with it." (Ernest L. Hicks, "Materiality,"
Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1964), page 158.) However, these
definitions won't really do as practical guidance. Accordingly, various and
sundry authors, authoritative and semi-authoritative bodies, and lexicogra
phers particularly interested in accounting have tried their hand at a definition.
To be fair, all of these definitions are not necessarily trying to achieve exactly
the same purpose and there are, or course, other definitions that I have not
considered. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, 13 definitions were
examined from the U.S., Canada and the U.K. and the following general
conclusions can be drawn (see Appendix 3 for more detail):
• In 11 of the 13 definitions specific reference is made to the users of the
information and in the other two cases it is implied, although not stated.
• In 9 of the 13 definitions the user is required to be "intelligent,"
"reasonable" or "prudent." In one of the remaining cases (a particular
court case) prudence was not particularly relevant.
• The degree of certainty that the preparer or transmitter of the information
should have that the user will be affected varies, but he would generally
require a relatively high degree of certainty. For example, none of the
definitions seen suggested that it was sufficient that the reader "might" be
affected. The conditions range from "reasonably likely" to "would" or
"should."
There is therefore a high degree of agreement that these three elements
should be included in any definition, and they are indeed the key three elements
in the definition contained in SFAC No. 2, issued by the AICPA in 1980 and at
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this time the most authoritative U.S. definition. In the draft CICA research
study, Leslie basically picks up the SFAC No. 2 definition and adds the element
of aggregation. (As seen in Appendix 3, his and that of the FASB.DM are the
only definitions to do this.) Leslie suggests that the aggregate of omissions or
mis-statements could cause a reasonable person to mistakenly rely.
In my view, this is the best definition I have seen and accordingly is quoted
as follows from the draft:
Materiality—The magnitude of an omission or mis-statement or the
aggregate thereof that, in the light of surrounding circumstances,
makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on
thefinancialstatements would have been changed or influenced by such
omission or mis-statement or the aggregate thereof.
For wider application (e.g., to other than financial statements), this
definition could easily be amended. No doubt different users will require
somewhat different difinitions but, for the purposes of the auditor, I believe
that the above definition is appropriate and properly encompasses the key
elements required.
2. Accounting versus Auditing Materiality
One of the problems (or non-problems) that seems to have continually
plagued researchers and standard-setters in this area is what is held to be a
distinction between accounting and auditing materiality. Perhaps this distinc
tion arose because it was the accountants who set the rules and created
problems for auditors in applying them. However, since accountants have not
in fact set very many detailed rules in this area (at least in the U.S. and
Canada), and the auditors have had quite a hand in preparing the ones that have
been set, this is difficult to understand.
The FASB D M on page 7 states,
The Board's consideration focuses on materiality infinancialaccounting
and reporting. However, the results of this project may be useful in any
consideration of materiality in auditing.
That comment has to be one of the understatements of all time. It is
impossible to imagine how auditors could conceivably not take into considera
tion any decision that the FASB might have reached. However, as we know,
the FASB did not reach any specific decisions as a result of this project.
The materiality problem does not exist only within the profession. Causey,
in his work on legal liability for public accountants (Duties and Liabilities of
Public Accountants) deals with the question of materiality and quotes a number
of cases. He starts out with the following statement (page 187-1982 edition):
No little confusion has surrounded the use of the word "material'' and
"materiality" in the accounting profession. The reason for this confu
sion is that authors use the words in various contexts with various
meanings without making careful distinctions for the different uses.
Materiality in the context of applying audit procedures is quite different
from materiality in the context offinancialreporting.
Nor do professional accountants from several countries when they get
together necessarily fail to fall into the same trap—
10

This study deals with materiality as it relates to accounting matters . . .
and sets forth some criteria used in making materiality decisions. It
does not consider the concept of materiality in relation to its effect on
auditing procedures that would normally be employed as the basis of an
auditor's opinion on the financial statements. (AISG Study, Materiality
in Accounting, 1974).
However, on the other hand, some authorities and researchers, while
recognizing that materiality is first of all an accounting concept, and that
auditors have to use the accounting concept, believe that the materiality
concept itself is the same in both cases. For example, D.R. Carmichael in
"The Cumulative Aspects of Materiality," (Journal of Accountancy, December
1969), says
The auditor uses materiality in essentially two ways: (1) evaluating the
fairness of presentation and reporting (materiality in accounting) and (2)
in deciding questions involving the development and execution of the
audit program (materiality in auditing). However, materiality in auditing
is dependent upon materiality in accounting. An item would be material
for auditing purposes if failure to detect mis-statement or misrepresen
tation of the item would influence decisions based upon the factual
statements.
The CICA Research Study on non-profit organizations (1980) starts out
with a distinction:
The Study Group believes that accounting materiality is one of the most
important governing factors in determining what should be disclosed in
any financial statement . . . Materiality in auditing is discussed in
chapter 14.
but goes on to say in chapter 14 (page 107):
If accounting materiality is set at a certain level, the auditor must
execute sufficient tests to obtain a reasonable degree of assurance that
if there are aggregate errors of that magnitude, they will be disclosed
during the course of the audit.
(This particular statement on the objective of auditing procedures will be
referred to again later.)
In the end, it seems that researchers and standard-setters acknowledge
that, while accountants set the materiality level, auditors have to use it. Some
researchers and authors go on to point out that the auditor uses the materiality
level at two stages, first devising the extent of procedures necessary to detect
material errors if they exist and then at the evaluation stage of the audit to
assess whether errors found are material. Most researchers to date have
suggested that the same materiality number is applicable both at the planning
and evaluation stages. However, this leads us right into the next issue in this
paper: materiality and the audit model.
In conclusion, therefore, there is widespread agreement that materiality
from the auditor's point of view at the final evaluation stage of the audit is the
same as it is from the point of view of the preparers of thefinancialstatements
(so-called "accounting materiality"). However, SAS 47 has stated that the
auditor for cost/benefit reasons may not in fact plan his procedures to detect
some errors that would be qualitatively material. If this view prevails (as it is
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almost bound to do in the U.S.) we are again back to two materialities:
"planning materiality" and "evaluation materiality." Future developments will
clarify this situation or further confuse it.
3. Materiality and the Audit Model
The objective of an audit is properly stated, in my view, in International
Auditing Guideline 1, "Objective and Scope of the Audit of Financial State
ments."
The objective of an audit of financial statements, prepared within a
framework of recognized accounting principles, is to enable an auditor
to express an opinion on suchfinancialstatements. (IAG 1, paragraph 2)
Paragraph 10 refines this objective further by stating
In forming his opinion on the financial statements, the auditor carries
out procedures designed to obtain reasonable assurance that the
financial statements are properly stated in all material respects.
The CICA Handbook, in Section 5000.04, "Audit of Financial Statements—
An Introduction'' states
In performing his examination, the auditor seeks reasonable assurance
that the financial statements taken as a whole are not materially mis
stated.
These objectives are similar to objectives contained in the audit evidence
standards (e.g., the third field work standard in the United States and the third
examination standard in Canada).
The principle to be noted here is that there is assumed to be a direct link
between material errors in the financial statements, if they exist, and the
auditor's procedures. Although the concepts of reasonable assurance and cost
effectiveness are mentioned by writers in this area, the fact remains that it
appears under this model to be inconceivable that an auditor could deliberately
not devise procedures which might leave open a substantial risk that material
errors would occur in thefinancialstatements. This is an issue which underlies
the literature up to the issuance of SAS 47, although it was generally not
highlighted.
SAS 47 has changed all that by specifically inserting the word "quan
titatively" into the definition in paragraph 13 and following it with a statement
that there are some kinds of things that an auditor would consider material if he
found them, but he will not go looking for them. Paragraph 13 states:
The auditor generally plans the audit primarily to detect errors that he
believes could be large enough, individually or in the aggregate, to be
quantitatively material to thefinancialstatements. Although the auditor
should be alert for errors that could be qualitatively material, it is
ordinarily impractical to design procedures to detect them. SAS No. 31,
"Evidential Matter," states that "an auditor typically works within
economic limits; his opinion, to be economically useful, must be framed
within a reasonable length of time and at a reasonable cost.'' (emphasis
added)
What this change means is that the auditor is now, in effect, in the position of
giving an opinion on the financial statements but in fact only expressing
negative assurance on some aspects thereof. This issue needs to be specifically
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addressed and further justified. Perhaps it is not the first time that such
negative assurance is implied in the auditor's report. Certainly, an argument
might be made that it has already been done in SAS 16, "The Independent
Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities" and SAS
17 "Illegal Acts by Clients."* Indeed, in the Berliner 1983 Article, the author,
who was Chairman of the Materiality and Audit Risk Task Force which led to
SAS 47, says that it is not the intent of the (SAS 47) exposure draft (as it then
was) to:
. . . establish a higher standard of responsibility for the detection of
errors or responsibilities than is recognized in SAS 16 . . . (p. 14).
Berliner discusses this issue at some length under the heading "The
Preliminary Estimate." Yet he acknowledges that "He who does not seek is
unlikely to find"—which is indeed the fundamental issue.
I believe that, based on this article and the other material I have reviewed,
this issue has yet to be developed. The only justification for acknowledging that
planning and evaluation materiality may be different would appear to be the
"cost/benefit" one. If this is the case, clarification and justification is going to
be required as to the situations in which the "qualitatively material option"
may be taken by the auditor at the planning stage.
4. Quantitative versus Qualitative Materiality
The literature of the 1960s through the 1980s makes reference to a
distinction between qualitative and quantitative materiality considerations,
although they are not necessarily called such. The FASB DM, page 56, quotes
from SAS 1 a passage which originated with the 1954 special report on auditing
procedures, "GAAS—Their Significance and Scope," as follows:
These (material) matters relate to the form, arrangement, and content
of the financial statements with their appended notes; the terminology
used; the amount of detail given; the classification of items in the
statements; the basis of amounts set forth, for example, with respect to
such assets as inventories . . . and the existence of affiliated or
controlling interests . . .
Some of these concepts are clearly not directly quantifiable.
The CICA Research Study on non-profit organizations comments (page 108):
The qualitative aspects of materiality refer to judgment by the auditor
on:
• important non-financial information that should be reported, but is not
disclosed adequately;
• quantified amounts and other pertinent information the auditor
identified as irregularities but which are below the quantitative
materiality threshhold.
* In my experience a similar situation has arisen in practice in Canada where auditors have tacitly
recognized (as has the CICA in a non-authoritative Auditing Guideline, "Related Party
Transactions and Economic Dependence" contained in the CICA Handbook) that, apart from
enquiring of management, there are no effective techniques for identifying all related parties as
determined under Canadian GAAP (CICA Handbook Section 3840, "Related Party Transactions—Disclosure Considerations"). Auditors, in remaining alert for such disclosure, in effect
provide a form of negative assurance that disclosures are complete.
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On the other hand SFAC No. 2, in paragraph 123, states "Materiality
judgments are primarily quantitative in nature." Perhaps all materiality
considerations are ultimately quantifiable, presumably because anything that
does not eventually affect future cash flows cannot be material, provided that
we assume that users have onlyfinancialgoals (or, if they have social goals,
that the auditor need not worry about them). Paragraph 7 of SAS 47 also
appears to be thinking along those lines when it says,
. . . errors of relatively small amounts detected by the auditor could
have a material effect on the financial statements. For example, an
illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if
there is a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material
contingent liability or a material loss of revenue.
This, too, seems to be suggesting that all qualitative considerations are
ultimately quantifiable and would be consistent with the view of the CICA group
(second bullet).
However, SAS 47, as noted above, does, in paragraph 13, make a clear
distinction between quantitatively and qualitatively material items, a distinction
that is very important in terms of the auditor's responsibilities.
In conclusion, the end result at the authoritative level in the United States
seems to be on the one hand that everything is quantifiable, and on the other,
that qualitative considerations are important. Perhaps it is not necessary to
make the distinction in these terms for a satisfactory resolution to be achieved.
As long as materiality decisions are related ultimately to future cash flows, they
are ultimately quantifiable. Nevertheless, for the auditor in a particular
circumstance, something that is quantitatively small may have characteristics
that lead him to be concerned because such characteristics may be material to
the user. That is the important point, rather than a question of semantics.
5. Practical Considerations When Unrealistic Materiality Levels Are
Demanded
"It has been long an axiom of mine that the little things are infinitely the
most important.'' (Sherlock Holmes in A Case of Identity, Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle.)
One of the problems that has bedevilled auditors throughout the entire
discussion of materiality is that those with great concern for users of financial
statements have from time to time suggested certain criteria that would set a
very precise level of materiality because of specific situations. For example,
under the heading "investors' view of materiality'' at the top of page 126 in the
FASB DM we find:
. . . some have stated that any item, transaction, or situation which has
or could have an effect on the year-to-year increase or decrease in an
enterprise's earnings of 5% or more should be disclosed on the basis
that it is material, even though it might affect total income by 1% or
less.
Statement V-10, under the heading "Disproportionate Significance"
states:
An item of small amount may nevertheless be of material significance in
the context of a company's particular circumstances . . .
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The recently issued (December 30, 1983) exposure draft of the FASB,
"Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts: Recognition and
Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises" states, in
paragraph 20, that
The individual items, sub-totals, or other parts of a financial statement
may be more useful than the aggregate to those who make investment,
credit and similar decisions.
An auditor cannot always live up to such expectations, particularly at the
planning stage of an audit because it may not be possible to devise procedures
at reasonable cost to detect such errors. Even if such considerations were to
fall under SAS 47's definition of qualitative characteristics, an auditor may be
unable to deal with such tiny items at the evaluation stage because it may be
impossible to prepare financial statements to that degree of precision. Such
rules, particularly when they relate to special situations and changes in trends,
would require materiality levels to jump around from year to year, a situation
that would be highly unproductive from the point of view of users as well as
preparers and auditors. Examples of unrealistic criteria that pervade the
literature include:
• criteria relating to swings or changes in trends of earnings; and
• small amounts which would push a working capital or similar ratio into
a "breach" situation with respect to trustee or regulatory require
ments.
While advance knowledge of such considerations can indeed affect the
scope of the auditor's work and necessitate more alertness for certain matters
or a concentration of audit effort differently than otherwise would be the case,
nevertheless it will still be unrealistic for an auditor to devise procedures and,
in some instances, evaluate the results, in terms of such precise materiality.
How, for example, can a company and its auditor cope with the situation where
users are worried about a 0.5% net income decrease because it would change a
trend when, for example, the maximum precision that could be attained in
computing the warranty provision is 1% to 2% of net income?
Auditors and preparers of financial statements should take some comfort
from SFAC No. 2 which (paragraphs 81 to 89) establishes "verifiability"* as a
qualitative characteristic, that is a sub-category of "reliability." The degree of
comfort will depend on the way that characteristic is applied in practice.
Verifiability should at least rule out the most unrealistic of user expecta
tions. In the same vein, in paragraph 130, SFAC No. 2 states that the degree of
precision that is attainable in estimating a judgment item is a factor in
materiality judgment.
My conclusion is, therefore, that it is impossible to meet users' expecta
tions in all circumstances and, if it is impossible, presumably someone should
be informing the user of that fact. User issues are discussed in issues 7 and 8
below.
* Previous studies, papers and texts had also identified verifiability as an important concept.
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6. Professional Judgment versus Rules of Thumb
Of all the issues that have been discussed with respect to materiality, in
both an accounting and an auditing context, by far the most visible is the
question of whether professional bodies should, or should not, provide detailed
guidance in quantitative terms concerning materiality decisions. Such guidance
is sometimes referred to as a "rule of thumb," which I will refer to in this
section as " R O T " (some would say a highly appropriate acronym!). Such
guidance is frequently regarded by commentators as a restriction on profes
sional judgment and therefore, by some, a bad thing automatically. Of the three
basic and six implementation issues identified in the FASB DM, one (and part
of another) basic issue and at least four implementation issues relate to this
question.
First of all, it should be noted that no professional body, practicing firm or
commentator on this issue has suggested that a ROT can do the whole job;
merely that it could be used as a point of departure. All state that there will be
circumstances in which the ROT will need to be overriden and many provide
examples:
• the CICA Technique Study, after setting up a table of quantitative
guidelines (these are illustrated on page 34 of the FASB DM) lists
seven conditions under the heading "Circumstances Causing Devia
tion from the Normal Guidelines."
• The AISG Study states (paragraph 30) "The quantitative guidelines
set forth in the preceding paragraph, combined with a further
provision for much lower quantitative limits in respect of certain
transactions such as those with directors and officers would . . .
represent a reasonable (approach)..." Paragraph 30 also notes that
"An amount is not material solely by its size" and sets out nine
conditions to be considered in addition to size.
Accordingly, the fact that ROTs cannot do the whole job is not in
contention. There is an argument as to whether they represent an adequate
starting point and, in the words of Australian statement DS7, will "help to
reduce the possibility of widely divergent judgments when decisions on
materiality are made" (pagagraph 2).
There is no room in this paper to repeat the arguments pro and con ROTs.
All have been made many times by different people and bodies and in varying
degrees.
The Berliner 1983 Article captures the arguments in explaining the views of
the author's Task Force:
Citing research studies that show the application by practitioners of a
wide variety of views in making materiality judgments, they (some
members) agreed that rule-of-thumb guidelines were needed. Other
members believed that a decision whether a certain item is material is a
matter of judgment for which rule-of-thumb should not be substituted.
They argued that materiality judgments are necessarily complex and
involve too many subjective factors to be reduced to simplistic guide
lines that are not likely to be appropriate in all situations" (pp. 11 & 12).
The question of restriction in professional judgment has brought strong
reaction from commentators as, for example, an early comment of Bernstein in
"The Concept of Materiality," The Accounting Review (1967) page 90: "An
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undefined and all-embracing process described as 'judgment' does not inspire
the confidence of thinking men." An even stronger criticism of delays in
adopting "decision aids" in the auditing process to reduce professional
judgment comes from Robert K. Elliott of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., New
York, and this view is, in my opinion, so important and so rarely expressed that
it is reproduced below at some length:
. . . the inevitable presence of judgment in the audit process does not in
any way indicate that it is to be celebrated or to be defended as the most
valuable element in the audit. That position is inconsistent with the
recent history of the profession.
Consider the following passage from IFAC's International Auditing
Guideline 1.
"Judgment permeates the auditor's work; for example, in deciding the
extent of audit procedures and in assessing the reasonableness of the
judgments and estimates made by management in preparing the
financial statements. Furthermore, much of the evidence available to
auditors is persuasive rather than conclusive in nature. Because of the
above factors, absolute certainty in auditing is rarely obtainable." (par.
09)
I believe this is an accurate passage. It cites the pervasiveness of
judgment, but it does not celebrate its use. It suggests that the
pervasiveness of judgment is a source of uncertainty in auditing. Yet the
value of the audit is, and has been, the credibility it lends to financial
statements. We do not add credibility by adding uncertainty to our
opinions. The credibility derives from the fact that users of auditors'
opinions believe there is a common body of procedures, based on
professional knowledge, that leads different auditors to similar decisions
when presented with the same audit problem. An audit opinion can
never provide absolute certainty about the fairness of the financial
statements, but it is designed to reduce that uncertainty. It seems
reasonable to conclude that if decision aids and models can reduce
uncertainty in the audit process, it is sensible to develop them even if they
reduce auditor judgment." (Robert K. Elliott, "The Research Path to
Audit Efficiency," Technical Papers, World Accounting Congress,
Mexico City (October 1982) (emphasis added).)
The opposite view, reflecting the advantages of unfettered professional
judgment is strongly expressed by Carman Blough in a response to an enquiry
addressed to the AICPA's Technical Service Department in 1950. It reflects
and elaborates upon the views of the AICPA's Committee on Accounting
Procedure, stating that materiality is "an elusive matter" and that general
criteria are "not feasible." He goes on to elaborate on several specific
instances where "judgment" would have to be used.*
This is still the view of the profession. SFAC No. 2, in paragraph 131
states:
Some hold the view that the Board should promulgate a set of
quantitative materiality guides or criteria covering a wide variety of
situations that preparers could look to for authoritative support. That
appears to be a minority view, however, on the basis of representations
* Blough's comments are quoted in part in prevously mentioned articles by Hicks and Bernstein.
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made to the Board in response to the discussion memorandum . . . .
The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be
made only by those who have all the facts.
Nevertheless, this paragraph goes on to say that the Board might in the
future review its conclusion not to provide quantitative guidance if circum
stances require it.
In terms of uniformity of practice, a recent comparison of auditing
methodologies of large U.S. accounting firms in reviewing compliance with
AICPA Au. Section 311.03 ("Planning and Supervision—preliminary determi
nation of materiality") concludes,
5

Of all the steps in the GAAS model, there is the greatest degree of non
conformity with this requirement.
Nevertheless, the FASB DM, on page 68, had concluded:
. . . some preparers and auditors believe that, absent unusual circum
stances, an item generally should be considered material if it affects net
income by 10 percent or more and not material if it affects net income
by 5 percent or less. They believe that the materiality of matters whose
effect on net income falls between 5 and 10 percent should be
determined through a careful analysis of the nature of the matter and
the surrounding circumstances.
A study by Woolsey, reported in the September 1973 Journal of Accountancy, surveyed CPA's (national, local and regional), controllers, financial
analysts and academics. As a result he concluded that a range of 4.5% to 5.5%
of normal pre-tax income was appropriate (subject to amendment in particular
cases). This study is interesting because it is one of the few that deal with a
typical auditing situation (the auditor had uncovered an error which the client
did not wish to adjust).
My own, limited, research bears this out from the point of view of auditors.
For the purposes of this paper, I conducted a telephone survey of 16 large
public accounting firms in Canada (including all the "big nine"). My survey
revealed that 11 of the 16 provide quantitative guidelines to their auditing
professional staff for determining what is material and that all 11 of them use as
the primary or as one among several presumptive guidelines 5% to 10% of
normal pre-tax net income for most profit-oriented clients. Two more firms
have guidance material in process.
What, then, can we conclude from all that has happened to date with
respect to ROT's or detailed guidelines? I think at least the following:
• Many (perhaps most) accounting firms and practitioners use ROTs
and find them helpful.
• Common sense would suggest that in the absence of ROTs mate
riality decisions will vary in like circumstances much more than if
there are such guidelines.
• Professional judgment, even with ROTs, still has a major role to play
(everybody agrees on that, although one or two regret it).
• With the exception of the US profession (FASB and AICPA), study
groups and standard-setting bodies in several important AngloSaxon-dominated professions have recommended and/or adopted
ROTs in some form.
• In spite of strong arguments from some practitioners and academics,
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the FASB and AICPA have resisted ROTs but have provided
guidance at a more conceptual or general level. The results of a
survey conducted during the preparation of SAS 47, including
material on ROTs, are expected to be published as a Research
Monograph.
• When ROTs have been developed, they have generally tended to
coalesce around 5% to 10% of normal pre-tax income (The 5-10%
Rule)* as a starting point, with a suggestion, in some cases, for
alternatives. Two Canadian studies (the 1965 Audit Technique Study
which used varying percentages of gross profit as a base and the 1980
non-profit Research Study which recommended a ROT of 1/2% of
normal revenue) were, in fact, quite consistent with the above even
though not expressed in terms of normal net income.
• Specific guidelines set in specific cases for specific legal or regulatory
purpose, or by the AICPA are, with a few exceptions, not greatly
inconsistent with a 5%-10% Rule.
• Researchers and article writers, with a few exceptions** (e.g.,
Hicks goes up to 20% ), based on this author's reading, would not
strongly disagree with the 5-10% Rule as a starting point, unless, of
course, they are opposed to any ROT at all.
With all this, then, one has to wonder why at least the "5-10% Rule"
guideline has not been authoritatively adopted with all its warts and recognizing
that it only does part (a quarter? a half? most?) of the job of improving
consistency among auditors. It may also present some potentially useful
opportunity for better user understanding. In my view, unless persuasive
evidence can be presented that serious harm would result to preparers,
auditors and users, this should be done. Finally, to assist the process, we
ought to decide that ROT is rot and replace the term "rules of thumb'' or even
"quantitative guidelines" with "decision aids" (Elliott's term) which has the
sound of assisting the professional judgment process rather than being
antithetical to it or "substituted" for it, as some members of Berliner's Task
Force would say.
6

7. The User Problem
As noted previously, all definitions of materiality are importantly related to
user requirements, usually the requirements of a reasonable investor, prudent
investor or intelligent reader. Just who this reasonable investor is may not be
entirely clear. It is important that we know this because, as the FASB DM says
in its Foreword (page 3),
There is a general belief that preparers, auditors, and users of financial
statements have dissimilar views of materiality.
Dissimilar views are an aspect of the conclusions of the Cohen Commission
Report in the United States issued in 1978 and a report issued in Canada (also
* A frequently used, more precise, guideline would suggest that matters affecting (in aggregate)
normal pre-tax income by less than 5% are presumed immaterial and, by more than 10%,
material. Between 5% and 10%, judgment is used. Frequently, the size of the entity is an
important factor within this range.
** Leslie, for example, in his forthcoming CICA Research Study, devotes some space to the
hypothesis "Net Income is Not a Problem-Free base."
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in 1978) with approximately the same objectives, The Adams Report. Both
reports identified as a major concern what "seems to be a gap between what
the public expects and what auditors are doing" (Adams Committee Report, B3)
and "evidence abounds that communication between the auditor and users of
his work—especially through the auditor's standard report—is unsatisfac
tory." (Cohen Commission Report, p. xxiv). A number of solutions are
suggested in both reports, being a mixture of steps that the profession should
take in the technical area and, most importantly, making efforts to explain to
users what assurance an audit can, and cannot, provide. Presumably, an
explanation concerning unrealistic materiality considerations, explained above,
would be one part of this education process.
Before educating, we have to know who to educate. In his 1964 article on
materiality, Hicks (p. 159) attempts to identify the average prudent investor
or reasonable person that the auditor should be concerned about. It is
interesting to note that he classifies users into three broad types; those who
are truly ignorant and uncaring at one end, and sophisticated securities
analysts, bank trust officers and managers of investment portfolios at the
other. He, however, excludes both these groups, the former for obvious
reasons and the latter because it has additional information at its disposal and
uses highly specialized "professional analytical techniques" for its purposes.
Hicks plumps for a middle group consisting of "knowledgeable individuals with
(at least) a rudimentary understanding offinancialstatements; they are willing
to and able to weigh financial information carefully." He equates this group
with the average prudent investor.
This is interesting because some of the literature, including material in
Chapter 5 of FASB DM (starting on page 89) clearly includes financial analysts
and advisors, stock exchanges, etc. within the concept of users that the auditor
worries about, and perhaps it is unrealistic to exclude them. Nevertheless,
Hicks' view received some support from the Trueblood Study Group in its
report "Objectives of Financial Statements."
Page 62 of this report is quoted in the FASB DM:
"An objective offinancialstatements is to serve primarily those users
who have limited authority, ability, or resources to obtain information and
who rely onfinancialstatements as their principal source of information
about an enterprise's economic activities." (emphasis added)
The report goes on to say that "the user envisioned by this objective has
been called a 'user without clout'."
Some commentators have expressed skepticism about the whole concept
of aiming guidelines at users. For example, O'Connor and Collins in a
December 1974 Journal of Accountancy article included as Appendix D to the
FASB DM say on page 178:
In theory, most agree that materiality guidelines ought to be aimed at
providing the "average prudent investor" with information necessary
to make an informed investment decision. The question remains,
however, whether that objective is attainable without knowledge of the
characteristics of the average investor or the decision model that he
uses.
I might add that the objective may not be attainable even with such
knowledge!
6
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Finally, the Financial Executives Institutes in both Canada and the United
States have cooperated with their respective accounting professions to try to
solve the communication problem through the inclusion in the annual report of a
"management report" to explain the relative roles of the auditor and client,
and a number of examples of such reports are quoted in those studies. In 1979
the AICPA published a report entitled Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Special Advisory Committee on Reports by Management.
While these various studies do suggest that management explain the role of
judgments and estimates, and the consequent lack of precision in financial
statements, they do not specifically raise the question of materiality and the
examples presented do not include specific mention of materiality.
Another reaction to the Cohen Commission and Adams Reports was an
increased emphasis on audit committees, and a CICA research study on audit
committees was published in 1981. This, too, did not suggest that auditors
discuss materiality levels with an audit committee, although I am aware that
this is sometimes done.
Those professions which have adopted specific quantitative guidelines have
made a decision on what they are going to do and have done it. The users can
read the standard and, presumably, if they do not like it, exert pressure and get
it changed. Leslie has previously expressed the view, repeated in the
forthcoming CICA study, that perhaps a better way of achieving this is to
disclose the materiality level right in each auditor's report. Either method is a
help. What is unsatisfactory, is evidence that users have expectations that
auditors, and in some cases preparers of financial statements, cannot meet.
In conclusion then, despite all the research done and despite a general
acknowledgement that the user is a vital element—perhaps the most vital
element—in the materiality discussion, there does not appear to be much
meeting of the minds between the two groups.* Perhaps this is impossible.
The user may be king, but that does not mean that he is God.
8. Informing the User
Much of the commentary on the question of whether or not accounting and
auditing standards should contain a quantification of materiality has centered on
the need for users to know the materiality levels used. Of course, to the extent
that any standard guidelines are deviated from in a particular case (which is
likely to happen frequently because of the still broad scope for the exercise of
professional judgment), users would still not know what materiality level had
actually been used. Nevertheless, they would at least know the starting point
for materiality decisions by preparers and by auditors. If they were aware of
the professional pronouncement, they would know that, if their expectation for
precision was in a range significantly less than 5% of net income, such
expectation would likely be unrealistic.
The Trueblood Report, starting on page 39, suggests that users might be
better informed if preparers communicated in ranges.
* The draft Leslie Study recommends that auditors and a representative group of users get
together to thrash out the question of materiality so that a solution that can be effectively audited
can be arrived at.
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Many economic decision makers would prefer simple, not complex,
answers, but simple answers may not serve them as well as complex
ones. Single numbers supplemented by ranges and investments
grouped by relative risk may be more complex, but they may also
communicate more accurately the imprecision involved in making
judgments.
This is one way of providing (indirectly) some disclosure to the user of the
materiality levels used in the preparation of the financial statements.
A similar view was expressed by Edward Stamp in an endowed lecture in
1979 to The Australian Society of Accountants (the University of Sydney,
Accounting Research Centre) entitled "Accounting and Auditing Standards; an
International Point of View." Stamp had proposed that margins of error should
be disclosed in financial statements and observed that this proposal was
unpopular in professional circles and had always been rewarded with peals of
incredulous laughter.
Nevertheless I am quite serious in my suggestion, and one has only to
look at practices in an associated profession (engineering), or indeed
throughout the whole realm of experimental science, to realize that
intelligent people are not deceived by uncertainty masquerading as
precision, and are only prepared to regard measurements useful if the
measurement error is disclosed.
Perhaps then, the Trueblood Committee and Edward Stamp would agree
with the proposals of Don Leslie that consideration be given to disclosing in an
auditor's report the materiality level used. Leslie made such proposals in 1977
at a symposium on auditing research at the University of Illinois at Urbana
Champaign in a paper entitled "Materiality in Auditing (Some of the Issues)"
and referred to it again in 1979 in Dollar-Unit Sampling, A Practical Guide for
Auditors, co-authored with Teitlebaum and Anderson (Toronto: Copp, Clark,
Pittman, 1979), page 6 and finally in the draft CICA research study. In this
draft study Leslie presents detailed arguments and examples of the manner in
which materiality could be disclosed in the auditor's report, in notes to the
financial statements or, possibly, in a "management report." In my experi
ence, the only instances of reporting specific materiality levels by auditors have
been, in rare cases, in the audit engagement letter for a normal audit and,
somewhat more frequently, in engagement letters and reports in special
purpose engagements (the only examples of reporting to third party users)
such as "purchase investigations." In oral and written presentations to audit
committees, materiality levels are sometimes noted and discussed.
Certainly some form of communication to users is necessary, especially if
we decide that many of their expectations are unrealistic. Other forms of
communication include education and some efforts have been made in this
regard (e.g. both the AICPA and CICA have published laypersons' guides as to
what an auditor's report means) . All these suggestions and proposals will have
to be considered in reaching the final solution, if there is one. It is, in my view,
far from resolution at this point and is a very important issue.*
7

* What is not needed, though, at this time, is more studies of what users say they need.
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9. Aggregation of Individual Materiality Judgments
Through the 1960s and 1970s, another issue that surfaced from time to
time was the question of whether materiality decisions could be made on an
individual item-by-item basis, or whether such decisions should be aggregated
into one overall decision. Professional pronouncements appear to have re
solved this question in favour of aggregation:
• In the United Kingdom (1968) in Statement V-10, paragraph 9(e).
• In Canada (CICA Handbook, Section 5400.13), which covers it more
obliquely by saying "the auditor must exercise his professional
judgment as to the appropriateness of the selection and application of
(accounting) principles to the particular circumstances of an enter
prise and as to the overall effect on the financial statements of
separate decisions made in their preparation."
• In the USA, the AICPA, in SAS 47, makes it abundantly clear
throughout the document, but particuarly in paragraph 18, when it
states that the auditor should design procedures to detect errors that
" . . . could be material, when aggregated with errors in other balances
or classes, to the financial statements taken as a whole." (emphasis
added)
In fact, one has to wonder why this was ever an issue. AICPA Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 43 stated, as far back as 1953:
. . . freedom to deal expediently with immaterial items should not
extend to a group of items whose cumulative effect in any one financial
statement may be material and significant (quoted in Hicks, "Mate
riality: A Useful Audit Tool," Journal of Accountancy(July1962), p.
63).
Other issues concerning aggregation have been raised from time to time (e.g.
the extent to which offsetting errors may be offset). However, in recent years,
at the authoritative level, no one has suggested that errors should not be
aggregated and their combined effect taken account of. Other issues related to
aggregation (particularly techniques as to how it is accomplished) may remain
to be resolved.

Concluding Comments
My remarks have to this point provided a very brief historical overview and
identification and discussion of nine important issues that have been raised in
selected authoritative and non-authoritative material, primarily in the 1960s
through to the early 1980s. The following points stand out:
• The FASB D M presented a comprehensive and well-thought-out
explanation of the issues from the point of view of preparers of
financial statements and their users, and the responses to the
discussion memorandum added further to the knowledge base.
• No material of comprehensive scope, authority, and thoroughness
has yet been published with respect to materiality viewed from the
auditor's point of view. However, I believe that the forthcoming
CICA research study will fill that gap.*
* I should declare at this point that I am not entirely free from the appearance of bias in
this judgment because Leslie, the author of the study, has been my partner in Clarkson
Gordon for approximately 10 years and my present position with the CICA associates
me with the Study itself.
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• The American profession, at the authoritative level, has been more
reluctant than other professions to "go public" with detailed quan
titative materiality guidelines. On the other hand, important guidance
in the form of more general criteria is set out on the accounting side
in SFAC No. 2, "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Informa
tion" and, on the auditing side, in SAS 47. The auditing pronounce
ment is an exceptionally thorough conceptual statement which is
unparalleled in the world, at least to this writer's knowledge.
• Of the nine auditing issues highlighted in this paper, the ones that I
believe to be farthest from acceptable solution in the United States
and Canada are:
1. Expectations of users: how to meet the ones that can be met,
identify those that can't, and discuss the latter in public so that
users know they are not met.
2. The need for practical quantitative "decision aids" at an au
thoritative level to reduce variations in practice and thereby
lessen uncertainty and increase utility for users, whether they
are aware of it or not. Attention should be paid to experience
gained with authoritative prounouncements in those countries
which have published decision aids.
3. How, in the light of SAS 47, to preserve the link between
materiality levels used in planning audit procedures and those
used at the reporting stage (A solution to item 1 above should be
of considerable help in this regard).
4. Communication with, and education of, users generally on
materiality issues as part of a program to close the expectation
gap identified by the Cohen Commission and in the Adams
Report.
In Canada, issues 1, 2 and 4 are important and 3 has not yet been
specifically identified as an issue. In addition, Canada (in my own
personal view—I cannot speak for the CICA) needs an equivalent
(not necessarily identical) pronouncement to SAS 47.
In the world as a whole, perhaps the IAPC will be able to take a lead in their
"Materiality and Audit Risk" project, presently in the early stages. We have
come a long way; we have enough information, let's keep on moving.*
* One last note: many research papers I have read conclude that further research is needed in "x''
areas. In this case, at least for the purposes of standard-setting and guidance at the professional
practice level, my own feeling is that little more will be required, especially after the publication
of the Leslie Study. However, research should continue, in my view, in the area of trying to
quantify materiality and risk criteria in a usable way. Also, more descriptive research is needed
on what auditors actually do and how long they spend doing it. For example, a study which would
review audits after they are completed in order to assess the impact of materiality decisions on
audit effort would be very useful.
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Discussant's Response to
The Origins and Development of Materiality
as an Auditing Concept
Lauren Kelly
University of Washington
David Selley does an excellent job tracing the institutional history and
setting of materiality. Particularly useful are his appendices where he contrasts
the development of materiality in different countries, compares the status of
materiality in both the accounting and auditing contexts, and examines the
elements of materiality definitions found in professional pronouncements.
Discussing such an extensive and complete review is a difficult task. Thus I
would like to elaborate on two aspects of the materiality topic that Selley
addresses but does not extensively discuss.
First, I would like to consider what research has told us about the various
observations Mr. Selley makes. (For a complete review of empirical research
on materiality see Holstrum and Messier, 1982.) In this connection, I will
remain cognizant of Selley's opinion as stated in footnote 20 which says,
"many research papers I have read conclude that further research is needed in
'X' areas. In this case, at least for the purposes of standard setting and
guidance at the professional practice level, my own feeling is that little more
will be required. . . . " Being an academician, I do not necessarily agree, and
thus would also like to consider where future research might be helpful.
Second, I would like to elaborate on the integration of accounting and auditing
materiality. In my opinion, this is a more difficult and perhaps more important
topic.

The Materiality Concept
Most authors, researchers, and authoritative bodies agree that the mate
riality of the accounting treatment or disclosure of an item depends upon its
importance to thefinancialstatement user. In this regard, the user is assumed
to be sophisticated (intelligent and knowledgeable), and significance occurs
when the accounting treatment or disclosure would affect the user's decision.
Most would also agree that materiality is an accounting concept with important
implications to the audit process.
Initial research focused on determining the factors or characteristics of an
information item that make it significant to the user. Attributes commonly cited
include the item's impact on net income, absolute size, cumulative amount,
impact on trends, the nature of the item, uncertainty regarding the issue, firmspecific characteristics, and environmental condition.
Early studies were ex-post descriptive, attempting to infer from financial
statements the quantitative thresholds used by preparers and auditors in
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resolving disclosure issues (Bernstein, 1967; Copeland and Fredericks, 1968;
Neumann, 1970; Frishkoff, 1970). In general these studies were unable to
consistently identify a quantitative measure of materiality. Other researchers
have suggested materiality issues can be assessed by reference to the
aggregate stock market (O'Connor and Collins, 1974; Abdel-Khalik, 1977;
Burgstahler and Kinney, 1984). Changes in stock market prices are observed
to infer investors' assessments of the materiality of specific disclosures.
Researchers have also inquired whether the same factors are considered
by financial statement users and preparers in resolving materiality issues.
Questionnaire case studies applied to both groups have largely found differ
ences in the factors, their relative importance, and the ultimate materiality
decision (Woolsey, 1954a, 1954b, 1973; Dyer, 1975; Pattillo, 1976). Subse
quently the focus turned to modeling the decision process apparently followed
by users and preparers in materiality situations. Focusing solely on users,
Rose, Beaver, Becker, and Sorter (1970) used the concept of significant
differences in stimuli to identify materiality thresholds. Two of the studies
compared the decision approach used by users and preparers. Using a policycapturing model, Boatsman and Robertson (1974) found the two groups had
consistent judgment processes and materiality criteria. However, Firth (1979)
found significant differences in materiality judgments made in thirty hypotheti
cal cases by users, management and auditors.
What does all this research tell us about Mr. Selley's observations entitled
"The User Problem"? One can only conclude that (1) materiality decisions are
multi-factor, situation-specific decisions, and (2) users and preparers may
consider different factors in assessing the significance of information. In
Selley's words, "despite all the research done and despite a general acknowl
edgement that the user is a vital element . . . in the materiality discussion,
there does not appear to be much meeting of the minds between the two
groups." However, I am not sure I agree with his conclusion: "The user may
be king, but that does not mean that he is God." This follows his suggestion
that to close the gap between preparers, auditors, and users, the former
should disclose the materiality guidelines used (preferably as sanctioned by
authoritative bodies), and the users should be allowed to reject them. That
approach renders the preparer God. We then have compromised on the
original intent of materiality.
Instead, I am more inclined to agree with the observation made by
Holstrum and Messier (1982, p. 48): "With limited knowledge of how financial
statements are integrated into users' decision models, and with limited
knowledge of the extent of consensus among these groups because of their
different perspectives on materiality, we have little information on how
materiality judgments made by preparers and auditors will affect the users'
decision making." Mr. Selley questions whether we could attain the objective
of materiality guidelines even with knowledge about the characteristics of users
and their decision models. I tend to disagree. Instead, I think additional
research regarding the user would be helpful.

Implications of Materiality in Accounting to the Auditor
To the auditor, the important question is how the audit is affected by
materiality. This issue necessitates integrating materiality in accounting with
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materiality in auditing, and in my opinion this issue must be addressed before
rules of thumb can be developed. As stated earlier, most people agree that
materiality is first an accounting concept, but with implications for auditing in
terms of the scope of the audit and the auditor's opinion. Berliner (1983, p. 10)
identifies this problem in tracing the background to SAS No. 47: "It was
concern about how the concept of materiality, given its elusiveness in
accounting, might affect the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures that
prompted the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to appoint a special task force in
1979."
Selley gives a very thorough treatment of the history of the materiality
concept in both the accounting and auditing contexts. I especially found
Appendix 3 useful, where he compared the elements of the various definitions
as they are found in the authoritative literature in several countries. I would
have liked some discussion of these comparisons, with perhaps some specula
tion as to why they differ. For example, what characterizes the accounting and
auditing environments in Canada, England, and the U.S. such that we find rules
of thumb for accounting materiality at least suggested by 1965 in Canada, 1968
in England, but not at all in the U.S.? Yet why has the U.S. been the only
country in which we find the authoritative pronouncements issuing guidelines
and guidance for auditing materiality? Additionally, a more direct comparison of
the pronouncements we do have on audit materiality would have been helpful;
for example, AICPA SAS No 39 "Audit Sampling" and Canada's research
study Extent of Audit Testing.
Returning to the problem as stated by Causey (and cited in Selley's paper):
"Materiality in the context of applying audit procedures is quite different from
materiality in the context offinancialreporting.'' To further explore materiality
in auditing, most observers distinguish between the planning and evaluation
phases of an audit. Planning the audit involves setting the scope and extent of
audit procedures. SAS 47 gives only conceptual guidance to this process,
stating that the auditor should use " . . . his preliminary judgment about
materiality levels in a manner that can be expected to provide him, within the
inherent limitations of the auditing process, with sufficient evidential matter to
make a reasonable evaluation whether the financial statements are materially
misstated" (paragraph 12). This is the very heart of materiality in auditing, yet
it seems to have been ignored by both researchers and standard setters.
In the evaluation stage, the auditor considers whether the errors dis
covered are material. This is materiality in accounting and, as Mr. Selley points
out, this is where the authoritative guidance has focused. In fact, SAS 47
recognizes that qualitative aspects of materiality may be present in the
evaluation stage that were not considered in the planning stage of the audit.
This problem further exasperates the necessary link between materiality in
auditing and accounting. In the section "Materiality and the Audit Model,"
Selley states: "There is assumed to be a direct link between material errors in
the financial statements (if they exist) and the auditor's procedures." I would
have liked to have seen him discuss this link more fully. Perhaps the reason we
find SAS 47 explicitly allowing only for quantitative materiality factors in
planning the audit is because auditors do not know how to explicitly allow
qualitative considerations to affect the audit scope.
The effect of materiality on audit planning was first addressed analytically in
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designing sampling plans (Elliott and Rogers, 1972; Kinney, 1975; Teitlebaum
and Robinson, 1975; Heimann and Chesley, 1977). More recently, Zuber,
Elliott, Kinney, and Leisenring (1983) present an example of a practical
approach that could be used to allocate the preliminary estimate of materiality
to components of the financial statements, and thus design appropriate audit
procedures.
Unfortunately, empirical research on the auditor's decision process has
largely focused on the evaluation stage of the audit. Several researchers have
proposed various decision models and structural forms to study the relative
importance of decision-related factors in materiality judgments (Boatsman and
Robertson, 1974; Ward, 1976; Moriarity and Barron, 1976; Hofstedt and
Hughes, 1977; Newton, 1977; Schultz and Reckers, 1981). Only two studies
have considered the relationship between auditing and materiality. Moriarity
and Barron (1979) used conjoint analysis to study the relative importance of
five factors in setting pre-audit materiality levels for planning audit tests. Their
research was unable to identify a consensus regarding the materiality judg
ments or factors. Cushing, Searfoss and Randall (1979) applied the Elliott and
Rogers (1972) approach for allocating overall materiality to the separate
accounts to be audited. Field tests of the model on four audits indicated it was
feasible to incorporate the materiality allocation concept into audit planning and
evidence evaluation.
In my opinion, joining materiality in accounting and auditing represents one
of the most challenging and fruitful areas for future research. Holstrum and
Messier (1983, p. 60) mention three aspects: (1) the impact of materiality on
audit planning and evaluation throughout all phases of the audit, (2) the
relationship between materiality and audit risk in determining the scope of the
engagement, and (3) the magnitude and/or importance of errors on audit
planning and evaluation.
Auditors are currently making these kinds of decisions and may very well
have in-house guidelines for setting materiality in planning the audit. Descrip
tive research would help in understanding the nature of such decisions or
guidelines, and how they relate to disclosure considerations. Judgmental
research could also be used to study how different disclosure situations (i.e.,
accounting materiality problems) affect the way the auditor plans the audit. The
previous two research studies have looked at the effect on audit sample sizes.
Nonquantitative factors need to be taken into account, and audit decisions in
addition to sample size need to be considered.

Rules of Thumb
Mr. Selley views the most visible issue in auditing as the discussion of
whether professional bodies should provide detailed guidelines in quantitative
terms for making materiality decisions. In his opinion, such a "decision aid"
should be authoritatively adopted. I have severe reservations as to whether
the auditing profession would benefit from such a standard.
First, I agree with Selley's observation that all materiality considerations
are ultimately quantitative, since to be material the issue must eventually affect
the future cash flows of the firm. This necessitates a long-run view of the item.
More realistically, most materiality decisions are made with more focus on the
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immediate aspects of the item. This renders qualitative considerations more
important. Indeed, SAS 47 makes this point in paragraph 7: "As a result of the
interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in materiality judg
ments, errors of relatively small amounts detected could have a material effect
on the financial statements. For example, an illegal payment of an otherwise
immaterial amount could be material if there is a reasonable possibility that it
could lead to a material contingent liability or a material loss of revenue."
Quantitative guidelines might work if the accountant's decision horizon is long
enough. Otherwise, potentially material items may be overlooked.
Second, Selley seems to view some users' expectations of materiality
levels as unrealistic. I agree that computation of net income can not be done as
precisely as some would like, and the user should be informed of the error that
potentially exists infinancialstatements. However, I am fearful that establish
ing quantitative criteria for materiality issues will just add to the delusion of
precision. This would lead precisely to the difficulties Mr. Selley discusses in
terms of planning the audit and devising procedures to ensure such precise
materiality standards are met. Yet these "unrealistic" expectations held by
users cannot be ignored in setting materiality guidelines, since in the final
analysis materiality is determined by the user. Instead, I think the accountant's
judgment remains predominant. Indeed, this was the conclusion of the FASB in
SFAC No. 2, where it was stated: "No general standards of materiality (can)
be formulated to take into account all the considerations that enter into an
experienced human judgment" (as quoted by Landsittel and Serlin, 1982, p.
293).
Admittedly, Selley states rules of thumb are merely a starting point, aimed
at reducing the possibility of "widely divergent judgments" and "improving
consistency among auditors." One might question whether we really want to
reduce the auditor's judgment. But more importantly, I am not convinced rules
of thumb will improve consistency. I am afraid there would be so many
exceptional circumstances that judgment would still predominate.
Selley's suggestion does lead to some interesting research questions. His
survey reveals only the U.S. does not have materiality guidelines. One might
inquire into why this is true. A cross-cultural study might be done (using one
international auditing firm in two or more countries) to study the effect of the
existence or nonexistence of materiality guidelines on (1) auditing—scope,
procedures, planning, evidence; (2) evaluation—disclosure decisions, opinion
formulation; and, perhaps (3) court cases—the ultimate determinant of mate
riality. The effect of rules of thumb could also be studied by using field
experiments and judgment models to study how audit planning and evaluation
are affected by guidelines. Also, the user aspect might be studied by
researching the impact of stated materiality thresholds on decisions and
perceptions offinancialstatements.
Basically, though, I question whether we are ready for rules of thumb. I do
not think we know where to begin to establish materiality guidelines that will
help the auditing profession until we have a better understanding of the link
between materiality in auditing and accounting. What good are disclosure
criteria if this link does not exist?
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Conclusion
Finally, I would like to consider Mr. Selley's recommendations and
concluding comments in light of where I believe we should be focusing our
attention in materiality in auditing. Selley cites several auditing issues that are
"furthest from solution." First are the expectations of users about materiality
levels and decisions, and the need for communication and education to close
this expectations gap. Selley states that what we do not need are more studies
of what information users say they need. Instead, he recommends practical
quantitative rules of thumb (or decision aids) at the authoritative level. Again, I
wonder how these guidelines can appropriately be established without thor
ough knowledge of what is significant to the financial statement user. And I
question reliance on a quantitative standard when qualitative aspects of the
issue may be more germane. Selley views such a guideline as a starting point
for preparers and auditors, deviated from when judgment indicates. I am afraid
the deviations would be so frequent that, in fact, the existence of a materiality
criterion would be misleading. In any case, I think it would be enlightening to
research the impact on users of communicating materiality guidelines in several
forms: official pronouncements from the FASB or AICPA, a statement of the
auditing firm's policy, the materiality level used stated in the auditor's or
management's report, educational programs as through AICPA layperson
guides, and communicating income probabilistically or in ranges.
Second, Mr. Selley states that preserving the link between materiality
levels used in planning audit procedures and those used at the reporting stage
is a major issue. I seriously question whether at this stage there is a link which
can be preserved. And this is where I believe the bulk of our efforts should be
concentrated. Understanding or establishing this link is critical before mate
riality guidelines which really relate to reporting issues can be devised. Mr.
Selley himself acknowledges this in a footnote: "Also, more research is needed
on what auditors actually do and how long they spend doing it. For example, a
study which would review audits after they are completed in order to assess
the impact of materiality decisions on audit effort would be very useful." Selley
himself could have added evidence on this in his paper. In his introduction he
states that part of his career was spent in the auditing standards department of
a CPA firm where he " . . . was part of the process of developing the auditing
materiality guidelines that then were wrestled with by those unfortunates in
the field. . . . " I would like to have known more about how he developed the
guidelines, and in what sense were they wrestled with.
In any case, it is interesting to speculate as to why we have had so little
research, conceptual debate, or practical guidelines on materiality in auditing.
Either the topic is not a problem and thus a nonissue (which is doubtful), or it is
very difficult to understand and truly judgmental. In the latter case, I think
materiality in auditing represents a very challenging and fruitful area for the
future.

References
Abdel-Khalik, A.R., "Using Sensitivity Analysis to Evaluate Materiality," Decision Sciences
(July 1977), pp. 616-629.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting

36

an Audit," Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47 (December 1983).
Berliner, R.W., "Materiality and Audit Risk—Sharpening the Focus," The CPA Journal (June
1983), pp. 11-19.
Bernstein, L . A . , "The Concept of Materiality," Accounting Review (January 1967), pp. 86-95.
Boatsman, J.R. and J.C. Robertson, "Policy-Capturing on Selected Materiality Judgments,"
Accounting Review (April 1974), pp. 342-352.
Burgstahler, D. and W.R. Kinney, Jr., "Market Price-Based Measures of Financial Statement
Materiality," research proposal submitted to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 1984.
Copeland, R.M. and W. Fredericks, "Extent of Disclosure," Journal of Accounting Research
(Spring 1968), pp. 106-113.
Cushing, B . E . , D . G . Searfoss, and R.H. Randall, "Materiality Allocation in Audit Planning: A
Feasibility Study," Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 17 (Supplement 1979), pp. 172-216.
Dyer, J.L., "Toward the Development of Objective Materiality Norms,'' The Arthur Anderson
Chronicle (October 1975), pp. 38-49.
Elliott, R.K. and J.R. Roger, "Relating Statistical Sampling to Audit Objectives," Journal of
Accountancy(July1972), pp. 46-55.
Firth, M . , "Consensus Views and Judgment Models in Materiality Decisions," Accounting,
Organizations and Society Vol. 4 (1979), pp. 283-295.
Frishkoff, P., "An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Materiality in Auditing," Journal
of Accounting Research Vol. 8 (Supplement 1970), pp. 116-129.
Heimann, S.R. and G.R. Chesley, "Audit Sample Sizes for Aggregated Statement Accounts,"
Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1977), pp. 193-206.
Hofstedt, T.R. and G.D. Hughes, "An Experimental Study of the Judgment Element in
Disclosure Decision," Accounting Review (April 1977), pp. 379-395.
Holstrum, G.L. and W.F. Messier, Jr., "A Review and Integration of Empirical Research on
Materiality," Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (Fall 1982), pp. 45-63.
Kinney, Jr., W.R., " A Decision-Theory Approach to the Sampling Problem in Auditing,"
Journal of Accounting Research (Spring 1975), pp. 117-132.
Landsittel, D . L . and J.E. Serlin, "Evaluating the Materiality of Errors in Financial Statements," Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance (Winter 1982), pp. 291-300.
Moriarity, S. and F . H . Barron, "A Judgment-Based Definition of Materiality," Journal of
Accounting Research Vol. 17 (Supplement 1979), pp. 114-135.
Moriarity, S. and F . H . Barron, "Modeling the Materiality Judgments of Audit Partners,"
Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1976), pp. 320-341.
Neumann, F . , "The Auditing Standard of Consistency,'' Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 6
(Supplement 1968), pp. 1-17.
Newton, L . K . , "The Risk Factor in Materiality Decisions," Accounting Review (January
1977), pp. 97-108.
O'Connor, M . C . and D.W. Collins, "Toward Establishing User-Oriented Materiality Standards," Journal of Accountancy (December 1974), pp. 67-75.
Pattillo, J.W., The Concept of Materiality in Financial Reporting, New York: Financial
Executives Research Foundation, 1976.
Rose, J . , W. Beaver, S. Becker, and G. Sorter, "Toward an Empirical Measure of
Materiality," Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 8 (Supplement 1978), pp. 138-148.
Schultz, Jr., J.J. and P.M.J. Reckers, "The Impact of Group Processing on Selected Audit
Disclosure Decisions," Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1981), pp. 482-501.
Teitlebaum, A . D . and C . F . Robinson, "The Real Risks in Audit Sampling," Journal of
Accounting Research Vol. 13 (Supplement 1975), pp. 70-91.
Ward, B . H . , "An Investigation of the Materiality Construct in Auditing," Journal of
Accounting Research (Spring 1976), pp. 138-152.
Woolsey, S.W., "Materiality Survey," Journal of Accountancy (September 1973), pp. 91-92.
Woolsey, S.W., "Judging Materiality in Determining Requirements for Full Disclosure,"
Journal of Accountancy (December 1954a), pp. 145-150.
Woolsey, S.W., "Development of Criteria to Guide the Accountant in Judging Materiality,"
Journal of Accountancy (February 1954b), pp. 167-173.
Zuber, G.R., R.K. Elliott, W.R. Kinney, Jr., and J.J. Leisenring, "Using Materiality in Audit
Planning," Journal of Accountancy (March 1983), pp. 42-54.

37

2
Auditor Reviews of
Changing Prices Disclosures*
K. Fred Skousen
W. Steve Albrecht
Brigham Young University

Research Purpose and Methodology
This research project was sponsored jointly by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
The objectives of the research and the steps followed in conducting the project
are described in this introductory section of the report.

Background
In September 1979, the FASB issued Statement of Finanical Accounting
Standard No. 33, Financial Reporting and Changing Prices. This statement is
an experimental standard on accounting for the effects of changing prices. It
requires selected public companies to report changing prices disclosures as
supplemental information to their financial statements. Although this supple
mental information is unaudited, auditing standards require auditors to
consider this information and, in certain circumstances, to report on it.
Because of the experimental nature of SFAS 33, the FASB has encouraged
research to assess costs and benefits of changing prices disclosure require
ments. This project is one offifteenresearch studies being monitored by the
FASB in assessing the SFAS 33 experiment. It represents the only FASBsponsored project that is focused specifically at audit issues and that provides
for auditor input.
The American Institute of CPAs, through its Auditing Standards Division,
also has encouraged research directed toward improving standards and
procedures for auditors who must deal with changing prices disclosures.
In assessing the SFAS 33 experiment, it is important to recognize the
views of all interested groups: users, preparers, and auditors. The results of
this study—the data and insight from an auditor's perspective—should be
considered in light of other related research concerning the usefulness of
changing prices disclosures.
1

2

* This paper was prepared initially for the AICPA and the FASB. © American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1984, and reproduced herein by permission of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants.
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Objectives
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 27 and SAS 28 provide general
standards for auditors in meeting their responsibilities with respect to a client's
changing prices disclosures. However, these auditing standards do not specify
detailed procedures to be used in reviewing the disclosures, nor do they
address special problems that may arise during the review process. Because of
the experimental nature of SFAS 33 and the general nature of SAS 27 and SAS
28, little is known about the actual review techniques used by CPAs. The
overall objective of this research was to examine the actual experience of CPAs
in conducting such reviews.* Thus, this is a descriptive study dealing with
auditors' perceptions, responsibilities, and experience in reviewing SFAS 33
disclosures.
More specifically, this research was designed to accomplish five objectives.
1. Determine the extent and impact of SFAS 33 changing prices dis
closures.
2. Identify the costs involved in the review process.
3. Identify the techniques and procedures currently used by CPAs in
conducting reviews.
4. Analyze special problems encountered in conducting reviews.
5. Identify auditor perceptions concerning the usefulness and auditability of
SFAS 33 disclosures.
The results of this study may assist the FASB in developing reporting
requirements that will provide more useful information. Such reporting
requirements might help to simplify auditor reviews and, thereby, lower the
costs of disclosure. In addition, this research may provide useful data for the
Auditing Standards Board in considering amendments to, or interpretations of,
SAS 27 and SAS 28.

Methodology
The first step in conducting the research was to review guidance Materials
developed by CPA firms for SAS 27 and SAS 28 reviews. Materials from seven
accounting firms were examined. In addition, FASB statements, statements on
auditing standards, articles, position papers, company annual reports, and
other publications dealing with financial reporting and changing prices were
studied.
A second step was to conduct in-depth interviews with national office
partners and personnel of three major CPA firms. These interviews, held in
New York City, were with individuals who are heavily involved with the
research topic. Prior to conducting the in-depth interviews, the researchers
prepared a detailed checklist of questions based primarily on CPA firm
guidance materials. These interviews proved extremely useful in clarifying key
issues and in identifying additional questions, which were then used in the
development of a questionnaire.
* The term review is used in this report in the context of the normal English language and not in the
technical sense of, for example, "compilation and review" as defined in Statements On Standards
For Accounting and Review Services No. 1, "Compilation and Review of Financial Statements"
(Accounting and Review Services Committee, December 1978).
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The third step in the research process was to develop a comprehensive
questionnaire designed to elicit responses from a representative sample of
audit practitioners with clients that currently disclose SFAS 33 data. Once the
questionnaire was developed, it was sent to each of the partners interviewed,
to representatives of the FASB and AICPA, and to academic colleagues for
review.
The fourth step was to conduct a pilot test of the questionnaire. Again,
interviews were conducted with key personnel of two different CPA firms, this
time in Salt Lake City offices. Based on these pilot tests, additional minor
modifications were made to the questionnaire.
Questionnaires were distributed to 172 potential respondents.* Of these,
126 were returned, a 73 percent response rate. Because of missing pages,
seven questionnaires were not usable. The data and comments received, along
with information obtained during interviews, provide the basis for the conclu
sions of this report, which are described in the next section.

Results of Research
The results of the research are grouped into five categories: perceived
client interest and involvement with SFAS 33 disclosures; nature, extent, and
impact of CPA involvement with changing prices disclosures; specific tech
niques used by CPA firms in performing SAS 27 and SAS 28 reviews; special
problems encountered by auditors; and auditor perceptions concerning the
usefulness and auditability of changing prices data.

Perceived Client Interest and
Involvement with SFAS 33 Disclosures
Although 98 percent of the audit clients in the sample met the SFAS 33 size
criterion and disclosed changing prices data in all four years (1979-82) covered
by the study, auditors perceived that their clients have little interest in SFAS
33 disclosures. Specifically, only six clients reported changing prices data on a
comprehensive basis. Other clients essentially provided the minimum required
disclosures specified by Statement 33. Of the 118 auditors responding to the
question concerning client interest in the disclosures, 104 clients were
evaluated by their auditors as complying only because of the disclosure
requirement, 12 were evaluated as having moderate interest in the changing
prices disclosures, and only two were evaluated as having sufficient interest to
frequently base managerial decisions on inflation-adjusted data.
Given the low level of interest in SFAS 33 disclosures, it is not surprising
that most companies comply with the minimum disclosure requirements, using
easily applied measurement methods that have a low relative cost. For
example, indexing is the most common method used by companies to compute
the current cost of property, plant, and equipment (PPE). In computing the
current cost of PPE, 59 percent of the companies used specific price indices, 3
* A representative sample of companies reporting under SFAS 33 was drawn from the FASB data
base and the CPA firms that audit these companies were identified. Nine major CPA firms were
involved. A cover letter and several questionnaires were sent to a partner in the national office of
each of the nine firms who in turn forwarded the questionnaires to engagement partners or
managers directly involved with the particular client companies in the sample.
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percent used direct price quotes, 12 percent used general indices such as the
CPI, 11 percent used annual appraisals, 7 percent used appraisals in the first
year with indices in subsequent years, and 4 percent used internally-developed
indices. The principal types of specific price indices used were U.S. Producer
Price Index (38 percent), Handy-Whitman Index (17 percent), and the CPI-U
(17 percent).*
With respect to inventory, current costs were most often estimated using
FIFO inventory costing (53 percent); standard costs were used in 17 percent
of the companies; and published indices were used by another 11 percent of the
companies.
In summary, it can be concluded that although large companies do comply
with SFAS 33, most are perceived by their auditors as having little interest in
the data and report the data only because of the FASB requirement. In general,
companies do not appear to use changing prices data for internal managerial
purposes, provide only the minimum required disclosures, and use simplified
methods to estimate current costs of PPE and inventory (i.e., indices for PPE
and FIFO for inventory).

Nature, Extent, Costs, and Impact of CPA Involvement
with Changing Prices Disclosures
SAS 27 and SAS 28 require that auditors be involved with their clients'
changing prices disclosures. Because SAS 27 and SAS 28 offer only general
guidance to auditors, this research gathered evidence on the extent of CPA
involvement, the costs incurred, and the impact of auditors' efforts.
As expected, in the first year of compliance, auditors were involved
extensively in assisting their clients in preparing the changing prices dis
closures; in subsequent years, auditor involvement was limited generally to
reviewing the data. Specifically, the percentage of auditors who assisted their
clients in preparing changing prices disclosures decreased from 54 percent in
1979 to 23 percent in 1982. As a result of this reduced involvement, auditor
time decreased each year. Average chargeable hours involved in helping clients
prepare changing prices disclosures and in conducting SAS 27 and SAS 28
reviews were 104 hours in 1979, 84 hours in 1980, 71 hours in 1981, and 68
hours in 1982. For 90 percent of the reviews, the procedures represented less
than 2 percent of "total audit time."
In respect to the hours charged to the reviews of changing prices
disclosures, senior staff accounted for 43 percent, supervisors/managers 27
percent, junior staff worked 23 percent, and partners accounted for only 7
percent. Using the average chargeable hours mentioned above and constant
billing rates of $45 per hour for junior staff, $65 for senior staff, $100 for
supervisor/manager, and $150 for partners, the average cost to clients of
auditor involvement with the changing prices data was $7,883 in 1979, $6,367
in 1980, $5,381 in 1981, and $5,154 in 1982.
* The Consumer Price Index-Urban suggests a national price level by calculating the average price
of a "market basket" of many commodities commonly purchased by urban and suburban
households. The U.S. Producer Price Index measures price changes on approximately 2,800
goods sold in large quantities by primary producers to wholesalers and distributors. The HandyWhitman Index is a property valuation index that is used in the public utility industry to estimate
construction costs.
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Measuring the impact of auditor association with changing prices dis
closures was more difficult than measuring costs. Impact (effectiveness) can be
measured accurately only if quality, extent of the disclosures, and degree of
compliance can be assessed both with and without auditor involvement.
Because involvement is required, the surrogate measurement used was
whether auditors initiated adjustments to the companies' changing prices
disclosures or modified their own reports because of material departures from
SFAS 33 guidelines.
With respect to adjustments, the performance of SAS 27 and 28 procedures
resulted in modified disclosures in 55 percent of the companies for one or more
years. Most of these adjustments involved correcting clerical errors and
problems with the translation of data from foreign subsidiaries. As a result of
the adjustments, some reported current cost number was changed for 34
percent of the clients, some constant dollar number was changed for 21
percent of the clients, a narrative disclosure was changed for 14 percent of the
clients, a reported holding gain and/or loss was changed for 15 percent of the
clients, a reported monetary gain or loss was changed for 12 percent of the
clients, reported income from continuing operations was changed for 9 percent
of the clients, and a reported "lower recoverable amount"* was changed for 4
percent of the clients.
In no case were auditor reports modified (i.e., a third paragraph added) to
call attention to omissions, material departures from SFAS 33 guidelines, or
because of the inability to perform SAS 27 and 28 procedures. Most auditors
agreed, because of the general nature of the standards and the subjective
nature of the changing prices data, that departures, errors, or omissions would
have to be extremely significant before a modification of the audit report would
be considered. Auditors suggested that materiality guidelines for changing
prices data are not nearly as strict as those for data contained in the primary
financial statements.
Based on these results, it is apparent that the cost of auditor involvement
with changing prices disclosures is comparatively low and represents only a
small percentage of total "audit" cost. Involvement does result in some
general adjustments, although mostly clerical, to the supplemental disclosures.
In no case were there omissions or departures from SFAS 33 guidelines that
were considered material enough to justify modification of the auditor report.

Specific Techniques Used by CPAs
in Performing SAS 27 and SAS 28 Reviews
As indicated earlier, SAS 27 and SAS 28 provide only general guidelines as
to how auditors are to meet their responsibilities with respect to clients'
changing prices disclosures. As a result, one of the major purposes of the
research was to determine what specific procedures are being used and
whether or not these procedures are consistent across CPA firms.
To determine existing procedures, CPA firms that have SFAS 33 clients
were contacted and asked to send copies of the programs they use in meeting
* SFAS No. 33 states that "If the recoverable amount for a group of assets is judged to be
materially and permanently lower than historical cost in constant dollar or current cost, the
recoverable amount shall be used as a measure of the assets."
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SAS 27 and SAS 28 responsibilities. Seven of the nine CPA firms with 12 or
more SFAS 33 clients sent programs; one replied they did not have a specific
program; and one firm did not respond. Once received, these programs were
analyzed and compared for consistency. Most programs were general, merely
rephrasing the overview procedures outlined in SAS 27 and SAS 28. On the
basis of these documents and interviews with audit partners, it was determined
that auditors use the following six procedures in meeting their responsibilities:
1. Inquiring of management and other client personnel.
2. Checking mathematical accuracy of the current cost and constant dollar
computations.
3. Performing reasonableness tests.
4. Comparing SFAS 33 disclosures with those in the audited financial
statements.
5. Reading narrative explanations.
6. Cross-checking data to source documents.
Of these procedures, numbers 1, 4, and 5 are specifically required by SAS
27 and SAS 28. It is not surprising, therefore, that inquiries of management and
other client personnel were deemed by auditors to be most important. On
average, 23 percent of total chargeable hours were spent in this activity. Most
inquiries were made of the client's senior accounting staff and controllers;
there is little interaction with nonaccounting personnel. Specifically, less than 5
percent of the respondents stated that they ever questioned engineers or
appraisers whereas over 64 percent indicated that inquiries were made of
senior accounting staff and controllers.
While the programs of most CPA firms did not specify types of inquiries
made, one program did enumerate specific areas for inquiry. Based on that
program and on initial interviews, the researchers identified several potential
topics covered in discussions with client personnel. On a scale of 1 (no
emphasis) to 5 (very strong emphasis), respondents ranked specific inquiries
as follows:
Nature of Inquiry
1. Are changing prices disclosures
consistent from year to year?
2. Do current cost and constant
dollar computations comply with SFAS
33 guidelines?
3. Are preparer(s) and reviewer(s)
knowledgeable about changing prices
disclosures?
What significant assumptions are
by clients in preparing
4. made
changing prices disclosures?
Are assumptions made by the company
in preparing the data consistent
5. with the nature of the business?
6. Are client's computations internally
reviewed and rechecked?
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Average Score
4.262
4.227
4.050
3.983
3.806
3.704

7. Are the sources of the current
cost data appropriate?
8. What methods are used in computing
current cost amounts?
9. What methods are used in providing
constant dollar amounts?
10. How does the client treat disposals of
business segments?
11. Who prepares the disclosures?
12. How are monetary assets and liabilities
classified?
13. What assumptions are made about inventory
turnover?
14. What shortcut techniques, if any, are
used in computing changing prices
disclosures?
15. How are the "lower recoverable amounts" of
assets calculated?
16. What considerations are given to the
homogeneity of assets?

3.655
3.649
3.550
3.487
3.413
3.303
3.056
3.047
2.947
2.857

Checking the mathematical accuracy of client's computations was the
second most time-consuming procedure used by auditors. Over 97 percent of
the respondents indicated that they test-checked mathematical accuracy,
spending, on average, 21 percent of chargeable hours in this activity. Most
checking involved recalculating adjustments made through using the CPI-U and
other more specific indices.
Eighty-seven percent of all respondents indicated they performed rea
sonableness tests in complying with SAS 27 and SAS 28. On average, rea
sonableness tests consumed 19 percent of total chargeable hours. Specific
reasonableness tests included the following:
1. Comparing the disclosed monetary gain or loss with the net monetary
position times the average rate of inflation.
2. Comparing constant dollar depreciation with the percentage increase in
restatement of fixed assets times historical cost.
3. Comparing the percentage change from historical costs to current cost
for fixed assets with the average yearly rate of increase in the value of
fixed assets times the assets' lives.
4. Comparing the percentage changes in the constant dollar and current
cost amounts with the general inflation rate.
5. Comparing the relationship between historical cost, constant dollar, and
current cost amounts in prior years to that of the current year.
6. Performing analytical reviews of significant fluctuations.
Although 87 percent of responding auditors indicated that they performed
one or more of the above tests, all indicated that less emphasis was placed on
these tests than on the other procedures.
Even though the average percentage of total chargeable hours consumed in
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comparing SFAS 33 disclosures to auditedfinancialstatements for consistency
was only 16 percent, because it is required, all respondents indicated that this
was a procedure they always performed.
The specific comparisons made, with their respective scores, were:
Nature of Comparison
1. Examining the consistency between the
basic data in the primary financial
statements with that used in the
changing prices disclosures.
2. Examining the consistency of methods,
indices, and assumptions used from
year to year.
3. Examining the consistency of the service
lives of property, plant, and equipment
with those assumed in the changing prices
disclosures.
4. Examining the consistency of the inventory
turnover assumptions used in changing prices
disclosures with those in the primary
financial statements.
5. Examining the consistency between the use
of "lower of cost or market" in the
primary financial statements and adjustments
to "lower recoverable amounts" in the
changing prices disclosures.

Average Score

4.274
4.188

3.404

3.229

3.045

The remaining two procedures used by auditors were reviewing narrative
explanations and test-checking the data to source documents. On average,
reviewing narrations consumed 11 percent of the total chargeable hours. To
assess what auditors look for when reading narrative disclosures, they were
asked to indicate the emphasis placed on the completeness of various aspects
of the disclosures. The following are average scores with respect to evaluating
management's narrative explanations:
Nature of Reading
1. Making sure there are no material
misstatements of fact.
2. Making sure there are no material
omissions.
3. Making sure there are no material
inconsistencies between changing prices
disclosures and data presented in the
audited financial statements or elsewhere
in the annual report.
4. Making sure all explanations are
logical.
5. Making sure all significant and unusual
relationships are explained.
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Average Score
4.483
4.235

4.139
4.000
3.586

6. Making sure all major assumptions are
fully described.

3.456

The scores indicate that, although reading narrative explanations is not
very time consuming, it is an extremely important step that must be
completed. These average scores, ranging from a low of 3.456 to 4.483, are as
high as those for any other procedure.
The final procedure, test-checking of data to source documents,* was
deemed to be the least important of any procedures performed by auditors.
However, 75 percent of the respondents indicated that they performed testchecks. Those using this technique indicated that, on average, the tests
consumed only 9 percent of total chargeable hours. Neither SAS 27 not SAS 28
suggest the examining of source documents, and many accountants would
consider this to be an "audit" procedure rather than a review technique.
To summarize, auditors use six specific procedures in complying with the
requirements of SAS 27 and SAS 28. These procedures, together with their
relative costs, are presented below:
Percentage of
Review
Time
Inquiring of Management and
Other Client Personnel
Checking Mathematical
Accuracy of Computations
Performing Reasonableness
Tests
Comparing SFAS 33
Disclosures with Audited
Financial Statements
Reviewing Narrative
Explanation
Testing Checking Data to
Source Documents
Totals

Approximate
Costs*

23

$1,185

21

1,082

19

979

16

825

11

567

9

464

100

$5,154

* These costs are estimated using the average 1982 costs as specified earlier in this report. The
costs assume a homogeneity of tasks that likely will not exist because junior staff will spend more
time on test-checking procedures while managers likely will make any inquiries.

Special Problems Encountered in Performing
SAS 27 and SAS 28 Reviews
One of the major objectives of the research was to assist the auditing
standard setting process by identifying SAS 27 and SAS 28 implementation
problems. Auditors identified three major problems in complying with SAS 27
* Examples of such test checking would be to examine the documention for the property schedules
that are used to support the fixed asset amounts.
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and SAS 28. The most common problem was that SAS 27 and SAS 28 are too
general to provide much guidance. As a result, it is difficult to know when the
data have been analyzed sufficiently. Typical comments were:
"It is difficult to know when to stop reviewing and yet be comfortable that
no embarrassment will result to the client or my CPA firm from amounts
disclosed."
"It is difficult to determine the extent of 'review' procedures and to
ascertain the propriety and reasonableness of indices used."
A second problem identified was that the changing prices data are so
subjective that no matter what procedures are performed, auditors can never
feel comfortable with the data. Typical comments included:
"Determination of current cost of property and inventory are difficult to
become comfortable with."
"Objectively reviewing the assumptions and judgments is difficult consid
ering the broad nature of assumptions and their limitations on companies
with world-wide operations."
The final major problem encountered was that, because changing prices
disclosures are only supplementary to the primary financial statements and
because they are unaudited, the disclosures are assigned a low priority by
clients. As a result, the information is not available early enough to allow for
meaningful evaluation. Typical responses were:
"Information necessary to generate data for SFAS 33 disclosures
generally is not available early enough to allow for adequate time to
generate meaningful data and allow adequate time to evaluate reasonable
ness."
"The client has relatively little interest in the information and prepares it
only to comply with GAAP. As a result, there is not a great deal of
attention paid to the preparation of the information or the significance of
the assumptions used."

Auditor Perceptions Concerning Usefulness and
Auditability of Changing Prices Data
The final objective of the research was to assess whether auditors perceive
changing prices data to be useful to investors and creditors and whether or not
disclosures should be audited. When asked whether or not they perceived the
data to be useful, most auditors replied with an emphatic "no." Typical of the
responses received were the following:
"Changing prices information should not be required. They presume that
inflation has an impact of similar latitude in each company's financial
statements. Business decisions are never based on these amounts to any
great extent. Investors would have a very difficult time using this
information to reliably predict earnings trends."
"The confusion brought about by SFAS 33 is enough to warrant
elimination of the disclosures."
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"SFAS 33 disclosures should be discontinued due to lack of tangible
usefulness to investors and to other interested parties. It is an over
simplified means of presenting the implications of a very complex set of
economic variables and events and, as a result, does not represent costbeneficial information. The basic framework is not readily understand
able."
Particularly strong in their objection to the requirements were auditors of
public utilities. Nearly all such auditors commented that, for public utilities, at
least, the requirements are a waste of time. Several respondents indicated
that, because public utilities are limited to recovering only historical costs
through the rate-making process, the "lower recoverable amount" require
ment causes PPE and inventory to be written up to current value and then
written back down to historical cost.
The auditors responding to the questionnaire generally concurred, how
ever, that if changing prices disclosures are to be mandated, then the
accounting requirements should be more specific so that comparability among
companies would be enhanced. Generally, auditors believe that SFAS 33 allows
too many alternatives that result in inconsistent disclosures. These inconsis
tencies significantly reduce the usefulness of the information. Typical com
ments supporting this position were:
"SFAS 33 guidelines should have been specific in nature in order to allow
for comparability of financial statements."
"The FASB should reduce the number of acceptable accounting methods
to avoid confusion and provide better consistency of the information."
Although responding auditors were generally not supportive of any chang
ing prices data, they did favor current cost disclosures over constant dollar
disclosures. When asked which method they believed preferable for reporting
to investors and creditors, nearly three times as many auditors responded that
current cost disclosures are preferred. Although unsolicited, some re
spondents expressed their views with the following kinds of comments:
"The dual approach (constant dollar and current cost) should be elimi
nated in favor of current cost. A dual approach is confusing, and current
cost is more appropriate."
"The FASB should drop constant dollar reporting or allow companies to
compute data based on indices representative of their business commit
ment."
"The assumption of applying constant dollar indexes to complex multina
tional companies is so illogical that no one should base any judgments on
the information."
The final group of questions in the survey asked auditors their perceptions
about the "auditability" of current cost and constant dollar disclosures and
whether auditing the disclosures would make them more reliable to external
users. Generally, auditors believed that data could be audited but that auditing
would take considerably more time and would not make the data any more
reliable to external users.
With respect to constant dollar disclosures and assuming the same
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requirements of SFAS 33, 78 percent believe that, by conducting additional
verifications and reviews of the indices and by checking more source docu
ments and mathematical calculations, they could audit and render an opinion on
financial statements that included such disclosures as a footnote. On average,
auditors believe it would take 2.25 times as many chargeable hours to obtain
the sufficient competent evidential matter necessary to audit such data.
However, 88 percent feel that audited constant dollar disclosures would not be
much more reliable to external users than the present unaudited supplemen
tary disclosures. Those respondents who believe that the constant dollar
disclosures could not be audited cited as their reasons the lack of specific
GAAP, the complications of international operations, the use of too many
assumptions and estimates, and the subjectivity of the data.
A much smaller percentage, 44 percent, believe that, given the same
requirements as SFAS 33, it would be possible to audit and render an opinion
on financial statements that included current cost disclosures as a footnote.
Respondents who believe it would be possible to audit current cost data
estimate that such procedures would take three times as long as current
procedures and would require more detailed reviews of indices, more tracing
to source documents, more checking of mathematical calculations, more
analytical reviews, and more detailed testing of computer programs used to
generate the data. Respondents who believe that current cost numbers could
not be audited cited the use of too many assumptions and estimates and the
subjectivity of the data as their primary reasons.
Both those who thought they could audit the data and those who believe it
would be impossible agreed on one proposition—the audited data would not be
much more useful to external users than unaudited disclosures. In fact, some
respondents indicated that, by leading financial statement users to believe the
information is more accurate than it really is, auditing might make the data even
more confusing.
In summary, most auditors stated that the present constant dollar and
current cost disclosures are confusing, subjective, and not very useful. They
indicated that current cost disclosures are more meaningful than constant dollar
disclosures but do not want to see expanded standards, such as a requirement
that the data be audited.

Conclusions
Based on an analysis of the accumulated data, the following conclusions
have been reached:
• There is little perceived client interest in changing prices disclosures.
Auditors do not perceive such disclosures to be used by internal management;
rather, the disclosures are provided only to meet the minimum FASB
disclosure requirements.
Of those auditors surveyed, 87 percent indicated that their clients have
little interest in changing prices disclosures. Many comments were received
indicating that, because of confusion about their meaning, changing prices data
are not considered when making decisions.
Seventy-three percent of the auditors indicated that their clients provided
the disclosures only to meet the requirements set forth in SFAS 33. In meeting
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these minimum disclosures requirements, most companies use the easiest
method available for calculating the current costs of property, plant, equip
ment, and inventories. Published indices are used by 59 percent of the
responding companies in valuing PPE while 53 percent indicate that they base
the current cost of inventories on FIFO.
• The average review of changing prices disclosures requires a small
percentage of engagement time and results in minor adjustments to the
disclosures. Departures from SFAS 33 guidelines ordinarily are not material
enough to justify modifying auditor reports.
In 90 percent of the cases, the auditors' review of changing prices
disclosures consumed less than two percent of total engagement time. This
amounted to less than $5,200 per client based on assumed costs in 1982.
Senior staff members were most often involved; partners had relatively little
involvement in reviewing the disclosures.
As a result of these reviews, several minor adjustments were made to the
changing prices disclosures. These adjustments usually involved correcting
clerical errors. None of the respondents reported having to modify audit
reports because of material omissions or material departures from SFAS 33
guidelines.
• Although few formal audit-type programs exist for reviewing changing
prices disclosures, CPAs use the following specific procedures in fulfilling their
responsibilities: inquiring of management, checking mathematical accuracy,
performing reasonableness tests, comparing SFAS 33 disclosures with audited
financial statements, reviewing narrative explanations, and test-checking data
to source documents.
Inquiring of management is considered the most important step in review
ing changing prices disclosures. This procedure consumes almost one quarter
of all chargeable hours related to reviews of SFAS 33 disclosures. When
conducting these inquiries, the senior accounting staff and controllers of clients
are most often contacted.
Almost all auditors perform mathematical checks of computations and
spend 21 percent of chargeable hours on this activity.
Various resonableness tests relating to changing prices data have been
developed by CPA firms. These tests are applied by 87 percent of auditors and
are responsible for almost one fifth of chargeable hours relating to SAS 27 and
SAS 28 reviews.
Another procedure always performed by auditors, comparing changing
prices disclosures with audited financial statements, accounted for 16 percent
of chargeable hours.
Although reviewing narrative explanations does not consume as much time
as other procedures, it is considered by most auditors to be one of the most
important. Management's narrative explanations are reviewed mainly for
material misstatements, omissions, and inconsistencies.
Test-checking data to source documents was the least important procedure
performed by the auditors.
• Several problems associated with reviewing changing prices disclosures
were identified by auditors. The problems mentioned most often were: SAS 27
and SAS 28 standards are too general, changing prices data are too subjective,
and complying with the requirements is assigned low priority by client
companies.
The procedures suggested in SAS 27 and SAS 28 provide few specific
details for auditors to follow in conducting their reviews. Consequently,
auditors feel uncomfortable with the review process.
The second problem, subjectivity of changing prices data, is a result of the
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flexible guidelines of SFAS 33. This statement allows changing prices data to
be computed using a variety of methods and assumptions. Many auditors
commented that, if changing prices disclosures are to be effective, more
specific reporting guidelines must be provided.
Because of the low interest expressed to the respondents by clients
concerning the changing prices data, the disclosures are seldom prepared in a
timely manner. Clients apparently generate the data as a compliance pro
cedure, not for use by management.
• Auditors responded that the present reporting guidelines, requiring
disclosures based on both constant dollars and current costs, are confusing,
subjective, and not very useful. They stated that current costs are more
meaningful than constant dollar disclosures. However, auditors indicated that
requiring changing prices data to be audited would not necessarily result in
more useful information for external users.
Many comments were received suggesting that requiring information based
on both constant dollars and current costs results in compromising the
usefulness of both sets of data. Because each method includes different
assumptions, the disclosures are confusing when reported with primary
financial statements, which use yet another set of assumptions.
Of those auditors expressing a preference, over 70 percent prefer current
cost to constant dollar disclosures. Although auditors feel that neither method
should be subject to an audit requirement, they indicated that the current cost
method results in information that is more relevant to financial statement
users.

Endnotes
1. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33, "Financial Reporting and Changing
Prices" (Stamford: Financial Accounting Standards Board, September 1979). SFAS No. 33
requires most large companies to provide supplemental financial data reflecting price changes. Two
methods are used to disclose this information. The first deals with changes in the general price
level for all commodities and services. This method is known as constant dollar accounting. The
second kind of price change relates to changes in prices of particular items. This second method is
referred to as current cost accounting.
2. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 27, "Supplementary Information Required by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board," AICPA Professional Standards, 1979 and Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 28, "Supplementary Information on The Effects of Changing Prices,"
AICPA Professional Standards, 1980. SAS No. 27 requires auditors to apply certain procedures to
supplementary information required by the FASB. Those procedures include inquiring of
management regarding methods of preparing information, comparing the information for consistency with audited statements and management's response to inquiries, and applying additional
procedures required by other FASB statements. SAS No. 28 requires that the procedures in SAS
No. 27 be specificially applied to a company's changing prices disclosures.
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Discussant's Response to
Auditor Reviews of Changing Prices Disclosures
Robert W. Berliner
Arthur Young & Company
Before addressing the specifics of the Skousen/Albrecht research, I should
disclose my involvement in the subject area because of the influence it may
have on my evaluation of their findings.
I am the partner in my firm with lead responsibility for the subject area of
accounting for changing prices and have been closely involved for the past ten
years with the efforts of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Securities
and Exchange Commission, and accounting bodies in certain other countries in
this area. This involvement led to my being named chairman of the Auditing
Standards Board's task force on Auditor Involvement with Required Supple
mentary Information. The activities of this task force resulted in the issuance of
SAS 27, Supplementary Information Required by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and SAS 28, Supplementary Information on the Effects of
Changing Prices. Further, I am the principal author of the Arthur Young
research paper on the use of changing prices information by financial analysts,
and I reported on this research at the FASB research conference in January
1983. What all this background means is that I believe that changing prices
information has merit. In fact, I have helped to shape the related auditing
standards and have conducted research that overlaps the subject research in
the area of usefulness of FAS 33 data.
I was, as well, one of the five members of the ASB's Planning Subcommit
tee that evaluated and recommended AICPA participation in the funding of the
subject research. And, further yet, I was one of the national office partners of
major CPA firms to be interviewed by the researchers for purposes of
providing input to the used in the development of their questionnaire.
These prefatory remarks should constitute full disclosure of the reasons
why I may be considered a nonindependent discussant of this research paper. I
can assure you, however, that I have not accepted any money or other
treasures from either Professor Skousen or Professor Albrecht and have
endeavored to maintain objectivity in reviewing their research paper.
Turning, then, to the paper itself, let me begin by focusing on the research
objectives. As set forth in the second paragraph on the report's first page, they
were:
• To determine the nature and extent of procedures used by auditors,
• To identify the costs and special problems related to the reviews, and
• To seek input from auditors concerning the perceived usefulness and
auditability of FAS 33 data.
Did the researchers accomplish their stated objectives? I'd answer that
with a qualified "yes"—something like "more or less."
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Achievement of Stated Objectives
As to the nature and extent of procedures—I think the researchers
have obtained a good handle on the nature of procedures followed by auditors in
reviewing the FAS 33 information. Theirfindingsas to the nature of auditors'
inquiries, reasonableness tests, and comparisons of the disclosures to the
auditedfinancialstatements are particularly informative. I have only one slight
reservation. The information about auditors' procedures was obtained pri
marily from a review of SAS 27 and 28 and the guidance material of some
accounting firms. These procedures were then listed in the questionnaire, and
the respondents were asked to make certain comments about them. I wonder
whether the researchers might have learned anything further had the question
naire asked the respondents to list their own procedures.
In terms of the extent of procedures, my reservations are somewhat
stronger. The researchers obtained excellent input on four of the six pro
cedures listed, but the questionnaire did not seek similar details as to the other
two: checking the mathematical accuracy of computations and test-checking to
source documents. These two verification procedures, which consumed 30
percent of the respondents' review time, are not required by SAS 27 and 28.
I'd be interested in learning more about them, particularly why they were
performed at all, given the limited assurance objectives of SASs 27 and 28.
As to the costs of the reviews—I think the researchers succeeded in
obtaining as much information as could reasonably be expected from a
questionnaire approach, namely a rough indication of total hours expended, the
relationship of these hours to total audit time, a percentage allocation of the
total hours to each of the basic procedures, and a percentage breakdown of the
hours by level of personnel involved. As I will explain later, my only
reservation here is how far one can go in interpreting this rough data.
As to the perceived usefulness of FAS 33 data—Let me begin by
saying that I would assign only a low priority to this objective. Information
concerning the usefulness of the data is best obtained from users and, to some
extent, from preparers—not from auditors. I believe this fact constitutes the
reason the researchers refer to the perceived usefulness of the data. The use of
that word suggests, and rightly so, that the researchfindingsin this regard are
only secondhand.
While I happen to agree with the researchers' finding that auditors perceive
little client interest in the disclosures, I do quibble with the basis for their
finding, principally the responses to the question: "How much interest does
your client have in using changing prices data?" Respondents were asked to
choose one of the following three possible answers to the question: "little
interest," "moderate interest," or "high interest." A client with moderate
interest is defined in the questionnaire as one who "uses selected changing
prices data occasionally for managerial decisions;" a client with high interest is
one who "frequently bases managerial decisions on inflation adjusted data."
Given the choices, I would expect, as was the case, that the great prepon
derance of auditors would describe their clients as having little interest, defined
as a client who "complies with FAS 33 only because it is a requirement."
But is it appropriate to base perceptions of usefulness solely on the extent
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of use in managerial decision-making? Isn't it possible for a client to be
interested in the disclosures from the standpoint of external communication
with users of financial information but not from the standpoint of use by internal
management? And, regardless of perceived usefulness, how many clients
voluntarily provide financial information that is not required by GAAP, some
regulatory body, or the like?
The researchers also supported their finding of auditor perception of little
client interest based on the fact that only six respondents reported a client
providing the changing prices data on a comprehensive basis. Is the fact that a
company provides only the acceptable minimum necessarily demonstrative of
little interest in the information?
I also question the intimation that clients have little interest because they
commonly use the indexing method to compute current costs of property,
plant, and equipment. Irrespective of the degree of interest a company may
have in the information, wouldn't it be only logical for it to use the most cost/
efficient method which produces reliable results? Contrary to the exposure
draft, FAS 33 raised indexing to a level of acceptability equal to any other
acceptable method of computing current cost. Further, when a relevant index
of new asset price change is applied appropriately to the historical cost of an
asset, I believe there is no basis for any implication that there is something
suspect or second rate about the result. Moreover, many companies believe
that indexing is not only the most cost-effective method of determining current
cost, but is often the only practical method.
I also find it significant that the researchers have reported that 71 percent
of the respondents made use of external indexes in computing current cost of
property, plant, and equipment. But the significance I find is not necessarily
what one would think it to be; I find that percentage surprisingly low. After all,
FAS 33 itself suggested the use of simplified methods. In these circumstances,
were I the decision-maker at a reporting company, I wouldn't hesitate to make
extensive use of external indexes.
Furthermore, I never would have expected to find that appraisals were
used by as many as 11 percent of the respondents or that appraisals were used
in the first year and updated by means of indexes in subsequent years by
another 7 percent of the respondents. Appraisals are by far the most expensive
method of computing current cost. Their use by nearly one company in five
points to more than little interest in the information.
My reservations about the researchers'findingsas to the perceived level of
client interest are not intended to suggest, by any means, that clients have
other than little interest in FAS 33 information. As I said earlier, my own
experience suggests that most companies, in fact, do have little interest in the
information. My comments were intended only to challenge the research as a
basis for supporting that conclusion.

Evaluation of the Research Findings
The nature and extent of auditor procedures—The researchers
report that "the average review takes less than two percent of total
engagement time and results in minor adjustments to the disclosures. Depar
tures from FAS 33 guidelines ordinarily are not material enough to justify
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modifying auditor reports." The fact that the average review takes less than
two percent of total engagement time is informative but very difficult to
evaluate. Given that the information is supplementary and unaudited, one
would not expect that it would require a significant portion of the total audit
time. In evaluating the amount of time spent, one needs also to consider that
the time reported is incremental time—time in addition to the time already
spent in conducting the audit. As part of the audit, the auditor spends time
obtaining information about the company's industry, business, accounting
system, accounting controls, etc., which reduces the amount of time he would
otherwise have to spend in reviewing the FAS 33 information. Put another
way, if the reviewer had not done an audit, he would need to spend a lot more
time on changing prices information than that indicated by the questionnaire
responses. Also, the fact that auditors are applying more than the minimum
procedures called for by SAS 27 and SAS 28 supports the belief that auditors
are spending all the time that is necessary to fulfill their professional
responsibilities.
The researchers also state that the auditor review results in minor
adjustments to the disclosures. Like a cup of coffee that is either half full or half
empty, the research findings can be interpreted in two ways. The question
naire revealed that the review procedures resulted in modified disclosures in
55 percent of the companies for one or more years. A 55 percent adjustment
rate strikes me as being very high, possibly even higher than the rate of
adjustment resulting from audits of the primaryfinancialstatements for these
large, public companies. Also, the fact that the adjustments were made at all
could suggest that they were more than insignificant, else they would have
been waived as immaterial.
The lastfindingin this area is that there were no ommissions or departures
from FAS 33 guidelines that were considered material enough to justify
modification of the auditors' reports. My only comment regarding thisfindingis
the need to bear in mind that no qualifications should be expected in light of the
materiality considerations involved, the subjective judgments involved in
preparing current cost information, the explicit flexibility provided by FAS 33
itself, and its experimental nature. Because of these factors, it is very unlikely
that an auditor could assert that the changing prices information departs
materially from the FAS 33 guidelines.
Special problems encountered in performing the reviews—The
researchers observe that the most frequently mentioned problem is that the
requirements of SASs 27 and 28 and FAS 33 are too general to provide much
guidance. As a result, they report, it is difficult to know when the data have
been analyzed sufficiently.
This finding doesn't surprise me as much as it disturbs me. 1 disagree that
the lack of specificity in these auditing standards is, or at least should be, a
problem to auditors. Of course, my previous involvement with SAS 27 and SAS
28 makes this issue the hardest for me to remain objective about. When
developing standards, standard setters can either adopt a broad, conceptual
approach or a narrow, so-called "cook-book" approach. The Auditing Stand
ards Board usually leans to the conceptual approach because of a reluctance to
impose a rigid structure that might unduly restrict a practitioner's exercise of
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professional judgment. Another reason is the fact that there is more than one
way to obtain audit satisfaction. Also, a cook-book approach to SAS 28 would
have been incompatible with the experimental nature of FAS 33 and the wide
latitude it permits preparers.
The question of when an auditor obtains sufficient comfort, when that magic
moment arrives when he can lay down his pencil and eye shade, is an age-old
question, and more specific procedures in the authoritative auditing literature
will not provide an answer. It simply must remain a matter of professional
judgment in the circumstances, and I am disappointed to learn that there are
practitioners who object to this condition.
On the other hand, I do agree that FAS 33 needs more specificity,
particularly in the area of current cost measurement. This is a problem which I
believe should be corrected now. That correction, though, must of necessity
recognize the inherent subjectivity of current cost information.
Another special problem noted by the researchers is that "the information
is not available early enough to allow for meaningful evaluation.'' This response
is a puzzlingfindingbecause it seems to imply that auditors were unable to
review the information in accordance with SAS 27 and SAS 28, which would be
inconsistent with the researchers' conclusion that auditors are performing
meaningful review procedures. I really don't know what to make of this
finding—I wish the researchers had pursued it.
Usefulness of data—Finally, the researchers find that requiring changing
prices data to be audited (as opposed to undergoing the SASs 27 and 28
review) would not necessarily increase the utility of the information to financial
statement users. As I commented previously, I believe that information
concerning the usefulness of the changing prices disclosures is best obtained
from users and preparers, not from auditors. More importantly, though, I
don't know how to interpret thisfinding.It is based on responses to questions
asking how much more reliable to external users the constant dollar and the
current cost disclosures would be if they were audited rather than included as
unaudited supplementary disclosures. The respondents had a choice of "not
much better,'' "somewhat better," or "significantly better.'' Based solely on
the responses to these questions, it would seem that conclusions can be drawn
only as to the reliability of the information.
Information utility is, however, a function of two qualitative characteristics:
relevance and reliability. If one is held constant and the other increased, the
result should be greater usefulness. Obviously, the degree of auditor involve
ment with the information affects only its reliability—in a positive way, we
hope. So the greater auditor involvement represented by an audit should, all
else remaining equal, increase reliability and usefulness.
I can think of two reasons to explain the contradictory finding. First, it
might mean that the information is perceived as so inherently imprecise that no
degree of auditor involvement could possibly add to its reliability. Personally, I
wouldn't agree with that, but it could be one interpretation of the finding.
Alternatively, the finding might mean that respondents perceived the
relevance of the information to be not only low, but close to nonexistent. For
example, assume a company decides to disclose in its annual report to
shareholders that the chief executive officer wears 9½-size shoes. I doubt if
anyone would find the usefulness of this information increased if the auditors
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verified and reported on the size of the CEO's shoes. Even if his shoe size
were reported with 100 percent reliability, the information would still be
without any utility whatsoever.
I don't know which of these interpretations—or others I have not thought
of—were behind the research findings. I wish they could be clarified.
Despite the reservations noted, the researchers' overall conclusions about
the perceived usefulness of FAS 33 information are consistent with other
research findings and may have the most significant effect on the outcome of
the FAS 33 experiment. Theirfindingthat auditors think that the requirement
to disclose changing prices information on both a constant dollar and current
cost basis contributes to confusion on the part of users is supported by other
research and is also particularly important. So is the finding that auditors
perceive that their clients believe that current cost disclosures are more
meaningful than constant dollar disclosures. These findings not only highlight
some of the major problems with FAS 33 but also shed light on possible
solutions.

Concluding Remarks
The FASB must soon decide what to do about FAS 33. It is currently in the
process of evaluating the more than 300 comment letters received in response
to its Invitation to Comment, Supplementary Disclosures about the Effects of
Changing Prices. The comments, which were due by April 25, 1984, were
directed to four issues.
• Are the FAS 33 disclosures a generally useful supplement to financial
statements? If yes, why? If no, why not, and what information would
achieve the objectives of changing prices disclosures?
• What should the FASB do about changing prices disclosures?
Continue present or revised disclosures on an experimental or
permanent basis, or discontinue altogether?
• What FAS 33 disclosures should be continued—both current cost and
constant dollar, current cost only, or constant dollar only? And which
specific disclosure items should be continued and what additional
disclosures should be required? And, should a more standardized
format be required?
• What changes should be made to improve the relevance and reliability
of current cost measures?
It will not be easy to resolve these issues. Many respondents have urged
the FASB to discontinue the disclosure, primarily because of the limited use
made of the information by financial analysts and other external users.
Focusing on the issues in those terms, however, masks the need to overcome
the distortion offinancialinformation caused by changing prices. That need is
now being addressed, albeit experimentally, by FAS 33. Withdrawing FAS 33
without substituting another way of meeting the need would abandon the
problem unsolved.
Clearly, the problem is not behind us. Inflation is in no danger of extinction.
Indeed, continuing record deficits in federal spending threaten its resumption
at punishing levels. In other areas of the world, it has never let up.
Nor does the distortion of financial information depend on continued
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inflation at extraordinarily high rates. Many assets acquired before and during
the most recent inflationary binge are still on the books, their carrying values
irrelevant to current decision making, and, over time, the cumulative effects of
even low rates of inflation seriously distort asset values and income measures.
Nevertheless, the great indifference of users to FAS 33 information,
indicated once again by the Skousen/Albrecht research, remains one of the
principal findings of the FASB's experiment. It will undoubtedly be a significant
consideration in the FASB's ultimate decision. So will some of the other
Skousen/Albrecht findings, such as the unusual flexibility in computation
provided by FAS 33, the resulting need for added specificity should the
disclosure requirement be continued, the confusion to users resulting from the
requirement to present the information on two competing bases, and the
preference for current cost information over constant dollar information.
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The Case for the
Unstructured Audit Approach
Jerry D. Sullivan
Coopers & Lybrand
In their recently completed study of the audit methodologies of 12 large
accountingfirms—theBig Eight plus four of the next six largest firms—Cushing
and Loebbecke analyzed the firms in terms of the amount of structure in their
audit approaches and then classified the firms as "highly structured," "semistructured," "partially structured," or "unstructured." Based on the
characteristics of a structured approach, as that term is defined in the study
and discussed below, I hope that Coopers & Lybrand falls into the "partially
structured" category, which could also be called the "mostly unstructured"
category. It's interesting to note that when C&L revised its audit approach in
1969, to what was the forerunner of our present approach, we called it the
Uniform Audit Approach, thinking at the time that it was one of the most
structured approaches in the profession. Today, those same initials—UAA—
might be used to identify the "Unstructured Audit Approach."
Cushing and Loebbecke define a structured audit methodology as "a
systematic approach to auditing characterized by a prescribed, logical sequence
of procedures, decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive
and integrated set of audit policies and tools designed to assist the auditor in
conducting the audit." Using that definition, it's hard to be against a structured
audit approach; to favor an unstructured approach seems almost subversive. I
would like to suggest, however, that merely calling the two polar positions by
other names would go a long way toward removing what some symposium
participants probably view as the stigma of an unstructured approach. For
example, in addressing what are essentially the same issues, Dirsmith and
McAllister use the terms "mechanistic" and "organic" instead of "struc
tured" and "unstructured." I would much rather be associated with an
approach that is viewed as organic than one that is referred to as unstructured.
On the other hand, I am sure that many auditors who take pride in their firms'
structured approaches would resent those approaches being referred to as
mechanistic.
There is a range of audit approaches between the two polar positions of
"structured" and "unstructured." I have already indicated that we thought
our approach was fairly structured when we first developed it. When I read the
Cushing-Loebbecke definition of a structured audit approach, I again thought
that our approach fit that definition. We always have believed that our approach
is systematic, comprehensive, and integrated—as those terms are typically
used. It's only when I see how far some firms have carried the notions of
1
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systematic, comprehensive, and integrated that I jump off the structure
bandwagon.

Classifying Firms' Policies
The Cushing-Loebbecke draft constructed a set of questions in an attempt
to identify a CPA firm's "potential policies for each audit process step" that
they identified in the study. They provided three alternative answers for each
question "which relate to the possible degree of structure a firm may feel is
appropriate." The set of answers that placed heavy emphasis on a structured
approach included the following possible policies (emphasis added):
1. All potential new clients would be investigated to the same extent.
2. All audit areas would be audited at a certain standard level of effort.
3. A totally substantive approach to an audit or to one audit area would
not be possible, and some detailed compliance tests would always be
required.
4. If the auditor wished to rely on internal control for one audit
objective for one type of transaction, internal control would have to
be relied on to meet all audit objectives for all types of transactions
and related accounts.
5. Statistical sampling would be used for all detailed tests.
6. Materiality would be allocated to various audit areas using a
statistical algorithm that totally ignored qualitative considerations.
7. Inherent risk would not enter into the determination of the scope of
audit procedures at all—that is, inherent risk would be set at 100
percent—presumably because the evaluation and assessment of
inherent risk are not susceptible to quantitative determination.
Those potential policies that underlie a structured audit approach seem to
suggest that the issue really isn't that of a structured approach versus an
unstructured approach, but rather that of structure versus judgment. The two
camps can also be divided into those auditors who believe that auditor judgment
should be replaced by structured, quantitative algorithms and those who
believe that the audit decision-making process cannot be reduced to a
quantitative model but will always require the exercise of considerable
judgment. Virtually every applied discipline faces this same issue of structure
versus judgment; only the words used to describe the debate vary. For
example, in the 1950s, the debate over the Federal Reserve's monetary policy
with regard to regulating the relationship between the money supply and the
level of economic activity was expressed in terms of "rules" versus "au
thorities," rules being the equivalent of structure and authorities being the
equivalent of the exercise of judgment on a continual basis by the Federal
Reserve Board and the Open Market Committee.
3

The Argument for Judgment
I don't believe that any audits are conducted based on the policies
suggested above as underlying a structured approach, nor do I believe that any
auditing firm has a set of policies, or even individual policies, that contain the
conclusions suggested by Cushing-Loebbecke as placing heavy emphasis on a
structured approach. I do not see that as the issue, however. The issue, as I
see it, is not where are we today? Rather, it is where are we going? Where will
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we be 10 years from now if we continue to strive to remove judgment from the
audit process, which seems to be a goal that some auditors support? Coopers
& Lybrand, and I'm sure this is true for all firms, seeks an audit approach that
helps the auditor perform an effective audit in the most efficient manner. We do
not characterize our approach as being either structured or unstructured; in
fact, we don't characterize it at all other than as the Coopers & Lybrand Audit
Approach, which I believe is far more advisable than having to defend or adhere
to one of the polar positions of structured or unstructured.
As part of our thinking about how to serve audit clients most efficiently,
C&L has classified its clients into a few market segments and has developed
different audit strategies for each of those segments—audit strategies that can
be changed as client conditions warrant. For example, our guidance for an audit
of a Fortune 500 client presumes that the control environment would support
auditor testing and reliance on controls; our guidance for audits of smaller
clients presumes that audit efficiency will be enhanced by using a purely
substantive test mode. In both cases, however, the methodology is sufficiently
flexible—that is, unstructured—to allow the engagement partner to follow an
alternative strategy if it is deemed to be the most efficient way of performing an
effective audit.

Audit Effectiveness
On the issue of audit effectiveness, my great fear is that a structured audit
approach that is based completely on quantitative algorithms is likely to
produce substandard audits, for a very simple reason—the incompleteness of
the linkage between the results of compliance tests and the nature, timing, and
extent of substantive tests. I do not believe that the technology currently
exists to enable auditors to determine with any reasonable level of assurance
what specific substantive tests should be performed and how much detailed
substantive testing should be done based on specified results of specific
compliance tests of internal controls. Even if inherent risk were set at 100
percent and even if no reliance were placed on the results of analytical reviews
in the substantive test phase of the audit—so that audit risk would be reduced
to an acceptable level solely through the application of compliance and detailed
substantive tests—I do not believe that an algorithm exists to permit a precise
and unarguable specification of the nature and amount of substantive testing
that should be performed, given the results of compliance test procedures in a
particular transaction cycle. Short of an arbitrary rule, no way exists of
determining, even on a statistical or probability basis, what the precise level of
a particular substantive test should be.
For example, if I concluded after applying statistical sampling to all key
controls over sales and cash receipts that I was 95 percent confident that the
true deviation rate for each control did not exceed 8 percent, what would that
tell me about the size of the sample for confirming accounts receivable? How
would that sample size change if sampling risk dropped to 1 percent? If the
upper deviation limit dropped to 6 percent? I don't think it can be done.
Auditors have neither the theory nor the technology to link the rate at which
control deviations occur and sampling risk in compliance testing with the
desired level of reliability in substantive testing. As a result, we cannot be
confident that an audit structured completely on quantitative algorithms will
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generate a sample size large enough to give us the level of reliability necessary
to comply with generally accepted auditing standards.
There is another extremely important aspect of the audit decision-making
process to which a structured approach will not contribute: the judgments the
auditor has to make, after the evidence has been obtained, about the
appropriate application of generally accepted accounting principles in the
client's particular circumstances. Decisions about whether the client has
properly accounted for sales with the right of return, potential inventory
obsolescence, and collectibility of receivables—to name just a few—are critical
to an effective audit but are not subject to a structured methodology or a
quantitative model.

Audit Efficiency
On the question of audit efficiency, the level of competition in the
profession today mandates that we not overaudit. If we do too much, either the
client pays for it and we risk losing the client to another firm, or we have to
absorb the unbillable hours. Neither prospect is attractive. Accordingly,
C&L—and I'm sure every other accounting firm—is extremely concerned
about performing audits as efficiently as possible, which means expending the
fewest possible hours to achieve the desired level of assurance. Let me
suggest that there are four ways in which an overly structured audit
methodology can lead to inefficiencies.
First, as I indicated earlier, a highly structured methodology largely
disregards the qualitative aspects of audit evidence that can and should have an
impact on audit judgments. Most auditors who espouse structure are heavily
quantitative and tend to ignore anything that can not be quantified. Among the
factors that are ignored are levels of inherent risk that are below 100 percent
and qualitative aspects of materiality that could serve to either increase or
decrease the audit effort in specific areas. Also ignored is knowledge about the
operation of controls that is obtained from nonsampling applications such as
observation and inquiry, and tests of controls over completeness (for example,
year-end reconciliations that are performed on a cumulative basis). I am not
suggesting that statistical sampling applications are necessarily inappropriate;
however, I am suggesting that sampling, and especially statistical sampling, is
not appropriate for much evidence of considerable audit significance. I simply
do not believe that an efficient audit can be performed if evidence of a
qualitative nature is ignored.
Second, the absence of linkage between substantive and compliance tests,
which I mentioned earlier, can lead to inefficient as well as ineffective audits. In
the absence of specific, quantitative guidance linking the nature and extent of
substantive tests to compliance testfindings,we are as likely to audit too much
as to audit too little, and overauditing in one area doesn't offset the effects of
underauditing in another area. The problems caused by the lack of precise
linkage exist in both the structured and unstructured approaches and are not
solved by increasing the level of structure in an audit. An unstructured
approach at least allows the auditor to consider information obtained about a
management assertion from tests other than the particular one under consid
eration. After all, accounts and tests of those accounts are interrelated; audit
evidence about any one assertion comes from multiple sources.
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Third, I do not believe that any of the structured methodologies take into
account, or can take into account, the audit efficiencies that ensue from what
C&L refers to as the "leveraging" of evidence obtained through compliance
tests. There are several ways to leverage evidence that C&L believes provide
the auditor with a means of obtaining, from sources other than compliance
tests, the necessary level of assurance about the continued and proper
operation of controls.

Leveraging Techniques
By way of incorporating the leveraging technique, the C&L approach
specifies that, to the extent possible and appropriate, some reperformance of
control procedures is a necessary aspect of compliance testing. For example,
assume an accounting control that consists of client personnel matching three
documents, following up on unmatched documents, and initialing the docu
ments. In testing that control the auditor should not only look for the initials but
also reperform the matching. Similarly, the auditor should recalculate some
extensions and footings if that is the control being compliance tested.
Otherwise, the auditor has no assurance that the initials mean anything other
than that the employee knows how to write his or her initials. Having
reperformed the procedures and determined that the control operated on the
items selected, the auditor can then obtain a higher level of assurance about the
operation of the control by observing the operation of the procedure on
numerous occasions and by examining evidence, namely the employee's
initials, that the procedure was performed. In other words, once it has been
established that the employee's initials do mean something, then compliance
testing of those initials is appropriate, and that is a far less costly auditing
procedure than reperforming calculations or matching documents.
Similarly, C&L believes that the ability to rely on internal controls is
enhanced if those controls are exercised in an environment that includes
adequate supervisory review of their operation. We distinguish two different
groups of controls: basic controls, which have to do with the control objectives
of accuracy, validity, completeness, maintenance of account balances, and
physical security, and disciplinary controls, which monitor the basic control
procedures. Among the disciplinary controls is supervision. We believe that
conclusions about the effectiveness of controls that are reached from com
pliance tests performed before year-end can be extended throughout the year
if supervisory controls exist and can be tested to determine if they operated
during the untested period. Testing supervisory controls is relatively inexpen
sive; it usually involves observation and reviewing error reports, such as
computer printouts of rejected documents, that a supervisor may create and
file. Recognizing a hierarchy of controls—which I do not think is included in any
quantitative algorithm and probably can not be because there are so many
variables involved—permits C&L to conduct a more efficient audit by eliminat
ing some (but not all) of the compliance tests involving reperformance that, I
believe, would otherwise be required for an audit in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards.
Perhaps an illustration will be useful. The primary objective of any audit
strategy is to provide the desired degree of protection against audit risk as
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efficiently as possible. Assume that the audit objective at hand is to be able to
conclude that recorded accounts receivable exist. A structured approach to
examining a client's accounts receivable to achieve audit satisfaction regarding
their existence is likely to center around the confirmation process, particularly
deciding the appropriate sample size and how to evaluate the sample results, as
a primary source of audit evidence. An unstructured approach would recognize
that in reality, and depending on the circumstances of the particular client and
its customers, the auditor may derive less comfort from the confirmation
process than is commonly thought. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibili
ties addressed this issue in its Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations
(page 40):
The Commission's review of significant cases involving auditors dis
closed several instances in which certain traditional audit steps did not
produce the assurances they were intended to provide. For example,
direct confirmation with parties outside the company is an important
method of substantiation of bothfinancialstatement amounts and other
management representations. However, in several cases, outsiders
either ignored incorrect information that was clearly shown in confirma
tions or actively cooperated with management in giving incorrect
confirmation. Constant attention should be given by both auditors and
the AICPA to the effectiveness of conventional auditing techniques and
to the development of new ones.
Accordingly, the auditor would be well advised to look to other sources of
evidence about the existence of the receivables. For example, the auditor
could look to secondary sources of evidence by testing the functioning of the
control system over shipping and billing, by determining by inquiry and
observation that there is proper segregation of duties and adequate and
continuing supervision over the basic controls in the revenue cycle, and by
determining through analytical reviews that there are no unexplainable varia
tions in the pattern of recorded sales and receivables. The auditor might also
look to other primary sources of evidence for assessing the existence of an
account receivable, such as examining subsequent cash receipts. All of these
factors together may provide the necessary level of comfort for an auditor who
uses an unstructured approach; not all of them are likely to be encompassed by
the quantitative algorithm that is an integral part of a structured approach.
Stated simply, deciding whether the appropriate sample size for confirmation
should be 50 or 100 isn't nearly as important as the way the auditor integrates
the knowledge obtained from all the other audit procedures that are likely to be
performed.

The Role of Compliance Tests
Lastly, I noted earlier the Cushing-Loebbecke view that a compliance test
audit strategy is usually part of a highly structured audit methodology. C&L's
experience has been that, for many of our clients, an audit strategy of relying
on controls is often inefficient. With the exception of the largest industrial and
commercial companies and large- and medium-sized financial institutions, a
substantive test strategy, supplemented by little more than the minimum level
of understanding of the system that is required by the professional literature, is
likely to produce a more efficient audit. Our methodology is not locked in on
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this point, and we have not abandoned our long-standing attention to the
client's control system. Each situation, however, should be looked at individu
ally, and the partner should determine whether a completely substantive test
approach would be more efficient for a particular client or a particular audit
area. C&L also believes that, in considering the costs and benefits of a
compliance test mode, the auditor must include cost and benefit factors that are
not related to the specific engagement, such as staff hiring, availability,
training, and retention. Even so, in many cases a strictly substantive test
approach is more economical. An audit methodology that biases the auditor
against reaching that conclusion is inappropriate, whether it's structured or
unstructured.

Decision Aids
The apparently heavy emphasis on quantitative algorithms that is part of a
highly structured approach seems to suggest that firms with structured
approaches provide more "decision aids" to staff auditors than do firms with
unstructured approaches. For example, one firm believes that the judgmentmaking process is enhanced by providing its auditors with a formula for
determining materiality. At C&L, we also provide decision aids to our staff—in
fact, we believe that Montgomery's Auditing is the profession's best decision
aid, and we have others as well—but we do so with great care, great restraint,
much training, and many caveats. Decision aids can enhance audit judgment but
can never replace it. Also, a decision aid should not be considered reliable
solely because it has been formulated based on past practices. A decision aid
that attempts to quantify a consensus without first ascertaining what the
correct judgment should have been may well give the auditor who applies it
what some have referred to as "the delusion of precision."

Conclusion
In summary, the research on error detection by Hylas and Ashton indicated
that in many instances the auditor's first knowledge of a financial statement
error came not through detailed tests that produced so-called hard audit
evidence, but rather through such relatively soft procedures as discussions
with the client, analytical reviews, and observation—hardly procedures that
lend themselves to a great deal of structuring or to quantitative algorithms.
That study suggests that the auditor's decision-making process is much more
complex than any quantitative model would suggest.
In their study on audit methodologies, Cushing and Loebbecke suggest that
many of the larger CPA firms have revised their audit methodologies in recent
years and that the changes have generally been toward more structured
approaches. They cite three motives for those changes: "(1) a need to
implement a consistent approach across a large practice; (2) a need to control
audit risk and audit costs more effectively; and (3) a desire to achieve a
distinguishable image in the market place." I think a strong case can be made
that those objectives can be achieved through an audit methodology that allows
the auditor, based on an understanding of the client and industry, to exercise
judgment in deciding what audit evidence is appropriate in the circumstances,
whether to compliance test or not, and whether to consider more nonquantifia4
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ble evidence than a highly structured methodology would accommodate. The
judgments the auditor must make in auditing under an unstructured approach
are no different from those, particularly valuation judgments, that the auditor
must ultimately make in assessing the overall fairness of financial statement
presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
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Discussant's Response to
The Case for the Unstructured Audit Approach
Carl S. Warren
University of Georgia, Athens
I would like to begin by making a few general comments concerning Jerry's
paper. I found the paper somewhat unstructured, which supports the use of the
title, and I found no new quantitative evidence in the paper supporting the
unstructured approach, although the paper does cite support from the HylasAshton study. Interestingly, however, this study was based upon the practice
of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., a firm which most would classify as highly
structured.
I plan to structure the remainder of my comments in three main areas: (1)
areas of agreement, (2) points of concern, and (3) questions in need of further
elaboration.

Areas of Agreement
Jerry makes several statements in the paper which I would defy anyone to
disagree with. For example, no one could possibly argue with the following
points:
Audit firms should perform effective, efficient audits.
Auditors need to integrate knowledge obtained throughout the audit
process.
However, such statements add little to either the academic or practitioner
literature and provide no new insights.

Points of Concern
My primary point of concern is that Jerry has set up a straw man (or straw
person if you wish) which he easily attacks and dismisses as an inappropriate
audit approach. This straw man is, of course, the structured audit approach.
For example, Jerry suggests that a structured approach is likely to involve a
series of seven policies*. However, few practitioners or academicians would
endorse any of these policies. Consequently, it is not surprising that Jerry
arrives at the conclusion that the structured approach is an inappropriate audit
approach. To illustrate, I have briefly analyzed each of these policies below:
1. All potential new clients would be investigated to the same extent.
* Jerry indicates that the seven policies used to define a structured audit approach were adapted
from the Cushing and Loebbecke study on audit methodologies. The final version of this study was
unavailable as of the symposium date. Irrespective of their source, the point remains that the
seven policies are so restrictive as to be meaningless in comparing a structured approach with an
unstructured approach.
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2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

I know of nofirmswhich would endorse such a policy. As clients
differ in business risk and audit risk so too would the extent of
pre-audit investigations. Perhaps Jerry had in mind that all new
clients would be investigated to some minimum extent. Most
academicians and practitioners would agree with such a state
ment.
All audit areas would be audited at a certain standard level of effort.
Again, I know of nofirmswhich would endorse such a policy. As
audit areas differ by risk levels, so would the extent of work. In
addition, the optimal level of auditing for any given area would
also depend upon the cost of auditing the area. For example,
cash is often audited to a relatively low level of tolerable error
simply because the cost is not high. Perhaps Jerry had in mind
some minimum level of auditing for each area.
A totally substantive approach to an audit or to one audit area would
not be possible, and some detailed compliance tests would always be
required
Again, I know of no firms which would endorse such a policy.
Compliance tests are frequently not conducted in many areas of
the audit.
If the auditor wished to rely on internal control for one audit
objective for one type of transaction, internal control would have to
be relied on to meet all audit objectives for all types of transactions
and related accounts.
This statement is so extreme so as to be nonsense.
Statistical sampling would be used for all detailed tests.
Again, this statement is simply nonsense.
Materiality would be allocated to various audit areas using a
statistical algorithm that totally ignored qualitative considerations.
This statement has some merit. Materiality should be allocated
across audit areas consistent with the philosophy of SAS 47;
however, depending upon how one defines qualitative considera
tions, such factors could be considered. In addition, one should
also recognize that how the auditor considers materiality alloca
tion depends upon the auditor's sampling approach. For exam
ple, dollar unit samplers can be said to consider materiality
allocation in a broad sense when they establish the tolerable
error for their samples.
Inherent risk would not enter into the determination of the scope of
audit procedures at all—that is, inherent risk would be set at 100
percent—presumably because the evaluation and assessment of
inherent risk are not susceptible to quantitative determination.
I personally believe that it is in the best interests of the
profession if auditors would adhere to this policy. However, SAS
47 clearly recognizes that inherent risk may be relied upon and
set at less than 100 percent. Given the competitive environment
of public accounting, I seriously doubt if any firm, structured or
unstructured, would adopt this policy.

The above analysis suggests that 6 out of the 7 policies which Jerry
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attributes to a structured approach are at best unrealistic and at worst
misleading.
Early in the paper Jerry complains about the use of the terms "structured''
and "unstructured" and suggests that the term unstructured carries a
negative stigma, whereas the structured approach does not allow or minimizes
auditor judgment. Clearly, regardless of what audit approach is followed, the
nature of auditing requires professional judgment. Jerry has apparently missed
the essence of a structured approach. Specifically, firms employing structured
approaches attempt to develop heuristics (or rules of thumb) to enhance the
auditor's judgment process—not to reduce or eliminate the role of judgment.
Jerry also takes pains to point out that the structured approach would lead
to inefficient auditing. However, this analysis is in many ways irrelevant
because it is based upon the straw man that was set up early in the paper. For
example, an audit approach that requires compliance testing in all areas will
clearly be inefficient. In addition, the difficulty of relating internal accounting
controls to substantive testing is a concern of both the structured and
unstructured approaches. Finally, if structured firms were as inefficient as
Jerry suggests, then there should be a shift in the market share away from the
less efficient structured firms to the unstructured firms, if for no other reason
than because the unstructured firms could offer their audits at a lower cost.
However, examination of recent changes in auditors among public companies
indicate that structured firms seem to be doing as well as unstructuredfirmsin
obtaining new clients.

Questions in Need of Elaboration
In general I found the information content of Jerry's paper small. I would
have liked to have seen Jerry expand upon some of the unique aspects of what
he believes is the Coopers & Lybrand audit approach. For example, the
reperformance of control procedures is a standard practice for many firms. As
a matter of fact, this is a policy of many structured firms. In addition, the
distinction between disciplinary and basic controls and how C&L uses this
distinction in their audit approach was not clear. Jerry's example of accounts
receivable confirmations was confusing to me. If the audit objective is
existence of the account, I don't understand how the auditor could be satisfied
through reliance on supervisory controls and the functioning of the shipping and
billing functions.

Concluding Remarks
Perhaps the real issue that this paper brings to light is: "What is an
effective, efficient audit?" Conceptually, we can address this question (see
SAS 47), but on a practical basis we have no way of measuring the product of
the audit process. This product can be conceptually stated as the likelihood that
material errors exist in thefinancialstatements reported upon. Thus, we have
the debate about a structured versus unstructured approach, the usefulness of
compliance testing, etc. Until we devise a measure of audit quality, little real
progress will be made on determining the properties of a normative audit.
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4

The Case for the Structured Audit
John Mullarkey
Touche Ross & Co.
This paper provides: 1) a definition and illustration of a structured audit; 2)
a comparison to other types of audit approaches; 3) some analysis of the audit
environment including a segmentation of the different levels of audit activity;
and 4) comparisons of the different types of audit approaches within the broad
categories of audit activity.

What is a Structured Audit?
As this term is not common, it may be useful to see how it was derived. A
dictionary definition of "structure" provides the following elements:
• A meaningful frame of reference
• An established relationship between components
• A set of rules or an agenda to be followed
• An arrangement in a definite pattern of organization.
Therefore, a structured audit would be one with a meaningful frame of
reference, with different areas of the audit clearly related to one another, with
a predetermined way of proceeding, and with a definite pattern of organization.

An Example of the Structured Approach
The Touche Ross Audit Process is an example of a structured audit
approach in that it is based on a conceptual framework that is used to design a
program for each specific audit engagement. Our process enables us to focus
our audit effort—and get results—where audit risks and significance are
greatest. It is based on two major assumptions, namely:
• No two audits are so similar that major differences will not have to be
dealt with
• Risk assessment and a focus on the entity's transactions provide an
organizational framework that can be applied across all audits.
The process is neither overly rigid nor lacking in direction and thrust—it
provides a disciplined approach based on risk assessment to determine audit
effort. Recognizing that no two companies are identical, the process focuses on
the company's transactions, a focus that unifies the audit effort as it does the
company's operations. It works this way: first, we understand the company's
business because that understanding is vital to a focused audit. Second, we
understand the company's operating transactions because these are the
tangible evidence of business activity and the unifying ingredient in every
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company's internal accounting control systems. This understanding is then
focused (a) on the potential errors in transactions or their recording for the
period under audit and (b) on judgments about probable future transactions and
their effect on the financial information being reported.
The process is performed, as illustrated in Figure 1, in three phases:
• Phase I, Planning and Evaluation: Where should audit attention be
concentrated and how shall we satisfy our audit objectives? That
depends, of course, on what the company does, its location, size,
control systems, and many other matters. Using our knowledge of
the industry, we broadly consider information about the client's
business, identify areas of significance and risk, document major
accounting systems, begin evaluation of internal control, and develop
the overall audit plan.
• Phase II, Testing: If our reliance on internal control will be signifi
cant, we test and evaluate the system. This is an efficiency and
effectiveness decision based on the apparent reliability of the system.
Ordinarily, the larger the company, the more significant is the need
for a well-developed control system that sorts and processes its vast
number of transactions. The smaller the company, the more neces
sary it becomes, usually, to test transactions and balances them
selves rather than the control system. In either case, both kinds of
tests are significant. The process uses both approaches to transac
tion testing, as appropriate, to achieve our integrated, specific audit
objectives.
• Phase III, Completion of the Audit: The nature and extent of the
work required depends on our assessment of the likelihood of errors
in the financial statements, together with our conclusions from
Phases I and II of the audit. The procedures, all of which are
correlated with specific audit objectives, are analytical and detailed.

Other Types of Audit Approaches and Their Basis
Two other basic types exist, namely:
• Unique approach—each audit is so different that a generalized
approach is not possible, and each audit must be individually de
signed.
• Predesigned approach—all audits are so similar that a specific ap
proach can be designed for all parts of the audit.
The "unique" approach is based either on the assumption that each audit is
so different that it must be designed without use of a general approach or
structure, or that use of a general approach is not cost effective. This approach
places a particular burden on the planner of the audit to use the full measure of
audit knowledge and experience in each engagement. It requires the audit
planner to be a seasoned and knowledgeable audit professional with a
particularly good grasp of audit techniques and interrelationships. More than
likely, it requires a management group professional (supervisor, manager, or
partner) as the planner.
The "predesigned" approach is based on the assumption that all audits, or
at least a very large part of all audits (say 80-90 percent), have so many
similarities that a predesigned approach (with modest tailoring) is effective.
Naturally a number of predesigned approaches can be developed. This
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approach requires more than a recognition that different industries may require
different approaches—it would also have to address such issues as whether the
audit would be conducted substantially at year end or would involve significant
work at an interim date.
Another possible assumption that may support the "predesigned" ap
proach could be characterized as the work-level assumption. Simply put, there
would be a tradeoff between investing more experienced audit team members
in the planning of a specific audit and requiring far more work than necessary to
achieve the audit objective.

Auditing Today and Tomorrow
While each approach in the abstract can be argued to be best, auditing is not
performed in the abstract. Before comparisons can be made, we must look at
the audit environment as it is today and as it may become.
Auditing today is much more competitive than it was not too long ago.
Consequently, some emphasis must be placed on how audit objectives can be
achieved in a cost-beneficial way. Additionally, retaining good auditors is
becoming a real concern of the public accounting profession because audit
experience continues to be an excellent background for financial and manage
ment positions in the private and public sector. This situation requires a
recognition of the nature and level of work performed by our audit staff as to
whether it is challenging, pertinent, and builds useful skills. As well, the
mid-1980s are a period of rapid, significant change and unprecedented
challenge. Whole sectors of our economy and those of other countries are
undergoing profound restructuring. As an example, the U.S. has moved from
essentially a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy; moreover,
some of our most stable sectors are now much more fluid (e.g., the whole
financial services sector). All these factors relate to an assessment of
competitive approaches to designing and executing audit activities. The
assessment should also give serious attention to the services the audit team is
expected to provide now and in the next few years.
More specific discussion may help to make these choices more apparent.
Auditing is a demanding profession. It encompasses a significant range of
activities from specific activities (e.g., determining how many items to test) to
complex and subjective procedures (e.g., assessing the adequacy of an
accounting estimate). Auditing will become even more demanding as the
business community takes on different reporting responsibilities, such as
widespread assurances on prospective financial information or on significantly
different financial information such as a larger role for human resource
accounting information that seems a natural part of the evolution to a servicebased economy.

Financial Information Continuum
A useful way to address the audit and choose which of the three audit
strategies might be best is to consider the nature of thefinancialinformation
subject to audit. Financial information can be roughly segmented, as illustrated
in Figure 2. Perhaps an illustration would help. Inventory is a simple example
and can be segmented in the following manner:
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Mostly Factual—how many and what types of inventory items are
there? One related audit decision: how many items to count.
Interpretive and Allocation—Howshould the cost of material and labor
be related to each inventory unit? One related audit decision: how
consistent is the method used this year to allocate these costs
compared with prior years, and does the allocation result in reasonable
cost for each inventory item?
Mostly Predictive—Should the inventory be valued at cost or market?
One related audit decision: is the probable sales price of the item
greater than cost? If not, what is the probable sales price?
Audit activities should be directly related to who on the audit team will
perform them and to the level of their knowledge, skill, and experience base.
Also the activities should focus directly on the conclusions that each audit team
member can actually make so that those performing the activities have
sufficient ability to understand the findings and how they interrelate to other
parts of the audit. With this overview of the nature and relative subjectivity of
financial information, a broad analysis of audit activities can be made and a
consideration of who should perform them discussed.
• Audit activities associated with the verification of mostly factual
information involve stafffrom the initial to senior category (usually less
than four years' experience). This area usually makes up the largest
part of the time spent on each audit. These activities are critical to
the audit because they provide the basis on which certain financial
statement items are stated. Just as critically, they provide the
evidence basis necessary for more skilled and experienced audit team
members to challenge other assertions in the financial statements
Figure 2
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that require subjective or more complex judgments, especially those
involving consideration of future probabilities.
• Audit activities associated with the interpretive and allocation aspects of
financial information. These audit activities generally interrelate the
audit work on mostly factual data to the financial information pre
sented. Since it is the same basic process as the supervision of the
audit field work, it is normally performed by the in-charge person—
either a senior or supervisor. Specifically, as related to the financial
statements, the activity is directed at determining whether the
entity's underlying events and transactions have been presented in
the financial information in conformity with generally accepted ac
counting principles. Related to the audit work, the activity is directed
at determining whether all of the underlying audit activities and
findings have been correlated to the financial information and have
been presented in a manner that will provide a reasonable basis for
the audit opinion on the financial information under examination.
• Audit activities associated with the professional challenge of the more
complex, subjective, or predictive judgments that are reflected in
financial statement assertions. This area usually involves audit en
gagement management using information that has been verified by
audit staff together with their own skills, experience, and knowledge
as expert auditors and accountants. Though it is not a large part of
the time spent on most audits, it is usually the most critical in that it
deals with the most significant risks that the financial statements
might contain a material misstatement.

How to Assess
The competing audit strategies have been briefly defined and discussed.
The nature of the audit has been segmented and discussed to illustrate what is
involved and who is involved in terms of staff and in-charge and engagement
management. Who should be involved in the performing of the different parts of
the audit also has been specified. The balance of this paper attempts to deal
with how each audit strategy relates to each of these segments of the audit and
the effect on the audit staff.

What Audit Strategy For Mostly Factual Information?
The work associated with the verification of the mostly factual information
underlying the audit is performed by the less experienced members of the audit
team and is a large part of most audits. This part of the audit involves a number
of possible audit approaches, e.g., an audit involving some reliance on internal
accounting controls, one involving little reliance on internal accounting con
trols, or a mix of reliance on some internal accounting controls for some parts
of the audit and little reliance in other parts of the audit. This stage also
involves a number of generic audit procedures, e.g., compliance and substan
tive tests with a substantial number of actual procedures that can be used
depending on how the entity authorizes, executes, records, and maintains
accountability for its resources. The objective of the audit activities here, as
with all audit work, is to have an audit plan to "search for errors or
irregularities that would have a material effect on thefinancialstatements, and
to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that examination." AICPA
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Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards at Section 327.05 goes on to
say:
The Auditor's Responsibility
.05 The independent auditor's objective in making an examination of
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards is to form an opinion on whether the financial statements
present fairly financial position, results of operations, and changes in
financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles consistently applied. Consequently, under generally accepted
auditing standards the independent auditor has the responsibility, within
the inherent limitations of the auditing process. (see paragraphs
.11-.13), to plan his examination (see paragraphs .06-.10) to search for
errors or irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial
statements, and to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that
examination. The auditor's search for material errors or irregularities
ordinarily is accomplished by the performance of those auditing pro
cedures that in his judgment are appropriate in the circumstances to
form an opinion on the financial statements; extended auditing pro
cedures are required if the auditor's examination indicates that material
errors or irregularities may exist (see paragraph .14). An independent
auditor's standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the financial
statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of
errors or irregularities.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine where such possible risks could
exist. Again using inventory as an example, the three approaches could be
roughly compared.
For work on a specific account or transaction:
• Unique Audit. The planner is a member of engagement management
and would know whether inventory has such a risk in it.
• Structured Audit. Using a transaction and a risk approach, the
significance of inventory is determined, and the specific risk of
possible material error or irregularity is assessed (i.e., high, moder
ate, low).
• Predesigned Audit. The specific amount of audit activities subject to
some tailoring is designated without specific consideration of risk in
this engagement. It would be based on a general consideration of risk
in a number of similar engagements.
Relating work on a specific account or balance to other audit work:
• Unique Audit. The planner knows how the audit work interrelates
and specifies the effect of that interrelationship on other audit work to
be performed.
• Structured Audit. Transactions tie together most of the major
activities of the entity under examination. Therefore, following the
transaction from initiation to its final destination enables the relation
ship to other audit work to be detailed.
The relationships that need to be understood and interrelated in either
approach for just a single transaction will indicate the complexity. The normal
interrelationships and effects of just a single transaction, assuming that a
significant risk could exist, requires consideration that a number of possible
things can go wrong with a transaction. For example, some of the things that
can go wrong with a sales transaction are:
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• Sales can be recorded, but goods are not shipped;
• Goods can be shipped but not recorded;
• Sales can be recorded incorrectly;
• Sales can be improperly costed;
• Sales can be recorded in the wrong period.
To prevent or detect these possible errors, many different controls may
appear to exist. A decision has to be made as to which controls—manual or
EDP-based—to test in relation to one or more potential errors. Alternatively,
controls may not be a significant part of the audit, and substantive tests will not
take into the account any reliance on controls (except that necessary to meet
the objectives of auditability and controls sufficient to enable substantive audit
tests to be performed). Note that some auditing procedures may pertain to
more than one potential error, whereas in other cases a combination of auditing
procedures and related assurances may be necessary to deal with a single
potential error type.
Finally, a single transaction (and related potential errors) will affect at least
two financial statement account balances as a consequence of double-entry
bookkeeping. In many cases, transaction and related potential errors in one
transaction can affect other parts of the transaction stream (e.g., the
relationship between the sales system and the costing system). While this
formulation takes some license with the audit process—it would need to be
substantially expanded to specifically address the decisions that actually need
to be made—it does point out the complexity of the interrelationships the
auditor must deal with.
• Predesigned Approach. All of these relationships can be specified in
general statements of audit activities that will require only modest
tailoring.

What Audit Strategy For Interpretive
and Allocative Aspects of Financial Information?
This part of the audit addresses whether all the underlying events and
transactions have been presented in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles in the financial information to be presented prior to the
necessary valuation decisions addressed in the next section (mostly the
predictive aspects of financial information). As it relates to this level of audit
work, it means whether all of the underlying audit activities have been
correlated in a manner that provides a reasonable basis for an audit opinion as
to whether the financial information under examination represents appropri
ately authorized, executed, recorded, and summarized transactions and
events.
The different approaches in this area are:
• Unique Audit. The focus would be on exceptions to the plan, whether
they were different than anticipated and how that affects work still to
be done or already done. The work is usually arranged in relation to
account balances.
• Structured Audit. The work performed is arranged in relation to
major transactions (initiation to account balance) or balance (interre
lated to transaction base). It provides an indication of risks and
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considers their significance and how the audit work leads to the
specific assessments.
• Predesigned Approach. The predesigned approach is modified to
consider matters that were different than anticipated. The work is
usually arranged in relation to account balances.
The differences are pronounced. Both the unique and the predesigned will
usually result in working papers that relate auditfindingsto account balances
and separate the work done to understand systems, etc., and the amount of
work shown in other sections of the working papers. The structured approach
normally interrelates transactions, systems, procedures performed, and as
surances achieved in relation to the transaction stream and resulting year-end
balances.

What Audit Strategy For Mostly Predictive Aspects
of Financial Information?
This area of audit activities relates mostly to subjective and complex
decisions made by engagement management in relation to the necessary
valuation decisions inherent in generally accepted accounting principles.
Consider this analysis of the different approaches:
• Unique Approach. Usually whoever develops the audit approach
would make these difficult decisions. Although some generalization is
necessary, the audit work should be directly helpful to these
significant audit decisions.
• Structured Approach. This approach provides an integrated presenta
tion in relation to major transaction streams and assessments of risk,
how those risks were dealt with, and the related conclusions (why
more work was done and the results of that work). In effect, it is an
integrated view segmented by major groups of transactions and
balances.
• Predesigned Approach. This approach is usually a segmented articula
tion of work performed, accounts analyzed, and points to be consid
ered. Integration of the audit work requires specific work by the
manager or partner at this point to get information from the audit that
is necessary to make these difficult and complex decisions.

Overall Assessment—Effect on Audit
While all these different audit strategies can work, their differences should
be considered when deciding which one is best or when to use each one.
Unique Approach. This approach places the responsibility for planning the
whole audit on management group personnel. If a firm does not have a defined
way of performing its audit, then the auditor who will be making the final
decision or some other auditor with a very high level of skill and ability would
have to plan the audit. The fact that a person at this level needs to be involved
in the planning of the part of the audit dealing with mostly predictive
information does not justify the need to have to do all the planning. This
stipulation seems excessive and inefficient. It should not be necessary for a
professional at this level to interrelate all of the detail previously described in
the section for mostly factual information. Further, since the mostly factual
area addresses a large segment of audit work performed by the audit staff, is it
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not also incumbent on this planner to do most of the supervision and staff
guidance necessary? Few would or could adequately describe in an audit plan all
of the matters that they believe the staff should be alert to when performing
this work. At the same time, in firms and audits where the partner works
closely with one or two audit team members, this could not only be a good
approach but more than likely the best approach. Therefore, where there is
frequent and direct supervision, review, and guidance of the audit staff, this
approach works well. However, it probably would not provide a good base for
building audit skills, since most staff members would be reluctant to constantly
be asking questions about why such an approach was taken.
Predesigned Approach. In small entities and simpler environments, a
predesigned approach can work well because the number of audit options is
limited. There may only be two or three different approaches that could be
used in a year-end audit of a small entity where control systems are adequate
enough to make the entity auditable and to enable the design of substantive
tests; however, no reliance could be placed on such controls in performing an
audit. Except for these circumstances, the predesigned approach is severely
limited in that it can miss actual important risks and allocate excessive work in
relation to risk in other areas. It also does not provide a good basis for
developing audit skills since staff will normally be presented with an approach
thought to be sufficient for the specific audit. It does not provide insight into
why it is sufficient for the specific circumstance because it is a general
program. Moreover, it invariably states that modification should be made, but
without a framework, modifications are difficult to make and not always
welcomed. Usually, modifications require reasoning and, with the exception of
doing more work because problems were found, reduction of the work without
a framework is difficult to justify and can even be dangerous.
Structured Approach. This approach provides a framework of the major
transactions or balances and the assessment of the nature of the risk in relation
to the possibility that material error or irregularities may exist. This approach
is quite different in the way it relates to auditors' planning and performance. It
requires that they study the company and think through their own plan as to
what is necessary. Consequently, the person performing the task is much
more aware of why the task is performed and what the results of the work
might mean. The structured approach moves the responsibility for actual
involvement in audit strategy much closer to those who perform the task than
do the other approaches. But it does require a clear understanding and use of
the skills and knowledge of the specific individual who will perform the task; it
also requires firms using this approach to provide training in audit techniques,
theory, and the interrelationships of the audit to the work they will perform.
(For example, Touche Ross has a comprehensive curriculum that segments
these considerations in relation to the audit task that each staff member is
authorized to perform.) This approach also brings the focus of audit strategy
much closer to the person who will do the work so as to provide the basis
needed to assess the results of the work performed. While this effect is a key
as to why it is a good approach, a significant investment in training and on-thejob supervision is required. If the staff is engaged mostly in audit activities or
closely related activities, it is cost effective. On the other hand, if audit work is
infrequent, it is doubtful if the investment required will be cost effective.
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The Effect of Different Audit Approaches on Staff
Auditing is not only a demanding profession, but it is also one where a
person never stops learning: for example, understanding many different kinds
and sizes of businesses; how management organizes for success; and different
control systems and control strategies. Which audit process is used also affects
how much the staff learns and determines who should perform what pro
cedures. The predesigned approach obviously provides the least possibility for
staff growth in relation to particular auditing procedures. In that it is a
predesigned approach, those using it are predisposed to accepting the
approach and are reluctant to tailor it extensively. Also, they might be
discouraged by engagement management from substantially tailoring the
predesigned approach because it may require more extensive justification to
specify why the predesigned approach was tailored than to execute the
predesigned approach.
Similarly, the unique approach designed by an experienced auditor leaves
the staff with little ability to tailor because it is prepared by a more experienced
person. The staff would be reluctant to use their insights to challenge a more
senior person who likely will be reviewing their work and determining what is
appropriate in the circumstances.
The structured approach, on the other hand, specifies that interrelation
ships should exist within a framework of dealing with the risks in an audit and
would not only provide a basis to allow earlier involvement in audit planning but
would provide more clarity as to the objective of the work performed. As a
result, individuals think through their part of the audit with transactions and
risk as a guide. They would be more inclined to tailor programs specifically to
the risk since there is no general program available dealing with the specific
way to plan this part of the audit. Depending upon what plans the firm has for
people, the audit approach could be significant. The structured approach
requires individuals to think through the process in relation to the specific risk
they will be dealing with. Thus, it encourages them to be intensive in their
consideration of the risk and specific in relation to how those risks are dealt
with. At the same time, it requires that more planning time be given in a
specific audit to this process of thinking through the audit objectives and how
they can be achieved. Therefore, it requires more time in planning than
ordinarily would be the case in the other approaches.
However, if the firm's desire is to build a strong business consultation
function with its auditors, then dealing with objectives and how objectives are
met in an early part of the career of an individual auditor is a good strategy. On
the other hand, if the firm is oriented to delivery of an audit at least cost, then
the time spent by people struggling with risks and how risks can be met in
specific circumstances may not turn out to be the way to accomplish that
objective most effectively. In fact, having a more senior person plan and
directly participate in a large part of the audit may actually result in similar
objectives being met with less total cost.

Summary
The decision points for the best approach are within the firm and how it
actually practices. On balance, the structured approach for firms that have
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substantial audit work provides a vehicle for staff development and a clearer
understanding of the work they are performing. It provides a framework that
all levels of staff can understand and use in determining what work needs to be
done and interrelating their work to achieve the audit objective. In essence, it
provides a vehicle for the staff to understand the audit objectives they are
assigned, to design effective approaches, and indeed, even to challenge
approaches in a logical and knowledgeable way.
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Discussant's Response to
The Case for the Structured Audit Approach
Gary L . Holstrum
University of Southern California
My comments on this paper relate to two overriding factors. The first is my
basic agreement with the argument for a structured audit approach, and the
second is my disagreement with the polar extreme used by Mullarkey to
describe what he calls the "predesigned" audit approach. With respect to the
first factor, many of the participants in this symposium are already aware of my
advocacy of a structured audit approach. During the past few years, I have
argued in support of such a structured approach—with a related overall
conceptual framework and integrated decision aids—in various articles, confer
ence papers, and seminar presentations. It seems appropriate and fair for me
to disclose my prior orientation and biases regarding this topic. When I
originally read this paper, I dutifully attempted to be very critical and
immediately made numerous critical comments. However, after reading the
Sullivan paper, which is presented at this symposium as a case against a
structured audit approach, I realized that any criticisms I had of the Mullarkey
paper were relatively editorial.

Polar Extremes
With respect to the second factor, I take issue with the polar extreme used
to describe the predesigned approach in Mullarkey's presentation of his
trichotomy of audit approaches (unique, structured, and predesigned). Specifi
cally, I question whether any firm that is actively engaged in audit practice
could appropriately be placed in the "predesigned approach" category.
According to the author, an important characteristic of a "predesigned"
approach is its failure to evaluate the audit risks of specific clients and to adapt
the audit approach in response to such specific client risk. In describing the
predesigned approach, Mullarkey states: "The specific amount of audit
activities subject to some tailoring is designated without specific consideration
of risk in this engagement." I am unaware of any firm that engages in audit
practice that has a policy of not giving consideration to audit risk in the specific
engagement. Furthermore, the only comparative study of audit approaches of
firms conducted to date (Cushing and Loebbecke) did not find any firms that
could appropriately be placed in the "predesigned" approach category upon
the basis of this criterion.
1

Comparison with the Cushing and Loebbecke Study
Cushing and Loebbecke conducted a comparative analysis of the auditing
methodologies of all of the "Big 8" firms plus four other large national
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accounting firms. The 12firmscooperated in the study by supplying their audit
practice manuals and related materials to the researchers and designating a
liaison person to help interpret such materials. Let us consider some sim
ilarities and differences between this paper and the Cushing and Loebbecke
study. Mullarkey's definition of a structured audit approach is similar to that of
Cushing and Loebbecke in the sense that both definitions indicate that a
structured approach would include a meaningful frame of reference that
interrelates various components of the audit through the use of a set of
guidelines and a definite pattern of organization. However, Cushing and
Loebbecke included in their description an important property that charac
terized firms with a structured approach: the development and implementation
of various decisions aids to enhance the quality of audit judgments beyond the
placement of complete reliance on subjective judgment. I believe the concept of
using decision aids should be incorporated into the definition of a structured
audit approach.
Cushing and Loebbecke attempted to identify some dimension that would
best explain the basic similarities and differences among the firms, and they
determined that the dimension with the greatest explanatory power was the
degree of structure employed in the audit approach. They found that the firms
in the study could appropriately be arrayed along a continuum representing
degree of structure such that two firms were "highly structured," four firms
were "semi-structured," four firms were "partially structured," and two
firms were "unstructured."
The Cushing and Loebbecke study revealed two important facts about the
most highly structured firms that are relevant to the Mullarkey paper. First,
both of the "highly structured'' firms explicitly consider and adjust for the audit
risk of the specific client engagement. Concerning the two "highly structured"
firms, Cushing and Loebbecke state: "Both utilize explicit criteria for evaluat
ing materiality and risk to shape their overall audit approach to each engage
ment." Second, both of the "highly structured" firms in the study made
extensive use of decision aids in many aspects of the audit process.

General Comments on the Paper
I have three general comments regarding this paper. The first is that the
"predesigned" audit approach is basically a "straw man" or a "null set" in
that no known firm fits into that category; i.e., no existing firm has been
identified that has a policy of not considering the audit risk of the specific client
engagement.
The second general comment is that the discussion of the structured
approach is mostly a reiteration of some basic ideas that are already found in
the Statements on Auditing Standards and that should apply to all approaches,
not just to a structured approach. Mullarkey discusses how the structured
approach develops an understanding of the client's business, evaluates the
client's specific audit risk and internal accounting control, and adjusts substan
tive tests accordingly. These concepts are well ingrained in current profes
sional guidelines, especially the recently issued SAS 43, "Omnibus Statement
of Auditing Standards,'' and SAS 47, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting
an Audit."
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The third general comment is that the paper would be more helpful if it
included specific examples of how a structured audit approach could use
decision aids in various aspects of the audit. It would be helpful to know how
the nature of decision aids should vary for the different types of information
processing represented in Mullarkey's Financial Information Continuum in
Figure 2. For example, for the "purely factual" information, auditors may
utilize relatively simple decision aids such as flowcharts, decision tables, or
statistical formulas. For "interpretive/allocative" information, decision aids
may take the form of worksheets, checklists, or questionnaires that help
remind the auditor of various accounting and auditing guidelines that should be
considered. For "purely predictive" information, more complex decision aids
may be needed, such as financial planning models or artificial intelligence
(decision-support) systems.

Specific Comments
I have four specific comments that are limited to particular sections of the
paper:
1. Although I generally agree with the definition of a structured audit
approach offered on the study's first page, I believe reference to a
"predetermined way of proceeding" is inappropriate. The use of
the word "predetermined" seems to be more consistent with what
Mullarkey calls the "predesigned approach" and is not a necessary
(nor even desirable) characteristic of a structured approach.
2. Mullarkey discusses audit strategy for interpretive and allocative
aspects of financial information, which comprise only a part of the
audit, by stating: "This part of the audit addresses whether all the
underlying events and transactions have been presented in conform
ity with generally accepted accounting principles in the financial
information to be presented." My contention is that this statement
describes what should be the objective for the entire audit process,
not for just the interpretive and allocative aspects.
3. The paper indicates that audit work for both the "unique" and
"predesigned" approaches is usually arranged in relation to account
balances, whereas the work for a structured approach is arranged in
relation to both balances and transactions. I would maintain that
there is nothing in the nature of either the "unique" or "pre
designed" approaches (as defined in the paper) that would preclude
or even discourage arranging audit work in relation to both balances
and transactions.
4. Regarding the relative efficiency of the various audit approaches,
Mullarkey states: " . . . if the firm is oriented to delivering an audit
at least cost, then the time spent by people struggling with risks and
how risks can be met in specific circumstances may not turn out to
be the way to accomplish that objective most effectively.'' I disagree
with the implications of this statement. In my opinion, analyzing the
audit risk associated with specific client circumstances and adapting
subsequent audit work accordingly are crucial factors in conducting
an efficient as well as an effective audit.

Summary
By far the most important point to be emphasized in my evaluation of this
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paper is that I wholeheartedly agree with the basic principles of a structured
audit approach. Although I basically agree with Mullarkey's description of the
desirable components of a structured approach, I believe his description of the
"predesigned approach" represents a polar extreme that cannot be found in
any existing firms. Furthermore, the paper could be improved significantly by
adding specific examples of decision aids applicable to various aspects of the
audit process. Finally, the paper provides a useful basis for dialogue concerning
the proper approach for integrating microcomputers and decision aids into the
audit process.
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5
An Analysis of the Audit Framework
Focusing on Inherent Risk and
the Role of Statistical Sampling
in Compliance Testing
Donald A. Leslie
Clarkson Gordon
Auditors are a loyal brotherhood of arithmetic wizards who when their profession starts to go
down the pipe . . . band together and disagree with one another.
with apologies to J. Hart

The highly competitive professional environment that has developed in the
U.S. over the past 10 years has spread like a cancer throughout most of the
world. As a result, meaningful professional standards are currently more
important to the profession's survival than at any time in its relatively short
existence. Competition can and should be healthy for a profession, ensuring
that users of the professional services receive "value for their money" and
that the profession keeps "abreast of modern technology." Unfortunately, far
too many users of accounting services are tending to treat them as simple
commodities that can be purchased like "groceries on a shelf." Some
observers are of the opinion that "the standard audit is increasingly viewed as
a simple commodity item" and that "a lot of companies are starting to treat
their accountants the way they treat their janitorial service." Extracts from a
recent interview with Ralph Walters on the subject of accounting regulation and
competition in the profession in the U.S. are set out in the Appendix.
1

The purpose of this paper is to assist the profession in establishing a
common audit objective.* In order to ensure that readers do not misinterpret
my intent, I should make it clear at the outset that I do not believe that it is
necessary for all auditors to carry out their audits in exactly the same manner in
similar situations. Rather, it is important that the work that every auditor
carries out achieves a clearly established and well understood audit objective.
Specific audit strategies, audit techniques, and levels of staff expertise and
competence (used to achieve the audit objective) will vary, and it is this
variation that will provide proper, healthy competition for users of accounting
and auditing services.
* Some might argue that current professional pronouncements in Canada and the U.S. provide for
a common audit framework. Others (myself included) would respond with "current practice
certainly does not support this view."
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The Audit Risk Equation
The heart of the audit objective is the audit risk equation which flows
directly from the standard auditor's report. "Present fairly" implies that the
financial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated while "in our
opinion" provides the user with the knowledge that there is some (relatively
small?) risk that thefinancialstatements could contain a material misstatement.
Over the past few years, the most authoritative risk equation in the audit
literature (the Appendix to SAS 39—which had its origin in SAP 54) has been
the subject of critical comments relating to both its validity and its application in
practice on an increasingly frequent basis.
Before analyzing the various risk equations found in the literature, it will be
useful to establish a standard notation to facilitate comparison. The following
terms will be used:
AR—analytical review risk
DIC—detective internal control risk
FAR—final audit risk
IC—internal control risk
IR—inherent risk
PIC—preventive internal control risk
PPE—prior probability of error
PR—posterior risk
STD—substantive test of details risk
FAR is the equivalent of "audit risk" in SAS No. 47 (which replaced "ultimate
risk" [UR] in SAS No. 39). The most common meaning of "ultimate" is "that
beyond which there is no other," and this was certainly not the meaning
intended in SAS 39.**
The SAS 39 risk equation can be expressed as:
FAR = IC x AR x STD
Figure 1 uses a ladder tree diagram to illustrate this equation. Starting at the
lower left rung, there is a .70 probability that IC will detect a material error and
a .30 probability that it will not. If the error is not detected by IC, there is a .60
probability that it will be detected by AR and a .40 probability that it will not be
detected by AR. Likewise, if it is not detected by AR, there is a .75 probability
that it will be detected by STD and a .25 that it will not. The right hand column
sets out the probability of each possible outcome for this model. The FAR (or
ultimate risk in SAS 39 terminology) would be .03*
One of the majorflawswith this model is that it does not recognize that the
components of a set offinancialstatements have different risks because of their
different inherent natures. SAS 39 addressed the inherent risk with the
following footnote:
2

The risk that monetary errors equal to tolerable error would have
** Readers may have noticed that SAS 47 does not use the term "tolerable error." It was
replaced by the expression "errors that could be material, when aggregated with errors in other
balances or classes, to the financial statements taken as a whole."
* Although the .05 ultimate risk used in the Appendix to SAS 39 was intended (?) to be illustrative,
it nonetheless seems to have become a standard.
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Ladder Tree Diagram
Illustrating SAS 39
Sample Risk Equation
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of each
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1.0000

IC
AR
STD

Internal Control
Analytical Review
Substantive Tests of Detail

Figure 1
occurred in the absence of internal accounting controls related to the
account balance or class of transactions under audit is difficult and
potentially costly to quantify. For this reason in this model it is implicitly
set conservatively at one, although audit experience indicates clearly
that it is substantially lower. Accordingly, it is not a factor in the
relationship expressed above. Therefore, the actual risk will ordinarily
be less than UR.
It is exceedingly difficult to agree with the above logic as will be
demonstrated later in this paper. In any event, in SAS 47 the AICPA decided to
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recognize inherent risk as a full-fledged factor in the risk equation. Its status is
similar to that of internal control and analytical review in that the auditor can
"include it if he so desires" by virtue of the statement:
If an auditor concludes that the effort required to evaluate inherent risk
for a balance or class would exceed the potential reduction in the extent
of his auditing procedures derived from reliance on the evaluation, he
should assess inherent risk as being at the maximum when designing
auditing procedures. (paragraph 22)
Thus, the AICPA risk equation now becomes:
FAR = IR x IC x AR x STD
Figure 2 illustrates this modified equation in ladder tree diagram form. The
inherent risk that a material error occurs has been set at .25, and its
complement, the probability that a material error does not occur, is .75. Note
the substantial reduction in FAR (or audit risk as used in SAS 47). If the desired
FAR were .03 as used in Figure 1, the result would be the elimination of STD
(since IR x IC x AR= .25 x .30 x .40 = .03). Later in the paper, it will be
demonstrated that a reduction of STD of this magnitude is not justified with this
IR.
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) use this equation as the focal point of their
critique of the risk analysis model. It is here that they make one of a number of
critical errors in their paper. They say that this equation is "equivalent to the
CICA model" in the CICA Extent of Audit Testing (EAT) Study. Had they
continued reading on the page that contained this model (p. 97), they would
have learned that this model was not recommended by the Study Group. The
EAT Study Group recommended the following model:
FAR=
IR x IC x AR x STD
(IR x IC x AR x STD) + (1 - IR)
A footnote on page 97 of the EAT Study indicates that further information on
the approach can be found in Leslie et al, "Dollar-Unit Sampling," page 296. In
fact, this model is the posterior risk model in Leslie et al (1979). The EAT
Study Group adopted this model because it "takes the effect of inherent risk
more accurately into account." Figure 3 uses the details from Figure 2 and
calculates the "posterior risk." In this instance (highly artificial as will be
demonstrated later), the difference would appear trivial, although the posterior
model would not totally eliminate STD.
It is important to understand the logic applied to Figure 3 to arrive at the
posterior risk. It is entirely Bayesian, applied in a discrete (and thus artificial)
manner. If the prior probability of error is .25, then, if the auditor proceeds up
the steps on the ladder and gets to the end without detecting a material error
(of course, it would be necessary for him to investigate the findings of
employees responsible for internal control in order to determine if IC detected
a material error), he can only be in one of two possible outcomes. Either the
material error actually occurred (.25 probability), and IC, AR, and STD failed
to detect it, or the material error never occurred in the first place (.75
probability). Since preventive internal controls help prevent the error from
occurring in the first place, it is only logical that they be considered together
with the inherent risk of error (this will be dealt with in more detail later).
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Assume for the moment that all internal controls identified were of a detective
nature and, thus, that the PPE is based entirely on IR.
While the difference between the SAS 39-47 equation and the posterior
model was trivial in the illustration in Figure 3, in Figure 4 we see that it can be
several times the nominal risk. In this illustration, the prior probabilities of a
material error and no material error are the reverse of those in Figure 3. If the
proponents of each of these models used an STD of .25 in the situation
illustrated in Figure 4, their equations would be as follows:
SAS 39=.30x.40x.25
=.03
SAS 39-47 =.75 x .30 x .40 x . 25
= .0225
Posterior = .75 x .30 x .40 x .25
= .0826
(.75 x .30 x .40 x .25) + (1 - .75)
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However, if they planned to obtain a (final) risk of .03 based on their planning
models, their equations would appear as follows:
SAS 39 = .30x.40x.25
=.03
SAS 39-47 = .75 x .30 x .40 x .333
= .03
Posterior =
.75 x .30 x .40 x .0859
= .03
(.75 x .30 x .40 x .0859) + (1 - .75)
What would these different values for STD mean in practice? It is useful to
compare the difference in sample extents that would result from these STDs.
Using dollar-unit sampling (zero expected error case) and setting the SAS 39
sample size equal to " 1 , " we get the following relationship:
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SAS 39
1.00
SAS 39-47
.79
Posterior
1.77
The most significent conclusion that can be drawn from this comparison is
that the formal inclusion of IR in SAS 47 will result in an unjustifiable reduction
in STD. Of course, it can be argued that the model in SAS 39 is simply an
example and that it is only intended for planning purposes. However, this
proposition can be countered with the argument that the model used for
planning should be consistent with the model appropriate for evaluation when
the audit evidence has been collected. In my opinion, the only appropriate
conceptual model for audit evaluation is the posterior risk model (with some
Ladder Tree Diagram
Illustrating Risks When
IR/PPE Is High
Probability
of each
outcome

Figure 4
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modifications as will be described later) because it relates directly to the
auditor's objective and the audit opinion. In order to give a clean opinion, the
auditor must be satisfied that there is a reasonably low risk (.03 in this
example) that the financial statements do not contain a material error. The two
AICPA "simple risk models" address this issue only at the planning stage. If
the auditor does not find a material error, the error is not addressed at the
evaluation stage, and the audit objective is simply "assumed" to have been
achieved. It was for this reason that the CICA EAT Study Group adopted the
posterior model. The Study Group was of the view that the auditor's opinion
should be based on the evaluation of the risk that the financial statements
actually contain a material error, given all of the avidence available to the
auditor, and that this model "takes the effect of inherent risk more accurately
into account."
Some members of the AICPA Materiality and Audit Risk Task Force were
concerned that the inclusion of IR in the risk model would result in a reduction
of work because an auditor could always "fall back'' to IR "for more assurance
in highly competitive situations." I certainly share the view of some of my
fellow Task Force members. However, I believe that auditors must address IR
when planning and evaluating an audit (and I believe the judiciary would agree
with my belief). Accordingly, it is even more important that the risk model used
in practice not deceive the auditor by permitting him to think he is achieving a
specific audit risk objective when, in fact, he may be incurring a real risk that is
substantially higher.

Numerical Illustrations
Table 1 provides a comparison of the risks generated by the three different
models based on the risks for IC, AR, and STD in the previous illustrations (the
first three columns). Column 4 contains the risk objective based on the SAS 39
model (.03). Column 5 contains various IR/PPE values from .05 to 1.0, and the
two right-hand columns reflect the risks that would be generated by the SAS 47
model and the posterior model. These risks have been computed in the manner
described earlier in this paper (examples §4 and §10 relate to Figures 3 and 4).
It should be noted that both risks in the final two columns are less than the
SAS 39 risk until the PPE exceeds .50 (actually slightly over .50). Above a
PPE of .50, the SAS 47 risk continues to increase until it reaches its maximum
of .03 when the PPE is 1.0. It is then equal to the SAS 39 risk, demonstrating
in theory, the comment in the footnote to the Appendix of SAS 39 that "the
actual risk will ordinarily be less than UR." Clearly, the word "ordinarily"
should be interpreted to mean situations where the PPE does not exceed .50.
Perhaps this limitation is what the authors of SAS 39 had in mind when it was
drafted. I would suggest, however, that this qualification is not being observed
in practice.
Note that when the PPE is 1.0, the actual (posterior) risk is also 1.0, as is
only logical because a PPE of 1.0 means that the auditor has "perfect"
knowledge that a material error exists and, thus cannot believe the results of
the audit if the error has not been detected. (Obviously, the auditor rarely has
such "perfect" knowledge that a material error exists. Likewise, there rarely
is "perfect" knowledge that a material error does not exist—a PPE of 0.)
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1 0.3000
2 0.3000
3 0.3000
S4 0.3000
5 0.3000
6 0.3000
7 .0.3000
8 0.3000
9 0.3000
S10 . 0 . 3 0 0 0
11 0.3000
12 0.3000
13 0.3000
14 0.3000
15 0.3000
16 0.3000

#

EX.

0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.4000
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
0.2500
TABLE 1

0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.9500
0.9800
0.9900
1.0000

0.9000

0.0500
0.1000
0.2000
0.2500
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.7500
0.8000
0.0015
0.0030
0.0060
0.0075
0.0090
0.0120
0.0150
0.0180
0.0210
0.0225
0.0240
0.0270
0.0285
0.0294
0.0297
0.0300

0.0016
0.0033
0.0074
0.0099
0.0127
0.0196
0.0291
0.0431
0.0654
0.0826
0.1071
0.2126
0.3631
0.5951
0.7481
1.0000

SAS 39 SIMPLE
SAS 47 EXTENDED
LESLIE ET A L
JOINT RISK MODEL
JOINT RISK MODEL POSTERIOR RISK MODEL
INTERNAL: ANALYTICAL SUBS. TESTS (FOR PLANNING INHERENT (FOR PLANNING
(FOR PLANNING AND
CONTROL
REVIEW
OF DETAIL
PURPOSES ONLY) RISK/PPE PURPOSES ONLY)
EVALUATION)

COMPARISON OF RISKS - SAS 39, SAS 47 AND POSTERIOR

Whereas SAS 39 "conservatively" set IR equal to 1, SAS 47 uses the term
"maximum" to "solve" this problem. Unfortunately, this change will
probably not be noticed by most readers of SAS 47, and it is likely to be
obscure to those who do recognize it.
Table 2 contains some comparisons of these three models based on the IC
and AR values used in Table 2 of the Appendix to SAS 39. Here, the .05 risk
objective used in SAS 39 has also been used. For the first eleven examples, IR/
PPE has been set at .50 (often referred to as the equivalent of a uniform prior).
The STD risk for SAS 39 and the posterior model are basically identical.
Logically (from an arithmetic point of view), the SAS 47 allowable risk is double
the risk of the other two.
3

COMPARISON OF TESTING RISK LEVELS REQUIRED
SUBSTANTIVE TEST OF DETAILS
RISK REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A .05
SAS 39
EX.

INHERENT

INTERNAL

ANALYTICAL

#

RISK

CONTROL

REVIEW

"ULTIMATE"
RISK

;

SAS 47

LESLIE

AUDIT

POSTERIOR
RISK

RISK

1

0.5000

0.1000

1.0000

0.5000

NTR

0.5260

2

0.5000

0.3000

1.0000

0.1667

0.1753

3
4

0.5000
0.5000

0.3000

0.5000

0.3333

0.3333
0.6667

0.3000
0.5000

0.3000

0.5556

NTR

0.3510
0.5850

0.5000

0.5000

0.2000

0.2000
0.4000

0.2105

7

0.5000
0.5000

0.5000

0.3000

0.3333

0.6667

0.3510

8

0.5000

9

0.5000

1.0000
1.0000

1.0000
0.5000

0.0500
0.1000

10
11

0.5000
0.5000

1.0000
1.0000

0.3000

0.1667

0.1000

12

0.2500
0.2500

0.1000

1.0000

0.3000

0.2500

0.3000
0.3000

1.0000
0.5000

5
6

13
14

0.5000

1.0000

0.1000

0.1000

0.1052

0.0526

0.2000

0.1053

0.5000

0.3333
NTR

0.1753
0.5260

0.5000
0.1667

NTR
0.6667

NTR
0.5260

0.3333

NTR

NTR

0.3000

0.5556

NTR

NTR

0.5000
0.5000

1.0000
0.5000

0.1000
0.2000

0.4000
0.8000

0.3160
0.6320

0.2500
0.2500

0.5000
1.0000

0.3000
1.0000

0.3333

NTR

NTR
0.1580

21

0.2500
0.2500

1.0000
1.0000

0.5000
0.3000

22

0.2500

1.0000

0.1000

15
16
17

0.2500
0.2500
0.2500

18
19
20

0.0500
0.1000

0.2000
0.4000

0.1667

0.6667
NTR

0.5000

0.3160
0.5260
NTR

NTR = NO TEST REQUIRED
INTERNAL CONTROL AND ANALYTICAL REVIEW
FACTORS FROM TABLE 2 , APPENDIX, SAS 39
TABLE 2
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The bottom eleven examples are based on an IR/PPE set equal to .25 (a
favourable prior). In these cases, the SAS 47 allowable STD risk is four times
the allowable SAS 39 STD risk. On the other hand, the allowable STD risk for
the posterior model is slightly more than three times the SAS 39 allowable STD
risk.
Table 3 contains some additional comparisons where the IR/PPE is
unfavourable (.75 and .90). These comparisons have been made via the dollarunit sampling extent that would be used if no errors were expected.* The SAS
* Given these priors an auditor would be foolish to use what is termed a "discovery sample"
(designed to accept only when no errors are found). However, it is the most convenient case to
use. For sample sizes designed to accept errors without breaching the materiality limit, the
differences in extents would be somewhat less.

COMPARISON OF DUS EXTENTS - HIGH PRIOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR
RATIO OF DOLLAR-UNIT SAMPLE SIZES
SAS 47
EX.

INHERENT

#

RISK/PPE

INTERNAL
CONTROL

ANALYTICAL
REVIEW

TO
SAS 39

POSTERIOR
TO
SAS 39

POSTERIOR
TO
SAS 47

•

1

0.7500
0.7500
0.7500
0.7500
0.7500
0.7500

0.1000
0.3000
0.3000
0.3000
0.5000

8

0.7500
0.7500

0.5000
0.5000
1.0000

1.0000
1.0000
0.5000
0.3000
1.0000
0.5000
0.3000
1.0000

9
10
11

0.7500
0.7500
0.7500

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.5000
0.3000
0.1000

0.8751
0.8394

1.4547
1.5843

4.2945
1.8874
2.6458
5.4473
1.6624
2.0098
2.6458
1.4928
1.6624
1.8874

0.5850

2.5121

4.2945

12
13
14

0.9000
0.9000

0.1000
0.3000
0.3000

1.0000
1.0000

0.8480
0.9412
0.9041
0.8208

4.0954
2.1975

4.8295
2.3348

2.9530
4.6503
1.9318
2.3331
2.9530
1.7162
1.9318
2.1975
4.0954

3.2662
5.6659
2.0244
2.4966
3.2662
1.7788
2.0244
2.3348
4.8295

2
3
4
5
6
7

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000

0.3000
0.5000
0.5000
0.5000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.5000
0.3000
1.0000
0.5000
0.3000
1.0000
0.5000
0.3000
0.1000

0.5850
0.8394
0.7381
0.5106
0.8751
0.8213
0.7381
0.9040

2.5121
1.5843
1.9530
2.7812
1.4547
1.6505
1.9530
1.3495

0.9542
0.9345
0.9041
0.9648
0.9542
0.9412
0.8480
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39 sample size has been set equal to " 1 " for these comparisons. In all cases,
the SAS 47 sample size is less than the SAS 39 sample size. The sample sizes
produced by the posterior model are much larger than both the SAS 39 and
SAS 47 sample sizes.
With respect to the reflection of IR in the audit process, these illustrations
demonstrate that SAS 47 can actually be a retrogressive step if an appropriate
risk model is not employed. It gives too much weight to favourable priors, and
it dangerously ignores those that are unfavourable. On the other hand, SAS 39
ignores the priors entirely, resulting in overauditing when they are favourable
and underauditing when they are unfavourable. It might be tempting to argue
that the situation more than "averages out'' for SAS 39 since far fewer than 50
percent of all audits would have a PPE greater than .50 (and thus overauditing
is more frequent than underauditing). Would such a defense be acceptable in
court? Would users of financial statements who have suffered losses as a result
of inadequate audit extents be happy with such an answer? Losses are certainly
not "averaged out'' over all the clients of an auditor when they are discovered.

Prior Probability of Error—Inherent Risk
and Preventive Internal Controls
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) express serious concerns about the
independence of the factors in the risk model. As a solution, they suggest (page
29):
A more reasonable approach might be to define inherent risk as
conditional upon the quality of the internal control system. Mathe
matically speaking, this is the correct way to formulate the model. It is
also consistent with the frequent audit practice of identifying "special
risks" or "sensitive areas" during audit planning. However, neither
the AICPA nor CICA model suggests or implies such an approach.
I noted earlier that what they referred to as the CICA model is, in fact, the
AICPA post SAS 47 model. I would strongly submit that the CICA model (and,
obviously, the Leslie et al model on which it was based) adequately addresses
this issue. Leslie et al (1979, p. 307) stated:
Of particular relevance to the auditor is the distinction between
preventive controls and detective controls. Preventive controls seek to
prevent the occurrence of errors or irregularities—or, more accurately,
to reduce their chance of occurrence. Detective controls seek to detect
such errors or irregularities as do occur—or, more accurately, to
increase their chance of detection. Usually, both types of control are
desirable. The need for controls of a preventive nature is less, the
greater the inherent insusceptibility to material error. Most auditors
assess the prior probabilities of an error occurring in the first place after
considering the nature and effectiveness of preventive controls.
The Cushing and Loebbecke article leads directly to the conclusion that IR
should be considered "high" if IC is "high." I believe that this is a myth that
should be dispelled. An example will illustrate my point:
Consider the inventories of two different types of business. Firm A is a
largefinancialinstitution that holds billions of dollars worth of marketa
ble securities for its own account and as custodian for customers. Firm
B makes steel reinforced concrete supports for expressway construc100

tion (minimum weight of two tons). An auditor would be very concerned
if Firm A did not have a well designed system of preventive controls (an
appropriate class of vault, armed guards, controlled securities cage,
segregation of duties relating to the recording and custody functions, a
record of certificate numbers, registration of certificates, use of jumbo
certificates [for example, where the holding of Ford Motor Company
stock had not dropped below 900,000 shares for a considerable period,
one share certificate for 900,000 shares would be obtained from the
transfer agent rendering the certificate virtually impossible to dispose of
if stolen or lost], etc.). We know that if Firm A were to leave these
securities sitting on tables in the general office with no such controls,
they would disappear rapidly. Firm B, on the other hand, would waste
money if it fenced the yard, installed an alarm system, hired armed
guards with attack dogs, etc.
Many more examples of contrasting situations of this nature can be cited,
and I am sure that practitioners will find that many come to mind rather quickly.
Thus, if auditors automatically consider IR to be high when IC is high, they are
virtually certain to overaudit in a high proportion of cases. Further, to make
recommendations for preventive control improvements when IR is low (and,
thus, potential benefits are limited) could cause clients to question an auditor's
understanding of the purpose of internal control. Management generally seeks
some constant low risk of errors occurring, and its decision on the implementa
tion of preventive controls will be strongly influenced by the inherent risk of
error in the first place. K.P. Johnson (1981) made some useful comments on
assessing risks that warrant repeating here.
Before a system of internal control can be designed, or an existing
system evaluated, management must know something about the kinds
of business and transaction risks that exist in its particular organization,
assess their significance, and determine which ones cannot be avoided.
Only then can controls be designed to reduce the remaining risks to
those that are consciously acceptable to management and are at a level
that management has consciously determined.
Internal controls should not be confused with, or limited to, the
accounting system. While an accounting system is a necessary element
of a system of internal control, the control system is much larger in
scope. A good system of internal control contains elements that have
little or no relationship to accounting activities. For example, require
ments for advance approval of transactions and restrictions on physical
access to assets are examples of internal controls that reduce the risk of
errors; they also operate outside of the accounting system. Internal
controls are introduced into the accounting system and into other
aspects of enterprise operations to prevent errors from occurring in the
first place, and to detect them on a timely basis if they do occur.
It is important that the inherent risk judgments be made separately for each
financial statement assertion. The illustration above involved the existence
assertion. With respect to the valuation assertion, the inherent risk assess
ment could be just the opposite. For example, the market values for securities
are readily available from reputable independent pricing services. On the other
hand, the steel reinforced structures could involve very complex pricing since
many consist of special high-strength steel rods. The steel is purchased from a
German mill in units of 1,000 kilograms, and the purchase invoice is in
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Deutsche marks. To arrive at a cost, it is necessary to convert steel rod
measurements for length and diameter to pounds, and then to kilograms. It is
then necessary to apply a price per kilogram based on a conversion of Deutsche
marks to dollars with the addition of freight and duty—a far more complex
calculation than the pricing of securities based on an independent pricing
service. The auditor, therefore, would assess the inherent risk for the
valuation assertion as high and would try to identify controls that reduce that
risk.
Figure 5 is an illustration of how an auditor could go about making an
assessment of the PPE. If he were a "quanto," he would make the
assessment in numerical terms by stating a probability. If he were a "judgo,"
he would make the assessment in nonquantitative terms such as high,
moderate, or low. In examples A, B, and C, the IR is high, and he would look
for preventive controls to mitigate the risk. In example A, the preventive
controls are excellent (such as those described for the financial institution
above), and he concludes that the PPE is low. In example B, the PICs are good
(rather than excellent), and he makes an assessment of the PPE as moderate.
In example C, there are no PICs (or any that exist are evaluated as ineffective),
and, thus, he assesses the PPE as high. The same logic applies to examples D
to I. In examples G and H, it should be noted that there is no apparent payback
for identifying PICs. These two examples demonstrate that the auditor is
cognizant of the risk of "double counting."* For example, G would be similar
to Firm B (in the earlier example) fencing its storage yard, installing an alarm
system, hiring armed guards with attack dogs, etc. Any reduction of an already
low risk would be so trivial that it would not be sensible to give any credit for it.
In example D, only partial credit is given since excellent PICs would not
improve the situation beyond a low PPE. The additive illustration in Figure 5 is
not intended to imply that the associated probabilities are additive but, rather,
that the auditor's knowledge of these two components is additive.
4

Thisfigurecan also illustrate why the auditor must work harder when there
is a high PPE. Consider examples A and C. Suppose that in each of these
examples the risks for DIC, AR, and STD are identical and neither auditor finds
a material error during the audit. Logically, the auditor in example A should be
able to sleep well at night because his sample confirmed his prior belief.
However, the auditor in example C should have trouble sleeping at night. His
sample did not find evidence that supported his prior belief—that a material
error more than likely existed. The posterior model would require more
evidence (from one or all of DIC, AR, and STD) to be obtained in example C
than both of the AICPA models. More evidence is required to obtain a "not
guilty" verdict when there is prima facie evidence of a crime than when it is
highly likely that a crime was not committed in the first place.

* Cushing and Loebbecke expressed concern over the independence of the component risks.
Making the PPE assessment in this manner provides protection against this potential problem.
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INHERENT RISK + PREVENTIVE CONTROLS
= PRIOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR

Example

Auditor's Assessment of
Prior
Probability
Pre
of
Inherent ventive [=]
Risk
Error
Controls

Figure 5
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Have We Now Identified the Theoretically
Correct Audit Risk Model?
I have a great subject [statistics] to write upon, but feel keenly my literary incapacity to make
it easily intelligible without sacrificing accuracy and thoroughness.
Sir Francis Galton

Unfortunately, we have not. Cushing and Loebbecke (page 27), in criticiz
ing the SAS 47 model (which they mistakenly identified as the CICA model)
made some valid observations about discrete models of the type we have been
dealing with to this point.*
Models such as this are abstractions of reality. They are used to gain a
better understanding of reality and to make reasonably reliable and
useful predictions. However, they are always simplified; i.e., all aspects
of reality can rarely if ever be accurately incorporated into a model. This
simplification is appropriate as long as it is not overdone or done
improperly. The measure of this would be whether the model caused
the user to misunderstand the reality being represented, or to use the
model unwittingly to make unreliable predictions.
After a discussion of these simple joint risk models, Leslie et al (p. 304)
described the oversimplification as follows:
The joint risk model discussed is an oversimplification because it
assumes that there is only one discrete risk, namely, the risk of a
material error. In fact, there should be a continuous distribution of
probabilities of occurrence (and detection) of errors aggregating various
amounts. . . .
The audit can be described as a continuous process. In theory, the auditor
commences this process with a continuous distribution representing the prior
probability of error based on his assessment of inherent risk and preventive
controls. As each piece of evidence is obtained the auditor revises this
distribution. If the evidence is favourable, the peak of the curve will move away
from materiality, and the area of the curve beyond materiality will diminish.
Conversely, if a piece of evidence is unfavourable, the peak will move toward
materiality, and more of the area will be beyond that point. When all
procedures have been completed, the final (posterior) distribution is the basis
for the opinion given on the financial statements. If the distribution peaks well
to the left of materiality with only a small portion in the right tail, an unqualified
opinion would be warranted. If the distribution peaks to the right of materiality
(most likely error exceeds materiality), a qualified opinion would usually be
warranted. If the distribution peaks to the left of materiality but the area to the
right of materiality is too large, then the risk would be too high to warrant an
unqualified opinion even though a material error would not be likely. The
auditor would not have obtained "reasonable assurance" that a material error
did not exist.
In the past, the theoretically correct model has been virtually impossible to
use in practice. Now, with the increasing use of computerized audit decision
* It should, however, be noted that their concerns are considerably different than mine. Their
paper proposes a model that lacks the same reality that causes their criticism of the post SAS 47
model.
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aids, it is becoming increasingly more feasible. It is not difficult to predict that
within the foreseeable future such complex models will be an integral part of
the audit. In the process of describing the theoretically correct model, I will
avoid the use of calculus and continuous distributions* by chopping up such
distributions into smaller pieces for use in an extended discrete posterior risk
model that behaves like the "real thing."
As noted above, one of the deficiencies with the discrete model is that it
loads all of the prior distribution on two points—zero error and exactly a
material error. In the real world, the prior distribution will extend from at or
near zero to some amount beyond materiality (since there is no known natural
law preventing errors from being greater than materiality). Table 4 contains an
illustration of a model with a uniform prior error distribution. In the far left
column, all possible population error rates are listed in .01 intervals (.00 to
.99—although .34 to .99 have been omitted). The prior probability of each of
these possible error rates is shown in column 2. This is the "no knowledge"
case where every possible error rate is equally probable (a .01 probability for
each). Column 3 contains the probability of finding " 0 " errors in a sample of
100 if the corresponding error rate in column 1 really exists. For example, if a
.01 error really did exist, the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a sample of 100
would be .36603.** Since the possible population error rate of .01 would (given
this uniform prior) only occur with a frequency of .01, the product of columns 2
and 3 represents the frequency of 0 error samples from this particular
underlying error rate. The aggregate of all such values in column 4 represents
all possible samples that contain 0 errors.
Column 2 illustrates how quickly the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a
sample of 100 approaches 0. By the time the possible error rate has reached
.12, the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a sample of 100 has declined to less
than .000003. For this reason, it was not necessary to include the remainder of
the distribution since all values in columns 3 to 6 are 0. This aspect also
resolves another apparent inconsistency with a uniform distribution. While it is
equated to the "no knowledge" state, if materiality were .03, we would have
.03 distributed below materiality and .97 above. In other words, the prior
probability of an error equal to or greater than materiality would aggregate .97.
Since possible population error rates beyond .03 have a diminishing impact on
the model, they do not create a problem.
Since column 4 contains all of the possible 0 error samples of 100 that could
be produced by this underlying uniform error distribution, when we obtain one
of them, we know that it must be one of those in this column. Thus, in column 5
we determine the relative frequency of each of the values in column 4 (each
value divided by the total of column 4). Column 6 contains the values in column
5 "summed-up." If our sample must be one of these (since we found 0 errors)
and we are concerned about an error rate of .03 or greater (the materiality
level), we can see that the probability (posterior risk) that our sample comes
* It is not as a consideration of readers that I avoid the use of calculus to deal with this issue.
Rather, it is the fact that I have never taken calculus that forces this approach.
** All calculations are based on the binomial distribution. Although 5 digits to the right of the
decimal are shown in the tables, Microsoft's Multiplan manual for the Apple Macintosh indicates
that internal calculations are carried out using 14 digits.

105

EXAMPLE OF POSTERIOR RISK - UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
0.090
0.100

0.110
0.120
0.130
0.140 i
0.150
0.160
0.170
0.180
0.190
0.200
0.210
0.220
0.230
0.240
0.250
0.260
0.270
0.280
0.290
0.300
0.310
0.320 i
0.330

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010

Probability
Of 0 Error
In Sample
Of 100
1.00000
0.36603
0.13262
0.04755
0.01687
0.00592
0.00205
0.00071
0.00024
0.00008
0.00003
0.00001
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

Column 2
X

Column 3
0.01000
0.00366
0.00133
0.00048
0.00017
0.00006
0.00002
0.00001
0.00000
0.00000

0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

TABLE 4
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Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4
0.63609
0.23283
0.08436
0.03025
0.01073
0.00377
0.00131
0.00045 i
0.00015
0.00005

Posterior
Risk
( o f error
rate
than
Column 1)
1.00000
0.36391
0.13109
0.04673
0.01648
0.00575
0.00198
0.00068
0.00023
0.00008

0.00002

0.00003

0.00001 i
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

0.00001
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

from a population with an underlying error rate of .03 or more is .04673. This is
virtually identical to the classical (i.e., non-Bayesian) sampling risk for a sample
of 100 and a .03 population error rate (which is .04755 as shown in column 3).
If our sample of 100 had contained, say, 1 error, the probability in column 3
would have been computed for 1 error instead of 0 errors. All other calculations
would remain the same. We make this calculation for the exact number of
errors we find, ignoring all of the other error cases because we know we
cannot be in any of them.
Table 5 (in 3 parts) contains a complete example of a uniform prior. In this
instance, the possible population error rates have been limited to a narrower
range (0 to .099, in 100 increments of .001). This is probably a closer
resemblance to a "no knowledge" distribution for an audit (0 to 3.3 times
materiality rather than 0 to 33 times materiality). At the .03 possible error rate
at the bottom of part 1, it can be seen that the posterior risk of this much error
(or more) is still equivalent to the classical sampling risk.
The subsequent posterior risk tables are all based on a sample of 115 to
facilitate a comparison with Figures 1 to 4. If a .03 error existed, the probability
of a sample of 115 containing 0 errors would also be .03.* Thus, a sample of
115 will yield the same risk as the product of IC, AR, and STD in Figures 1 to 4
(.30 x.40 x .25 = .03).
The illustration at the top of Table 6 represents the 50/50 distribution for a
discrete model (the equivalent of the uniform priors in Tables 4 and 5).** At
the material error value (.03001), the classical sampling probability and the
posterior risk are virtually equal (.03008 and .02920). The SAS 39 model would
imply a risk of .03, the SAS 47 model would imply a risk of .015, and the simple
discrete posterior model would indicate .0291 (see Table 1). However, if the
prior is stacked 50/50 at $1 over and $1 under materiality, the posterior risk
rises to virtually .50 as illustrated at the bottom of Table 6. The illustration at
the top of Table 7 spreads the .5 portion of the prior below materiality in a level
or uniform manner, but stacks the .5 above, right at materiality. In this case,
the posterior risk rises to .08347 or almost three times the stated risks for the
discrete posterior model and the SAS 39 model. It is almost six times the
stated risk for the SAS 47 model. This result is due to the fact that the simple
discrete models ignore reality when they stack the priors on 0 errors and a
material error. Of course, these last two illustrations are not realistic either.
The illustration at the bottom of Table 7 reflects the circumstances in
Figure 3. This condition results in the same posterior risk of .0099. The
circumstances in Figure 4 are reflected in the illustration at the top of Table 8,
and once more the results are in agreement. But neither of these two
illustrations can be considered to represent reality. The illustration at the
bottom of Table 8 contains the same prior as the illustration at the top, but in
* Readers should ensure that they do not confuse the two .03 values. One is a risk; the other is the
materiality level selected for purposes of the illustration. The fact that they are the same in this
illustration is entirely coincidental.
** If $30,000 is the materiality level, does this mean that an amount greater than $30,000 ($30,001
and above) would be material, or does it mean $30,000 and above? To avoid splitting hairs, I have
loaded the portion of the distribution applicable to a material error at or above .03001 and the
portion applicable to less than a material error at or below .02999.
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EXAMPLE OF POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR
Prior
Possible
Probability
Population: Of Error
Error
Rate In
Rates
Column 1
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.010
0.011
0.012
0.013
0.014
0.015
0.016
0.017
0.018
0.019
0.020
0.021
0.022
0.023
0.024
0.025
0.026
0.027
0.028
0.029
0.030
0.031
0.032
0.033

0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010i
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010

Probability
Of 0 Error
In Sample
Of 100
1.00000
0.90479
0.81857
0.74048
0.66978
0.60577
0.54782
0.49536
0.44789
0.40492
0.36603
0.33085
0.29902
0.27022
0.24417
0.22061
0.19930
0.18003
0.16261
0.14686
0.13262
0.11975
0.10811
0.09760
0.08810
0.07952
0.07176
0.06476
0.05843
0.05271
0.04755
0.04289
0.03868
0.03489

Column 3

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate x than
Column 1)

0.01000
0.00905
0.00819
0.00740
0.00670
0.00606
0.00548
0.00495
0.00448
0.00405
0.00366
0.00331
0.00299
0.00270
0.00244
0.00221
0.00199
0.00180
0.00163
0.00147
0.00133
0.00120
0.00108
0.00098
0.00088
0.00080
0.00072
0.00065
0.00058
0.00053
0.00048
0.00043
0.00039
0.00035

0.09607
0.08692
0.07864
0.07114
0.06435
0.05820
0.05263
0.04759
0.04303
0.03890
0.03516
0.03178
0.02873
0.02596
0.02346
0.02119
0.01915
0.01730
0.01562
0.01411
0.01274
0.01150
0.01039
0.00938
0.00846
0.00764
0.00689
0.00622
0.00561
0.00506
0.00457
0.00412
0.00372
0.00335

1.00000
0.90393
0.81701
0.73837
0.66723
0.60288
0.54469
0.49206
0.44447
0.40144
0.36254
0.32737
0.29559
0.26686
0.24090
0.21745
0.19625
0.17710
0.15981
0.14419
0.13008
0.11734
0.10583
0.09545
0.08607
0.07761
0.06997
0.06307
0.05685
0.05124
0.04617
0.04161
0.03748
0.03377

Column 2
X

TABLE 5 - PART 1
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E X A M P L E OF POSTERIOR RISK -

LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR

0.034

0.010

0.03146

0.00031

0.00302

0.03042

0.035
0.036
0.037

0.010
0.010

0.02836
0.02557

0.00028
0.00026

0.00272
0.00246

0.02739
0.02467

0.010

0.00221

0.02221

0.010

0.02305
0.02077

0.00023

0.038

0.00021

0.02000

0.039

0.010

0.01872

0.00019

0.00200
0.00180

0.040

0.010

0.01687

0.00017

0.00162

0.01621

0.041

0.010
0.010

0.01520

0.00015

0.01458

0.01369
0.01234

0.00014

0.00146
0.00132

0.01111
0.01001
0.00901
0.00812

0.00011
0.00010
0.00009
0.00008

0.042
0.043
0.044

0.010
0.010

0.00012

0.00119 i
0.00107 i

0.01800

0.01312
0.01181
0.01062
0.00956

0.045
0.046
0.047

0.010
0.010
0.010

0.048

0.010

0.00731

0.00007

0.00070

0.00695

0.049

0.010

0.00658

0.00007

0.00063

0.00625

0.010

0.00592
0.00533

0.00006

0.00057
0.00051

0.00562
0.00505

0.050
0.051
0.052

0.010
0.010

0.053
0.054

0.010
0.010

0.055

0.00096
0.00087
0.00078

0.00859
0.00773

0.00480

0.00005
0.00005

0.00432
0.00388

0.00004
0.00004

0.010
0.010

0.00349
0.00314

0.00003

0.00034

0.00003

0.00283

0.00003

0.058

0.010
0.010

0.00030
0.00027

0.00254

0.00003

0.00024

0.00238

0.059
0.060

0.010
0.010

0.00022
0.00020 i

0.00213
0.00191

0.061

0.010

0.00229 i 0.00002
0.00205
0.00002
0.00185
0.00002

0.00018

0.00172

0.062

0.010

0.00166

0.00002

0.00016

0.00154

0.063
0.064

0.010 i

0.00149

0.00001

0.00014

0.010

0.00134

0.00001

0.00013

0.00138
0.00124

0.065

0.010

0.00001

0.00012 i

0.00111

0.066
0.067

0.010
0.010

0.00121
0.00108
0.00097

0.00001

0.00010
0.00009

0.00089

0.068

0.010

0.00087

0.069
0.070
0.071
0.072
0.073

0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010

0.00079
0.00071
0.00063
0.00057
0.00051

0.056
0.057

i

0.00001

0.00037

0.00001
0.00001

0.00008

0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001

0.00007
0.00006
0.00005 i
0.00005 i
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0.00046
0.00041 i

0.00008

0.00453
0.00407
0.00366
0.00329
0.00295
0.00265

0.00099
0.00079
0.00071
0.00063
0.00057
0.00051
0.00045

E X A M P L E O F POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR

0.00040

0.010

0.00046

0.00000

0.00004

0.010

0.00041

0.00000

0.00004

0.00036

0.076

0.010

0.00037

0.00000

0.00004

0.00032

0.077

0.010

0.00033

0.00000

0.00003

0.00028

0.00030

0.00000

0.00003

0.00025
0.00022

0.074
0.075

0.078

0.010

0.079

0.010

0.00027

0.00000

0.00003

0.080

0.010

0.00024

0.00000

0.00002

0.00020

0.081

0.010

0.00021

0.00000

0.00002

0.00017

0.082

0.010

0.00019

0.00000

0.00002

0.00015

0.083

0.010

0.00017

0.00000

0.00002

0.00013

0.084

0.010

0.00015

0.00000

0.00001

0.00012
0.00010

0.085

0.010

0.00014

0.00000

0.00001

0.086

0.010

0.00012

0.00000

0.00001

0.00009

0.087

0.010

0.00011

0.00000

0.00001

0.00008

0.088

0.010

0.00010

0.00000

0.00001

0.00007

0.089

0.010

0.00009

0.00000

0.00001

0.00006

0.090

0.010

0.00008

0.00000

0.00001

0.00005

0.091

0.010

0.00007

0.00000

0.00001

0.00004

0.092

0.010

0.00006

0.00000

0.00001

0.00003

0.093

0.010

0.00006

0.00000

0.00001

0.00003

0.094

0.010

0.00005

0.00000

0.00000

0.00002

0.095

0.010

0.00005

0.00000

0.00000

0.00002

0.096

0.010

0.00004

0.00000

0.00000

0.00001

0.097

0.010

0.00004

0.00000

0.00000

0.00001

0.098

0.010

0.00003

0.00000

0.00000

0.00001

0.099

0.010

0.00003

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

10.40907

0.10409

1.00000

1.000
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POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [STACKED ON ZERO AND MATERIALITY]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.03001

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1

Probability
Of 0 Error
In Sample
Of 115

0.50000 1.00000
0.50000
0.03008

Column 2
X

Column 3

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate than
Column 1)

0.97080
0.02920

1.00000
0.02920

0.50000
0.01504

POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [STACKED AT

MATERIALITY]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1

Probability
Of 0 Error
In Sample
Of 115

Column 3

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

0.02999
0.03001

0.50000
0.50000

0.03015
0.03008

0.01507
6.01504

0.50059
0.49941

Column 2
X

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate than
Column 1)
1.00000
0.49941

TABLE 6

this instance the spread is somewhat realistic (0 to .054, peaking at mate
riality). This produces a posterior risk of .24640 in comparison with the simple
posterior risk of .08276, the SAS 39 risk of .03, and the SAS 47 risk of .0225
(see example §10 in Table 1).
The illustration at the top of Table 9 spreads the 75/25 prior in a similar
manner (0 and .04 peaking at materiality). Here we see a true posterior risk of
.04301 in comparison with the simple posterior risk of .0099, the SAS 39riskof
.03, and the SAS 47 risk of .0075 (see example §4 in Table 1). The illustration
at the bottom of Table 9 spreads the 75/25 prior again but with a lower peak (0
to .05, peaking at .015, which is 50 percent of materiality). The true posterior
risk dropped to .01693, and, of course, the three simple risk model results do
not change.
We have seen that the simplistic risk models can significantly understate
the auditor's risk when he is giving a clean opinion. The SAS 39 model totally
ignores IR/PPE. The SAS 47 model gives too much credit to inherent risk
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POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [LEVEL BELOW MATERIALITY]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.00300
0.00600
0.00900
0.01200
0.01500
0.01800
0.02100
0.02400
0.02700
0.03001

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.05000
0.50000

Probability
Of 0 Error Column 2
X
In Sample
Column
3
of 115

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of e r r o r
rate than
Column 1)

0.05000
0.03539
0.02503
0.01768
0.01247
0.00879
0.00619
0.00435
0.00306
0.00215
0.01504

0.27754
0.19645
0.13892
0.09813
0.06924
0.04881
0.03437
0.02417
0.01698
0.01192
0.08347

1.00000
0.72246
0.52601
0.38709
0.28897
0.21973
0.17092
0.13655
0.11238
0.09539
0.08347

1.00000
0.70785
0.50053
0.35357
0.24949
0.17586
0.12383
0.08710
0.06120
0.04295
0.03008

POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [FIGURE 3]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.03001

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1
0.75000
0.25000

Probability
Of 0 E r r o r Column 2
X
In Sample
Column 3
Of 115

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate than
Column 1)

0.75000
0.00752

0.99007
0.00993

1.00000
0.00993

1.00000
0.03008

TABLE 7
when it is favourable, and when it is unfavourable the impact is in the wrong
direction. The simple posterior model suffers when the PPE is stacked on zero
and materiality and the portion below materiality should be spread in what
would amount to an unfavourable pattern. Since none of the simple models
recognize the possibility of the actual underlying error being well in excess of
materiality, it is not clear how the auditor would evaluate the results when a
single material error is actually discovered. If a significant portion of the prior
distribution actually extended beyond twice materiality, he could well be
ignoring undetected error that still exceeded materiality.
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POSTERIOR RISK - 25/75 PRIOR [FIGURE 4]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.03001

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1
0.25000
0.75000

Probability
Of 0 Error Column 2
X
In Sample
Column 3
Of 115

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate x than
Column 1)

0.25000
0.02256

0.91724
0.08276

1.00000
0.08276

1.00000
0.03008

POSTERIOR RISK - 25/75 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT MATERIALITY]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.00750
0.01500
0.02250
0.02999
0.03001
0.03600
0.04200
0.04800
0.05400

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1

Probability
Of 0 Error Column 2
In Sample
X
Of 115
Column 3

0.01000
1.00000
0.02000
0.42074
0.04000
0.17586
0.08000
0.07302
0.10000
0.03015
0.20000
0.03008
0.25000
0.01475
0.15000 0.00720
0.10000
0.00349
0.05000
0.00169

0.01000
0.00841
0.00703
0.00584
0.00301
0.00602
0.00369
0.00108
0.00035
0.00008

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4
0.21967 i
0.18485
0.15453
0.12832
0.06623
0.13214
0.08102 i
0.02371
0.00767
0.00185

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate x than
Column 1)
1.00000
0.78033
0.59548
0.44095
0.31263
0.24640
0.11425
0.03324
0.00953
0.00185

TABLE 8

Some Interim Alternatives
While I am tempted to suggest that auditors abandon their simple discrete
models and use either an expanded discrete posterior model or a continuous
posterior model, I recognize that in some quarters they still shoot the
messenger who brings bad news (much larger substantive testing extents). In
addition, some practitioners are of the view that the Bayesian approach is a
"frame of mind'' and that anyone who would recommend its use must be "out
of his mind." (With respect to this latter point, anyone who does not believe in
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POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT MATERIALITY]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.00500
0.01000
0.01500
0.02000
0.02500
0.02999
0.03001
0.03500
0.04000

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1

Probability
Of 0 Error Column 2
X
In Sample
Column 3
Of 115

0.02000
1.00000
0.05000
0.56189
0.08000 0.31481
0.10000
0.17586
0.15000
0.09795
0.22500
0.05439
0.12500
0.03015
0.12500
0.03008
0.07500 0.01662
0.05000
0.00915

0.02000
0.02809
0.02518
0.01759
0.01469
0.01224
0.00377
0.00376
0.00125
0.00046

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate than
Column 1)

0.15745
0.22117
0.19826
0.13844
0.11566
0.09634
0.02967
0.02960
0.00981
0.00360

1.00000
0.84255
0.62138
0.42312
0.28468
0.16902
0.07268
0.04301
0.01341
0.00360

POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT 0.5 MATERIALITY]

Possible
Population
Error
Rates
0.00000
0.00500
0.01000
0.01500
0.02000
0.02500
0.02999
0.03001
0.03500
0.04000
0.04500
0.05000

Prior
Probability
Of Error
Rate In
Column 1
0.05000
0.07500
0.12500
0.17500
0.15000
0.10000
0.07500
0.02500
0.09000
0.07000
0.05000
0.01500

Probability
Of 0 Error Column 2
In Sample
X
Column 3
Of 115

Relative
Frequency
Of Prob.
In
Column 4

Posterior
Risk
(of error
rate than
Column 1)

0.05000
0.04214
0.03935
0.03078
0.01469
0.00544
0.00226
0.00075
0.00150
0.00064
0.00025
0.00004

0.26618
0.22435
0.20949
0.16384
0.07822
0.02896
0.01204
0.00400
0.00796
0.00341
0.00134
0.00022

1.00000
0.73382
0.50947
0.29998
0.13614
0.05792
0.02897
0.01693
0.01293
0.00496
0.00155
0.00022

1.00000
0.56189
0.31481
0.17586
0.09795
0.05439
0.03015
0.03008
0.01662
0.00915
0.00502
0.00274

TABLE 9
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the Bayesian approach should be doing a constant amount of work on all audits
regardless of how low or high inherent risk is assessed. I believe that the
competitive environment will adequately deal with this problem when the PPE
is favourable. As well, the increase in litigation resulting from significant audit
failures will, no doubt, cause auditors to do more work when the PPE is
unfavourable.)
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) suggest that the SAS 39 model not be used
"when the auditor believes that the likelihood of material error is high." They
suggest that some other model (unspecified) would be more appropriate in
such circumstances. Given the foregoing illustrations of the failure of the SAS
39 and 47 models when the prior risk of error is high, it is not difficult to agree
with this suggestion. But the question remains as to what alternative the
auditor has at the present time. He could throw up his hands in frustration and
revert to "good old gut feel" until a reliable computerized Bayesian planning
and evaluation model becomes available.* This would certainly not be a very
progressive step.
One interim solution might be to modify the discrete posterior model in an
attempt to correct the deficiency resulting from the stacking of the prior
probability of error on only two points. One approach that I am in the process of
investigating involves using some fraction of materiality (such as ½or2/3)as the
cut-off for the portion of the prior distribution that would be stacked on zero.
The balance would be placed on materiality, resulting in a reduction of the
allowable STD risk and, thus, requiring a larger sample. Although too early to
judge, this approach might provide a workable procedure.
Another interim solution would be to use an extended discrete model with
the auditor actually specifying the prior distribution over reasonably short
intervals (such as 10hs or 5ths of materiality). IC and AR could be integrated
into the model by using the equivalent prior sample concept. This procedure
involves inputting the values for IC and AR in terras of a sample size and a
specific number of errors (this is very convenient because the parameters for
the βeta distribution can be described in these terms and the βeta distribution
can model audit priors in a very "realistic" manner). Such a model could be
used for planning and evaluation, and it could be programmed for use on a
micro-computer at a reasonable cost.
When an auditor believes that a material error does not exist (low PPE), he
collects evidence to support this belief. When he believes that a material error
does exist (high PPE), he should attempt to prove that case rather than cross
his fingers and hope he can prove that the situation is actually acceptable (this is
why the posterior risk model requires a much larger substantive sample if the
auditor wishes to "accept" when the PPE is high). The auditor can use the
posterior risk model in another manner that would address the concerns
expressed by Cushing and Loebbecke and also reduce the size of the
substantive sample. This approach would require the auditor to change his
outlook when the PPE is high. Instead of accepting the underlying population as
5

* A quasi-Bayesian model purported to contain all of the desirable features of an audit risk model
was recently described by McCray (1984). While this model may have some promise, it has not yet
been subjected to a thorough analysis by the accounting and statistical professions. In addition, it
has not been tested in a live audit environment.
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being free of material error when he failed to detect it, he would search further
because the result would be inconsistent with his expectation. Thus, he could
start with a reduced sample extent and enlarge it if he failed to identify the
expected error condition. The most common decision rule used in practice at the
present time is just the opposite—start with a small sample and enlarge it only
if errors are found.
Researchers in practice and academe must be cognizant of the competitive
environment. Understandably, client-handling partners of accounting firms will
exhibit resistance to changes in the audit risk model if the result is more work.
If they could be assured that their competitors were using the same model and
achieving the same audit objective, I feel certain that they would not resist
what we might all agree are "advances in theory and practice." However, we
know that, in the "real world," even the simple models that we criticize are
used by only a small minority of practitioners.* An impartial observer might be
of the view that we are criticizing the Model T because more advanced models
are available when, in fact, our profession is still in the horse and buggy era.

Some Related Issues
Even if we were to obtain complete agreement on the appropriate audit risk
model, it would mean little if we could not achieve some degree of uniformity in
materiality judgments. Audit risk by itself has absolutely no meaning. It can
only be quantified and used in a model when it is related to a specified level of
materiality.** In a forthcoming CICA Audit Research Study, I have recom
mended that the profession solve this problem by providing users of financial
statements with the level(s) of materiality used in the audit.
Cushing and Loebbecke raised the issue of the aggregation of evidence
throughout the audit and lamented the fact that "none of the sources cited in
the literature review indicate how the model could be expanded to address the
aggregation problem." Once again, they did not look very carefully at the
literature they cited since Leslie et al (1979) described a methodology*** for
aggregation that is consistent with paragraphs 27 to 32 of SAS 47. I believe that
in the very near future this method of aggregation will be attacked in the
literature as being without logic, statistical validity, or any other redeeming
qualities. In this respect, one is reminded of the mid 1970s when almost
everyone was attacking the validity of the Stringer bound. Several researchers
recommended alternate bounds that generated much higher upper error limits.
Now, of course, all of the literature in this area attacks the Stringer bound as
being too inefficient because it is so conservative. A look into my crystal ball
suggests that history is about to repeat itself.
6

* This contention will be illustrated in a forthcoming AICPA Audit Research Monograph by Carl
Warren. The basis of this monograph will be the 690 questionnaires submitted by 60 accounting
firms as part of the Materiality and Audit Risk Task-force project.
** Readers may have noticed that the final title of SAS 47 reversed the order of "risk" and
"materiality" set out in the title of the Exposure Draft. This was the result of the mistaken belief
of several members of the ASB that risk is determined before materiality and then used to
determine the amount that is material.
*** This method of aggregation, or a variation thereof, is used by Clarkson Gordon, Deloitte
Haskins & Sells and several other firms.
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The Role of Statistical Sampling
in Compliance Testing
"If there's no meaning in it," said the King, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as
we needn't try tofindany.''
C.L. Dodgson

The debate over the role of statistical sampling in auditing has spanned
several decades. One segment of the profession holds the view that statistical
sampling has no place in auditing since it results in a reduction in the use of
judgment by the auditor. The other segment is of the view that without the use
of quantitative methods the auditor has no reasonable method by which to
determine testing extents. This latter segment also believes that the use of
statistical sampling enhances the use of judgment in the audit process.
Members of these two segments are now commonly referred to as "judgos"
and "quantos," respectively. I make no attempt to hide the fact that I am a
member of the "quanto" segment.
Earlier in this paper, internal controls were identified as being either
preventive or detective, and preventive internal controls were considered
together with inherent risk in order to determine the prior probability of error.
The preventive and detective distinctions are described in both the AICPA
"Statements on Auditing Standards" and the CICA "Handbook." The latter
includes the following description in paragraph 5205.13:
Internal controls may be characterized as preventive or detective. Preventive
controls are those which prevent, or minimize the chance of occurrence of,
fraud and error. Detective controls do not prevent fraud and error but rather
detect them, or maximize the chance of their detection, so that corrective
action may be promptly taken. The known existence of detective controls may
have a deterrent effect, and be preventive in that sense.
It is reasonable to classify a detective control as a preventive control provided
that detection will result in the recovery of the particular asset that would
otherwise be lost to the entity. Prompt recognition (recording) of a loss by the
entity would not qualify the control as one with preventive value. As an
example, consider the earlier case of a large financial institution that holds large
quantities of securities. If this institution could detect missing securities
promptly and recover them, this control feature would serve as a preventive
control since a dishonest (or potentially dishonest) employee would be
reluctant to steal certificates if negotiating them exposed him to a high
probability of being caught. On the other hand, if the institution could detect
missing certificates promptly but do little to recover them, the control would be
considered entirely detective since it would have no deterrent value.
Certain types of control will be clearly preventive or detective in nature
while others may be difficult to classify. In this respect, it is important to
develop a decision rule for audit staff in order to avoid "classifications of
convenience."

Objectives of Compliance Testing
In order to employ statistical sampling in compliance testing, the auditor
must first establish the objective of his compliance tests. SAS Au § 320.59
describes the purpose of compliance tests as follows:
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The purpose of compliance tests is to provide reasonable assurance that
the accounting control procedures are being applied as prescribed. Such
tests are necessary if the prescribed procedures are to be relied on in
determining the nature, timing, or extent of substantive tests of
particular classes of transactions or balances, as discussed later . . .
Other than the reference to "reasonable assurance," the above passage
provides no guidance as to "how much compliance testing is enough." Of
course, reasonable assurance (the complement of risk) must be related to
"something" if it is to have any meaning. The "something" is described in
paragraph 31 of SAS 39 (Au § 320.31) as '"the maximum rate of deviations from
prescribed control procedures that would support his planned reliance." The
subsequent discussion in paragraphs 32 to 42 of SAS 39 has, through the use of
examples, established the internationally known and (ab)used "5 & 5 gets ya
60" syndrome. This magic "60" is without a doubt the most commonly
employed compliance testing extent in the world. If one is prepared to accept
this number,* all of the problems related to compliance testing extents quickly
vanish.
Even though this approach would appear to have the blessing of a
substantial portion of the profession (silence implies acceptance), it should not
go unchallenged. SAS Au § 320.68 states:
The auditor's evaluation of accounting control with reference to each
significant class of transactions and related assets should be a conclu
sion about whether the prescribed procedures and compliance there
with are satisfactory for his purpose. The procedures and compliance
should be considered satisfactory if the auditor's review and tests
disclose no condition he believes to be a material weakness for his
purpose. In this context, a material weakness is a condition in which the
specific control procedures or the degree of compliance with them do
not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that errors or irregularities
in amounts that would be material in relation to the financial statements
being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely period by
employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions.
(emphasis added)
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine how the magic number "60" can
meet the materiality criterion for every audit engagement.
The following illustration demonstrates the variability in compliance testing
payback when this approach is used. These calculations use the SAS 39 model
(they ignore inherent risk for simplicity). AR is not effective and has been set
equal to 1. In these cases, when the auditor takes his compliance sample of 60
and finds no deviations, he subjectively determines that the IC risk is .25, and,
using his risk equation, he increases his allowable sampling risk from a βeta of
.05 to a βeta of .20. Columns (4) and (5) contain the DUS extents for each of
the βeta risks based on the assumption that no errors will be found throughout
the entire audit. In some instances, there is a positive payback, and in others it
is negative. It can be seen that the payback is highly variable. But, suppose
some of these populations are a part of the same audit engagement. Population
2 is the western accounts receivable supervised by the credit office in Los
* I suspect that Charles Dodgson would consider acceptance of a magic number of this nature as
blind faith.
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Angeles, population 3 is the eastern accounts receivable supervised by the
credit office in New York, and population 4 is the Florida accounts receivable
supervised by the credit office at the head office in Miami. Since all of the
accounts are on the same computer and all of the systems are uniform, another
auditor decides to compliance test the entire system as one and spreads his
sample of 60 over the three locations. His payback is shown in case 5. Note
that the net payback for 2, 3, and 4 is a sample reduction of 254, whereas for
population 5 it is a reduction of 374. Is there any logic in the difference of 120
between the two approaches?
(2)

(3)

(5)
(6)
(4)
DUS For
DUS For
Internal Control
Pop. Population
Mate
0 Errors
0 Errors
Payback
No. Book Value
riality and β= .05 and β= .20
(4)-(5)-60
1
$ 1,000,000 $ 30,000
100
54
-14
2
$10,000,000 $100,000
300
160
+ 80} Net
3
$20,000,000 $100,000
600
320
+ 2 2 0 } » + 254
4
$ 1,000,000 $100,000
30
16
-46}
5
$31,000,000 $100,000
930
496
+ 374
6
$10,000,000 $300,000
100
54
-14} Net
7
$20,000,000 $300,000
200
107
+ 33} » - 36
8
$ 1,000,000 $300,000
10
5
-55}
9
$31,000,000 $300,000
310
166
+ 84
Now, along comes a bright young auditor, and she points out that the
materiality level used was far too low based on various studies she has seen in
the literature. A decision is made to increase materiality to $300,000. The
impact of this decision is shown in cases 6 to 9. When the segments of the
population are considered separately, there is a negative payback of 36 items.
If they are considered "one" population, there is a positive payback of 84
items. In either case, the level of materiality played an important role.
However, the compliance testing guidance provided in SAS 39 provides no
linkage to materiality. Clearly, a linkage is necessary. Consider this second
case with materiality of $300,000 versus the first with materiality of $100,000.
One would think that a system would have to work much harder to prevent or
detect errors aggregating $100,000 than it would to prevent or detect errors
aggregating $300,000. Thus, a higher tolerable rate of noncompliance should
be acceptable for a materiality level of $300,000, resulting in a smaller sample.
Unfortunately, this fact has been consistently ignored by most of the profession
around the world. A fixed sample size of 60 (or any other magic number) cannot
provide a linkage to materiality.
In order to achieve this linkage, all the auditor need do is establish some
reasonable relationship between the frequency of monetary errors and com
pliance deviations. If such a relationship cannot be developed, then one must
question the concept of relying on internal control in the first place. This
concept is actually recognized in SAS 39 (paragraph 34):
In assessing the tolerable rate of deviations, the auditor should consider
that, while deviations from pertinent control procedures increase the
risk of material errors in the accounting records, such deviations do not
necessarily result in errors. For example, a recorded disbursement that
does not show evidence of required approval may nevertheless be a
(1)

119

transaction that is properly authorized and recorded. Deviations would
result in errors in the accounting records only if the deviations and the
errors occurred on the same transactions. Deviations from pertinent
control procedures at a given rate ordinarily would be expected to
result in errors at a lower rate.
As many researchers are aware, my associates and I have been expounding
this approach for many years. When we first contemplated using the "5 & 5"
fixed sample approach, our associate, Albert Teitlebaum of McGill University,
pointed out the lack of logic and statistical consistency. It was his objective
view from the sidelines, uncontaminated by the audit literature of the time
(SAP 54), that forced us to see the illogical aspects of not relating the extent of
compliance testing to materiality. In addition, whenever we attempted to
incorporate the value for IC in a risk model, we found that it had to have a
relationship to materiality in order to make any sense. The result was the
"smoke/fire" methodology that we have described in two books and several
papers. I hope that participants in this Symposium will focus some of their
attention on this issue.
7

Comparison of Value-Oriented and Neutral
Sampling Methods for Compliance Tests
The decision on the objective of compliance testing will impact the auditor's
decision on method of sampling and, therefore, the method of selection. If the
auditor subscribes to the magic number "60," he will more than likely use a
neutral sampling method (all physical units will be given the same chance of
selection—physical unit attribute sampling). A decision to relate compliance
testing to materiality will generally result in the use of a value-oriented
sampling method (DUS, CMA, PPS). The following is an example taken from
the forthcoming CICA Audit Research Study on Materiality and from Leslie
(1977). The sample of 257 is based on using a βeta risk of .20 and a three times
multiple of materiality (see Leslie et al (1979) page 150). The sample of 95 is
the magic number "60" expanded to allow acceptance of one compliance
deviation without rejecting reliance on IC (consistent with the 257 calculation).
Although the distribution in this illustration is hypothetical, it follows the
shape of those found in actual accounting populations. This illustration demon
strates the stark contrast between the selection methods and, perhaps, the
importance of using value-oriented selection (where the maximum possible
error in an item is related to its book value) regardless of the philosophy used
to determine the sample size.
In a number of research experiments carried out by the writer and others,
groups of auditors have been requested to select samples from populations on a
"judgmental representative" basis. Analysis of these samples revealed that
the average judgmental allocation is very close to the V-O (DUS) average and
in no way even resembles the neutral allocation. This is the reason why many
auditors prefer to use judgmental value-oriented selection rather than physicalunit attributes sampling in cases where they feel the cost of selecting a rigorous
value-oriented probability sample (DUS) is not warranted by the added
objectivity. When one envisages an auditor describing these two different
approaches to an audit committee (or a judge), it is difficult to visualize any
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Upper
Stratum
boundary
($000)
100
75
50
25
20
15
10
5
4
3
2
1
.5

Number
of
items

Stratum
value
($000)

4
9
31
98
154
200
357
655
795
1,230
1,360
2,150
5,825
12,868

330
500
1,100
2,200
2,700
2,600
2,500
2,900
2,700
3,200
1,900
1,700
1,400
25,730

Average Sample Allocation
n = 257
n = 95
Neutral
V-0
V-0
Neutral
[ 3
41 { 5
{ 11
{ 22
27
26
25
29
27
32
19
17
14
257

3
3
4
7
13
16
25
27
43
116
257

{1
15{ 2
{4
{8
10
10
9
11
10
12
7
6
5
95

1
1
2
3
5
6
9
10
16
43
95

Average item value is $2,000
V-O (257)—select 1 dollar unit out of every $100,000 on average.
Neutral (257)—select 1 physical unit out of every 50.07 on average.
V-O (95)—select 1 dollar unit out of every $270,526 on average.
Neutral (95)—select 1 physical unit out of every 135.45 on average.

support for the neutral approach since it concentrates on the small items and
ignores the large ones.

Sample Extension
Kinney (1983) addresses the problem of the increasing risk when a sample
is extended. He points out that, if a compliance sample of 60 is selected and a
deviation is found, the auditor is not in a position to accept. On the other hand,
if he had taken a sample of 95, he would have been able to tolerate one
deviation. Thus, he selects another 35 items, and, if he finds no further
deviations, he accepts. Kinney rightfully points out that in a strict statistical
sense the auditor's risk will be in excess of the desired .05.
This example serves to illustrate why Bayesian methods are required in all
areas of auditing. Suppose in this example the auditor decided to extend his
compliance test by 200 instead of 35. In accordance with strict statistical
theory, the auditor's risk is still in excess of .05. But what if he extended by
another 5,000 items and found no additional deviations? The statistical
conclusion remains the same—-the risk is greater than .05 (but only very
slightly). Now this does not seem very intuitive to the average auditor. He
cannot imagine how he can have a sample of 5,060 with one deviation and be
worse off than an auditor with a sample of 60 and no deviations. Of course, the
auditor's intuition is correct. It is the statistical conclusion that is incorrect.
This problem was first brought to our attention by Herbert Arkin in 1971.
Needless to say, we found it very puzzling even though we could understand
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the strict statistical conclusion. As reported by Teitlebaum (1973), the solution
to this problem can be found in Bayesian analysis. For example, if a prior
distribution of compliance deviation rates in a population is established
(subjectively, of course—and it should be favourable or the auditor has no
business considering reliance on IC) and then combined with the results of a
compliance sample of 60 containing one deviation, a certain posterior distribu
tion is produced. If this posterior distribution is then used as the prior
distribution and combined with a deviation free sample of 35, the posterior
distribution produced is identical to the posterior distribution produced by using
the original prior and a sample of 95 with one compliance deviation.
Thus, the auditor who employs Bayesian methods can ignore the issue of
increasing risk when extending his samples. If his priors are favourable, his
results will be acceptable. If his priors are unfavourable, deviation or error free
results may not even be acceptable. This posture contrasts to that of the nonBayesian who will only react to sample results—with no recognition given to his
prior beliefs.
Much more extensive research in Bayesian methods and their application to
auditing would be desirable. They are applicable to all areas of the attest audit.
While prior probability distributions are subjective (and usually somewhat
fuzzy) and cannot be "verified," they do and should reflect what the auditor
actually believes. If he is prepared to "fudge" his priors in order to do less
work, he knows when he concludes his audit that he really does not have the
reasonable assurance he set out to obtain. He is then forced to live with his
conscience.

Is Compliance Testing Really Necessary in
Order to Place Reliance on Internal Control?
Based on auditing standards in Canada and the U.S., the answer would
seem to be an obvious "yes." Perhaps it is time, however, to take another
look at this requirement. It may well be that analysis of internal control results
would be a far more useful and efficient approach than compliance testing in
many situations. Consider the following three situations:
(2)
(3)
(1)
Inherent risk
High
High
Low
Preventive internal
controls
Excellent
Poor
Good
Prior probability
of error
occurring
Low
High
Low
In case (2), the auditor identified detective internal controls and evaluated them
as structurally sound. He would like to place reliance on these DICs in order to
reduce his substantive test. Should he compliance test these key controls?
Since the PPE is high, he expects a material error to occur (or there is a high
probability that it will occur). It would seem logical that the first step should be
an investigation of the errors detected by the DICs. If these controls did not
find errors, he would have to question their effectiveness (and perhaps review
the evidence supporting his decision relating to the high PPE). He might be
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wise to ignore the DICs altogether and rely entirely on AR and STD for his
assurance.
If, on the other hand, the controls were detecting errors regularly and if
these errors were being dealt with properly by management, would it still be
necessary to compliance test the controls in order to place the planned reliance
on them? It would seem to me that compliance testing should not be necessary.
After all, the auditor would have discussed these controls with the employees
responsible for their execution (when documenting them), traced a handful of
different types of transaction through the key points in the system, and
observed their effectiveness in detecting errors. Would compliance testing add
anything in a situation of this nature?
In cases (1) and (3), the auditor might well decide that the risk was low
enough that any substantial reliance on DICs would not be warranted. He might
already be prepared to use a risk of .20 for substantive work. An increase in
this risk to, say, .37, as a result of reliance on DICs, would not have an
adequate payback to warrant the compliance testing effort. He would then
concentrate his efforts on AR and STD. He should, nonetheless, investigate
the results obtained by any DICs. If they did detect significant errors, he would
logically reconsider his PPE decision.
With respect to PICs, the auditor would ignore them in both cases (2) and
(3). In case (2), they do not help prevent error, and in case (3) his PPE
evaluation would not change in their absence. In case (1), the auditor would
carry out compliance verification procedures that would usually be observation
oriented (segregation of duties, physical security, etc.), although in some cases
audit trails would exist and compliance testing would be possible. If analysis of
errors found by DICs and prior audits revealed that errors were not being
prevented, no reliance would be taken for PICs.
This compliance verification philosophy began to crystallize over the past
few months while I analyzed the audit framework. If the concept is valid,
implementation would help reduce audit costs by eliminating unnecessary
compliance testing in many situations.

Recommendations
It has been demonstrated that the simple risk model set out in the Appendix
to SAS 39 (and modified by SAS 47 to include the inherent risk factor) is not
reliable and can seriously mislead auditors in the most dangerous situations
they face. The Auditing Standards Board should give this model immediate
attention. Simple risk models based on SAP 54 have served a useful purpose,
but it is now time to take another step forward. Although the simple posterior
model illustrated earlier is not perfect, I believe that it is more appropriate than
the SAS 39/47 model. It would be a reasonable alternative until an "auditor
friendly" continuous model is developed. Accordingly, I would recommend
that the ASB withdraw the model in the Appendix to SAS 39 and replace it with
the posterior model.
An alternative to this recommendation would be to change the examples in
the Appendix to SAS 39 to a .025 desired final audit risk so that a .50 inherent
risk would provide the same final audit risk as the present .05 examples (that
ignore inherent risk). This change would be accompanied by a caution
informing users that, where the prior probability of error is high and evidence
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of a material error is not detected by detective internal controls or the audit,
the adequacy of the audit should be reconsidered. This admonition would
require minor modifications to various SASs in order to explain the link
between inherent risk and preventive internal controls (also required for the
previous recommendation).
SAS 39 has resulted in the undesirable adoption of a fixed compliance
testing extent by a significant segment of the profession (in the U.S. and
Canada). The ASB should review this outcome and either bless it or condemn
it. If it decides to bless this approach, it should provide the logic that justifies a
fixed sample size. In addition, some guidance as to how the auditor uses
compliance testing results together with his assessment of the structure of
internal control and materiality to determine the risk factor used in the equation
would be welcomed by most of the profession.

A Final Comment
The focus of audit research over the past two decades has been primarily
on quantitative techniques. It would not be unrealistic to state that technique
development (statistical sampling, regression analysis, etc.) is leading practice
by a wide margin. On another front, academics conducting behavioral research
do not always receive a warm welcome from practitioners. It is to be hoped
that practitioners will recognize the contribution that behavioral research can
make to the advancement of the profession. The cooperation of practitioners is
necessary for such research to be conducted properly and to provide the
maximum benefits to the profession. More research on how auditors assess
prior probabilities as well as how they should assess such probabilities would be
useful.

End Notes
1. See for example, Power (1984).
2. See for example, Leslie et al (1979), Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1980),
Kinney (1983), Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) and McCray (1984).
3. See earlier quotation from paragragh 22 of SAS No. 47.
4. Paragraph 21 of SAS 47 concludes with the sentence "These components of audit risk may
be assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in nonquantitative terms that range, for
example, from a minimum to a maximum."
5. For more information on the equivalent prior sample (EPS) approach see Teitlebaum
(1973), Felix (1976) and Leslie et al (1979, pp. 305-307).
6. ''MATERIALITY—The Concept and Its Application To Auditing." This study should be
released in late 1984 or early 1985.
7. See for example, Leslie et al (1979), Anderson, R.J., (1977), and Leslie, D.A. (1977).
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Appendix
Comments of Ralph Walters (ex FASB board member—retired December 1983, formerly
a senior partner with Touche Ross), extracted from a recent interview conducted by
Professor Edward Stamp and published in a supplement to the International Accounting
Bulletin, January 1984, entitled "Accounting Regulation in the U.S.: The Growing
Debate." The supplement also contains interviews with Don Kirk, Robert Sprouse, Jim
Leisenring, and Lee Seidler.

I think when you become highly competitive as they have, and they have
very strong growth instincts, they feel they have to grow; there's a tendency
to lose sight sometimes of how you grow. I mean, grow all you want on the
basis of better quality work, there's nothing wrong with that, but in their
eagerness to grow they may have in some cases stooped a bit low. That's the
impression we get here.
If somebody is doing substandard work, cutting corners and isn't found out,
you cannot upgrade the profession and upgrade the work. You know, there's a
truism in auditing—it isn't whether you do a good audit or a bad audit that
makes the difference, it's whether you get caught. That's all that counts.
You could do a crummy audit and, as long as it never comes to light—and
probably the chances are that in most cases it never will—everything's fine.
You can do perfect audits and you're really in no better shape than the guy that
did a bad audit and was never found out.
Yet when you talk to individual CPAs, as I do quite a bit, they're a highminded group of people. They want to do what's right. Most of them have very
strong professional instincts. I've never talked to anybody who was stealing
somebody else's client or low-balling, but there's got to be somebody out
there somewhere that's doing it. It needs leadership and it needs to be looked
at as an extremely serious problem, because I maintain that, if accountants
don't pull up their own socks, somebody's going to do it for them and they may
do it in a fairly rough fashion.
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Discussant's Response to
An Analysis of the Audit Framework
Focusing on Inherent Risk and the Role of
Statistical Sampling in Compliance Testing
William R. Kinney, Jr.
University of Michigan
Don Leslie has prepared a paper with many ideas that give rise to a number
of implications for both the theory and practice of auditing and that merit careful
thought, discussion, and debate. I agree with most of what he has to say but, of
course, have some caveats, reservations, and qualifications.
The paper has nine sections, and I plan to comment on parts of all nine,
concentrating on three central topics: the audit risk formula, assessment of the
prior probability of material error, and the role of compliance tests. My closing
comments will address some of the political aspects of Leslie's policy
recommendations.

The Audit Risk Formula
Leslie is correct that the audit risk formula of SAP 54 and SAS 39 can
understate the "final audit risk" (FAR)* relative to the approach suggested in
Leslie, Teitlebaum, and Anderson (1979) and the CICA's Extent of Audit
Testing (EAT). He is also correct that a reasonable interpretation of SAS 47
may lead to a formula that will always understate FAR relative to the EAT
approach. Finally, he is correct that the difference between FAR calculated
using SAS 39 and FAR using EAT is small when the prior probabiity of material
error (PPE) is small.
Leslie implicity assumes that for the zero error population, every item in
the population has zero error and any audit test will confirm this fact. I make a
slightly less restrictive assumption that net error in the population is zero.
Under the latter assumption, substantive tests of details (STD) may lead to
incorrect rejection, and, of course, analytical review (AR) may lead to incorrect
rejection even if every item has zero error. Under the zero net error
assumption, the EAT formula understates FAR relative to a slightly more
complete "Bayesian Risk Product" (BRP) calculation* because the EAT
approach ignores the risk of incorrect rejection for both analytical review
procedures and substantive tests of details.
* Since Leslie sometimes uses "final audit risk" and "posterior risk" interchangeably and since
posterior risk seems to be a misnomer as used here, I will use "final audit risk'' (FAR) throughout.
* I refer to this approach as the Bayesian risk product rather than Bayesian since it assumes that
decisions are made on the basis of the likelihood information and not the posterior that combines
the likelihood information with the prior distribution.
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To illustrate, consider Leslie's Figure 3. Leslie's "ladder-tree diagram" is
reproduced as the top part of Figure 1.** The bottom branches diagram the
state for which there is zero net error in the account. Leslie calculates the final
audit risk by dividing the probability of receiving "accept" signals from both
AR and STD under the condition of "intolerable" error (ME) that has not been
detected by internal control by the sum of the probabilities that such audit tests
would be obtained under either M E or zero net error condition.*** He
implicitly assumes that the zero (net) error case will always lead to acceptance
by the auditor.
While the assumed outcome of no incorrect rejection signals is likely given
that there is zero net error in an account, it is also true that even in the absence
of error the analytical review procedures and/or the substantive tests of details
will sometimes indicate that material error may exist. That is, the auditor may
incur the cost of needlessly extending the audit, revising the audit plan,
suggesting incorrect adjustments, or withdrawing or qualifying the opinion. For
specificity, I have included these branches with incorrect rejection probabilities
equal to .05 and .10 respectively.
With the inclusion of these additional branches to the bottom branch of
Leslie's ladder tree, we see that the possibility of completing the audit with no
indication of material error from any test can arise by the top most route (with
probability .0075) or via the top route of the bottom branch (with probability
.6412 (.75 x .95 x .90)). The denominator for the FAR calculation is the sum of
the probability of the top route and the top route of the bottom branch. Thus,
the FAR for BRP is:
F

A

R

PPE x PIC x AR x STD

=

(PPE

x

DIC x

AR x

STD)

+

(1-PPE)

x

(1-RIRAR)

x

(1-RIRSTD)

.0075
=

=

.0116

.0075 + .75 x .95 x .90

where RIRAR and RIRSTD are the risks of incorrect rejection. The formula is
identical to that of EAT with the exception of the RIRAR and RIRSTD factors.
Since these factors are always
1.0, the Bayesian risk product will always be
greater than or equal to the FAR from the EAT formula. How much less will
depend, in part, upon the level of the RIR factors. Thus, the BRP approach will
always lead to planned sample sizes that are equal to or greater than those
using EAT.
To elaborate on the comparison, the relative sample sizes for SAS 39, SAS
47, EAT, and BRP (with PPE = .75, DIC = .30, AR=.40, and FAR =.03)
would be 1.00, .79, 1.77 and 1.88. Thus the sample size for BRP is about 6%
greater than that for EAT. A similar calculation using PPE = .25 would yield
1.0, 0, .19 and .31. Thus, for the low PPE case, SAS 47, EAT and BRP
require much less substantive tests of details than does SAS 39.
As shown in the figure, the difference in FAR for PPE= .25 is .0017 or
about 17% more than FAR using EAT. For the PPE = .75 case, FAR using
** For those familiar with Bayesian decision trees, the Leslie approach differs in that his "ladder
tree" places the prior probabilities of states at the start of the tree rather than at the end of each
branch.
* * * I will use ME to denote "just intolerable" monetary error for the account. Thus it is the single
account counterpart of materiality for the financial statements taken as a whole.
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*

FAR

(SAS 39)

=

1 x .3 x .4 x .25

=

.0300

FAR

(SAS 47)

=

.25 x .3 x .4 x .25 =

.0075

FAR

(EAT)

FAR

(BRP)

. 0075
.0075 + .75
.0075
.0075 + .6412

.0099
.0116

IA denotes " i n c o r r e c t acceptance", CR denotes " c o r r e c t r e j e c t i o n " , e t c .

BRP is .0116 or 15.3% more than EAT. While these differences are not huge,
they aren't negligible either. If the EAT formula provides appropriate correc
tion of the SAS 39 formula then the BRP correction to EAT would also seem
justified.
As to the direction of the misstatement of risk, Leslie shows that, under his
assumptions, the SAS 39 formula is conservative relative to EAT for PPE .5
and is not conservative for PPE > .5. He is especially concerned about the use
of SAS 39 for PPE>.5 since statement users may not have adequate
protection against material error in audited financial statements. Yet it seems
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likely that, in the presence of a high expectation of material error, the auditor
would probably not use the risk formula in an "hypothesis testing" mode.
Rather, the auditor might use an "estimation" approach to adequately
estimate the extent of error so that adjustments can be made or perhaps some
other strategy pursued in which the client attempts to correct errors. In the
latter case, sampling may not even be applicable. Thus, apropriate use of the
SAS 39 formula may not lead to excessive risk of incorrect acceptance but may,
of course, lead to costly overauditing for the PPE .5 cases and would be of
concern to an auditor who faces competition.
A reader familiar with Bayesian statistics will note at least two deficiencies
in all four formulations of the auditor's problem. First, all approaches assume
that M E that is detected by DIC cannot lead to incorrect rejection (i.e.,
Leslie's original assumption). A more complete formulation would direct the
.70 branch from the DIC node to the lower AR node. This change would lead to
FAR = .0080 for EAT and FAR = .0094 for BRP. Second, all of the approaches
ignore the possibility that the auditor might misassess IR or misassess the
reliance to be placed on internal control. For example, the auditor might
conclude, on the basis of a study and evaluation of internal control, that DIC is
.30 when the correct probability is .50. A complete Bayesian formulation would
consider such misevaluations.
Finally, the AICPA models, EAT, and BRP implicitly assume that one of
two states must occur—either net error is zero or net error is equal to ME.
Outcomes between zero and ME as well as error greater than M E cannot
exist. Leslie believes that such simplification may lead to substantially different
answers than would a continuous outcome space. I am not convinced that
relative sample sizes will be substantially affected by allowing continuous state
spaces. I base this view on the lack of meaningful differences for several
continuous state follow-up studies of the Kinney (1975) discrete Bayesian
model. Also, the imprecision inherent in the auditor's subjective assessments
may overshadow any differences due to continuous state modelling.
1

How Should IR and Internal Control Risks be Assessed?
Another area of considerable controversy in the profession concerns the
appropriate way to consider the three client-specific factors related to PPE.
These factors are inherent risk (IR), preventive internal controls (PIC), and
detective internal controls (DIC). In SAS 47, para. 24, the Auditing Standards
Board suggested that the auditor may separately assess IR and "control risk"
(PIC and DIC) and presumably multiply them together to get the risk that ME
will occur and not be detected by IC. Leslie suggests that IR and PIC be
considered together and multiplied by DIC to yield the same risk. A third
alternative, also mentioned in SAS 47, para. 24, is to jointly assess the effects
of all three factors. That is, the auditor would assess the overall risk that ME
would occur in the accounting process and not be prevented or detected by
internal controls. The joint method requires no separate assessment of
individual factors that have not been separately observed and does not specify a
particular combination algorithm (e.g., multiplication).
Using as an analogy, gun control at Kansas City International Airport, we
might ask a gun control worker to assess the joint probability that a plane
2
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departing the airport has one or more guns on board. Alternatively, we might
ask the worker to estimate the number that would, in the absence of all
controls, carry a gun on board and the number that would be caught by the
controls. The worker's response to the alternative question is likely to be
"How should I know?—I've never observed would-be passengers without the
control." Furthermore, the worker is not likely to be able to separately assess
PIC and DIC (it seems clear to me that the X-ray machine is detective but has
preventive aspects as well). Finally, it is not clear that simple multiplication of
separately assessed risks is in order due to lack of independence, because
passengers' behavior is conditioned by their expectation of the control
components.
I favor the alternative of joint assessment and argued for it at the Auditing
Standards Board deliberations on SAS 47. As discussed by the ASB and Don
Leslie, behavioral research may lead to a determination of the best method.

Compliance Testing
Leslie's concern about the "5 and 5 will get ya 60" syndrome deserves
comment. The example of a .05 tolerable rate (which, in practice, would have
been set based on the auditor's judgment about the relationship of the
prescribed control to ME) and .05 risk of overreliance due to compliance
deviations originated in SAP 54 in 1972 as an example of reasonable levels of
the factors. These levels were continued in SAS 39, and an example sample
size of 60 was added. Sixty was chosen to show nonstatistical samplers that a
compliance sample size that would satisfy the required criteria of "acceptably
low" risk that the error rate for the population does not exceed a "reason
able" tolerable rate requires a compliance sample size of considerably greater
than, say, 5 or 10—even if no deviations are observed. It is only an example
and not intended to be a standard itself. Leslie does not cite evidence to
support his claim that it has become the standard the world over. Even if it has,
however, it has probably led to an increase in compliance sample sizes and,
thus, is not necessarily bad.
Furthermore, it is not clear to me that a "smoke to fire" ratio is the only
way to assess the risk of overreliance due to the compliance portion of the joint
risk of overreliance. There would seem to be various ways to map the design
evaluation and rate of deviation (whether based on documents or dollars of
book value) to the posterior probability of error.
Is compliance testing always necessary for reliance? Leslie raises some
challenging questions with respect to required compliance testing for preven
tive controls. He suggests that a preferred alternative is to look for evidence
that such controls have actually detected errors. While such a procedure may
be acceptable under some circumstances, in a generally poor control environ
ment employees may document phony "prevention hits" or detected errors
that were not really errors. That is, evidence of effectiveness may not indicate
application of a control at all. Again, joint assessment of risk may help.

Conclusions
To summarize, I agree with Leslie that the audit risk formula can be
improved. For example, it can be modified to be less conservative for low PPE
130

audit situations. Also, I agree that future Auditing Standards Board considera
tion should be given to elaboration of the PIC and DIC concepts. Whether
official improvement of the formula is possible within the present ASB is, of
course, an open question.
It has been my experience at the ASB that the firms that have the most
structured audit approaches generally vote in support of structured standards.
Similarly, those with the least structured approaches regularly vote against
further structure. In drafting standards, there is a desire to make them "read"
better by simplifying the wording, and yet complex concepts often require
seemingly difficult wording to be correct. The audit risk formula seems to be a
victim of such a conflict. The concepts of audit planning and evaluation are
complex—a simple formula and few words are not likely to be technically
correct. Yet complex formulae and discussion will not receive Board support.
While there is little disagreement that auditors tend to behave as if they are
Bayesians, there is much disagreement as to how this should be expressed in
professional standards. There is a valid question of how much "theory" should
be in professional standards. I do not believe that much more structure is likely
to be forthcoming from the ASB. Elaboration of the PIC and DIC concepts is
more likely since they are easier to understand.
While the audit risk formula of SAP 54 and SAS 39 may be subject to
misuse, it has led to considerable research and experimentation as well as to
enlightenment of scholars and practitioners. It indicates relevant audit planning
factors and the direction of their effects on auditing procedures. Furthermore,
even if a practitioner uses the formula "simplistically," I know of no evidence
or even claims that those not using the formula take larger samples or conduct
more thorough or extensive audits. That is, I have never heard critics of the
formula claim that they do not use it because they feel that they should be
taking larger samples.
I have heard the opposite claim—that a firm does not use the formula
because it leads to sample sizes that are too large. This latter result, however,
is often because the auditor has not taken advantage of his or her judgment in
designing the sampling applications, rather than the potential problem that
Leslie mentions. SAS 39 is quite clear in the statement that nonstatistical
sample sizes for a given level of effectiveness cannot be smaller than a well
designed statistical sample.
I am concerned that those who have been using the SAP 54 and SAS 39
formula may now apply the implicit formula of SAS 47 in a way that increases
FAR. It seems to me that many practitioners have already included some
allowance for inherent risk in assessing IC under the SAS 39 guidance. That is,
they have implicitly adjusted the IC factor to include an allowance for inherent
risk as well as internal controls. In effect, they use IC as the PPE when
planning AR and STD. If they now use the same value for the IC factor and
multiply it by an IR less than one, they will double count IR and will unduly
restrict STD. The extent of this potential problem can also be addressed by
behavioral research, of course.
In conclusion, I believe that Don Leslie has written a thoughtful and very
timely paper. Increasing competition and the micro computer are making
operational many of the models that we have discussed at this conference for
the last ten years, beginning with Felix (1974). Field workers now have the
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computing power necessary to do sophisticated audit planning and evidence
integration. We scholars can no longer avoid these issues by using the excuse
of computational impracticality. Consideration of Leslie's analysis, criticisms,
and suggestions can help all of us improve the practice, theory, and, perhaps,
the regulation of auditing.

End Notes
1. See Cushing and Loebbecke (1983), for additional discussion.
2. A similar problem with multiplication of risks is noted in Jiambalvo and Waller (1984), p. 87.
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6
Current Developments in
United Kingdom Auditing Research
David R. Gwilliam
The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth
A recent American academic visitor to the U.K., Raymond Johnson, wrote
on more than one occasion (e.g., 1983) that "auditing research in the U.K. has
been minimal" and further observed that the research that has taken place has
concentrated on broad issues (e.g., the value of the external audit function, the
extension of the auditor's role to include wider issues of efficiency and social
accountability, etc.) to the virtual exclusion of consideration of the actual audit
process. This orientation he considered to be one-sided and something of an
obstacle to the development of worthwhile U.K. research.
This view is widely shared among U.K. academic accountants and, indeed,
is one with which I have much sympathy. The purpose, therefore, of this paper
is four-fold:
• To identify what auditing research has recently been carried out or is
currently in progress in the U.K.
• To consider why there has been relatively little auditing research in
the U.K.
• To consider to what extent the auditing research work carried out in
the U.S. is directly applicable to the U.K. situation.
• To consider where developments in U.K. research effort may be of
most benefit both for the U.K.'s own needs and in complementing
the work of U.S. researchers.

Current Research Activity
Appendix 1 details the results of a recent survey of U.K. universities and
polytechnics designed to establish the level of interest in auditing research and
to ascertain current and recent research interests. Appendix 2 lists recent
work published in Accounting & Business Research and in Accounting,
Organizations and Society, the principal U.K. academic journals containing audit
research.
Although the survey and journal review show that there is a certain degree
of interest in auditing research (rather more in Scotland than the rest of the
U.K.) and some projects have been completed, the overall impression is one of
an academic accounting community for whom auditing is considered to be
something of a sideline. The findings also bear out, with one or two exceptions,
Johnson's contention that academic interest focuses on wide questions of the
auditor's professional and social function rather than on more practical
questions of identifying and improving suitable audit techniques.
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The bulk of academic research in the U.K. is funded by the government via
quasi autonomous research councils. The council concerned with the social
sciences (the ESRC)* has shown some interest in auditing and acted as
cosponsor (with Deloitte, Haskins + Sells) of a conference entitled "Auditing
Research: Issues and Opportunities," the proceedings of which have been
published (Hopwood et al, 1982). Apart from this activity, however, there has
been no funding for any specific auditing projects in recent years.
The U.K. academic establishment does not, of course, have a monopoly on
research skills and interests. The large U.K. auditing firms have sufficient
resources in terms of finance and personnel to carry out their own "in-house"
research programs. Indeed, they may prefer to do their own studies when they
perceive the possibility of commercial benefits deriving from advances in audit
methods and techniques. Alternatively, they may undertake collaborative
research under the aegis of the professional organizations in the U.K. such as
the ICAEW or the CCAB.
The question of the extent of research by U.K. professional firms was
addressed in a series of discussions with the technical and technical develop
ment partners and staff of the U.K. offices of large international firms (Gwilliam
and Macve, 1982). (The specific views of one particular technical partner are
also noted below.) To summarize, although the firms have an active interest in
keeping abreast of the changing legal, commercial, and technical (particularly
computing) environment within which they and their clients work—and are also
seeking workable improvements to every day audit techniques (e.g., sample
selection, internal control decisions, and methods of obtaining audit evidence
such as analytical review)—they are carrying out little that could be described
as "pure" or even "applied" research in these fields. Indeed they rather
object to the use of the word "research" to describe their activity.
The professional firms show even less interest in what they see as general
and rather hypothetical questions as to the optimum level of the external audit
function, being largely content to operate within the existing statutory
framework (which in the U.K. requires all active registered companies to be
audited annually). As to possible extensions to the audit role, their outlook is
again strictly practical. Some interest is shown in the concepts of "efficiency"
and "value for money'' auditing, but only in relation to the perceived expansion
of the market for public sector, in particular local authority (i.e., local
government) audits. (Currently, the great majority of these audits are carried
out by "district auditors" who are central government employees. The
present Conservative government is encouraging local authorities to appoint
private sector auditors, and a number of them have now done so.)
Auditing is, to be sure, an activity where it is difficult to secure for any
length of time any commercial advantage derived from improved techniques
and methods of operation. The free flow of personnel between firms, the
review of working papers of other auditors, etc. make the retention of any
benefit within one firm virtually impossible. This characteristic may act as a
disincentive to research by individual firms but may encourage collaborative
research projects, e.g., via the collective professional body which, for the sake
of clarity, if not strict accuracy, I shall refer to as the ICAEW. The ICAEW,
* See Appendix 3 for the full names of organizations given in acronym form.
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which acts as the representative of the profession, might also be expected to
be more interested in wider topics, e.g., the need to demonstrate to other
sectors of the business community the benefits derived from audit or, say, to
explore questions of auditor independence.
The professional body has, in fact, recognized a need for research in
auditing, and a number of projects have been commissioned. The Auditing
Practices Committee (APC) (effectively—although not constitutionally—a sub
committee of the ICAEW), which is primarily responsible for developing
auditing standards and guidelines, has already sponsored projects on:
• Statistical Sampling
T. McRae
(completed and published [1982])
• Analytical Review
C. Westwick
(completed and published [1981])
• Fraud
D. Flint
(report recently submitted)
• Materiality
J. Shaw and T.A. Lee
(report recently submitted)
Westwick is a former technical director of the ICAEW and is now with Arthur
Andersen; the other four are academics, but both Flint and Shaw have been
presidents of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland and Lee is its
(part-time) research director. Following the appointment of Professor Bryan
Carsberg as its part-time director of research, the ICAEW published a
"Programme for Research" (Accountancy, May 1982) which includes certain
specific auditing topics:
• Guidelines for decisions in auditing.
• The auditor's duty in relation to bribery.
• The purpose and scope of the audit of a small company.
• Judgmental sampling, statistical sampling, and audit scope.
• Value for money auditing.
A project on the last of these areas has recently been completed by J. Glynn at
the University of Exeter.
The ICAEW has also sponsored a survey of audit research which I am
presently carrying out with Richard Macve at Aberystwyth. This survey is
primarily a literature review covering the major U.K., U.S., and Australian
research journals, together with a number of other sources, e.g., conferences
and symposia, and the findings should be published later this year. Another
ICAEW project with important auditing implications is that of Bhaskar and
Williams at the University of East Anglia investigating the impact of micro
processors on the work of small firms. This study has recently been
completed. The ICAEW's growing interest in encouraging more research in
auditing is also illustrated by its recent sponsorship of a conference on this
theme at Manchester University.
Overall then, the extent of U.K. auditing research, if not "minimal," has
certainly been limited (e.g., of more than 20 articles published on "auditing"
topics (broadly defined) in Accounting, Organizations and Society, all but two
have been written by academics from North America, Israel, and Australia).
There have been recent signs of a greater awareness of, and interest in,
auditing research, but this has not yet been translated into an output of
published work which remotely compares with that in North America.
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Why Has There Been So Little U.K. Auditing Research?
The first and most obvious reason is the relative lack of numbers of
academic researchers within the U.K. There are approximately 300 U.K.
academic accountants within universities (there are more in polytechnics, but
the great majority of research takes place within the university sector). This
figure compares with an estimate of approximately 5,800 academic accountants
in the U.S. (Steele, 1983). The U.K. university accounting departments are
recent in origin; until the 1950s, there was only one full-time chair of
accounting (at the L.S.E.) in the U.K. Consequently, the opportunity for
completed research has been limited until recently.
The U.K. academic approach to accounting research has looked for its
theoretical underpinning mainly to economics (Wells, 1983), but only recently
has there been much in the way of a formal and coherent economic theory from
which to appraise and evaluate the audit process. However, the development
of "agency theory" and its application by U.S. researchers to auditing (e.g.,
Ng, 1978; Ng & Stoeckenius, 1979; DeAngelo, 1981; Chow, 1982) may now
stimulate more intellectual interest in the U.K.
It may also be a fact that the U.K. academic accountants are not so
research oriented as those in the U.S. For example, only 15 percent of U.K.
academic accountants hold doctoral degrees as compared with approximately
45 percent in the U.S. (Steele, 1983). Although one needs to allow for
differences between the two countries in university and professional examina
tion structure, still the disparity is striking, and the conclusion that most U.K.
academics have been less well trained in research methodology (particularly
quantitative empirical methodology) than their U.S. counterparts seems
inevitable. Just as U.K. academics have tackled relatively little quantitative
accounting research of the "efficient market" type (Peasnell, 1981), so have
they done little on the more quantitative theoretical or empirical topics in
auditing research, e.g., statistical sampling, analytical review, and the effect on
market prices of audit qualifications.
As part of our survey of academic research interests (Appendix 1), we
inquired as to whether respondents agreed that auditing was relatively under
researched in the U.K. and, if so, why this was the case. The great majority of
respondents agreed with the proposition that auditing was under researched in
the U.K. and advanced a number of reasons, including lack of funding, the
absence of "glamour" of the subject vis-a-vis other accounting questions, and
also the status of many U.K. academic accountants who, as "unsuccessful
refugees" from a professional world dominated by routine and mundane
auditing, adversely perceive the benefits of auditing. Again, it would be unwise
to take this argument too far, but it is true that the majority of U.K. academic
accountants have worked in professional practice (approximately two thirds
hold professional qualifications) and also that the majority of these left the
auditing profession fairly soon after qualification.
Most U.K. financial accounting research has concentrated on aspects of
how to report the activities of a business entity and how such information is
used by investors and other interested parties in their decision processes
rather than on the processes by which the credibility of such information is
attested to. In particular, the question of how best to provide useful
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information during a period of rapidly changing prices has been the focal point of
much of the research. That focus is not surprising since in the 10 years January
1972 to January 1982, the U.K. index of retail prices increased nearly fourfold
from 83 to 311. In one very real sense then, auditing research has been
squeezed by the need for research in other areas seen as having overriding
priority.
Academic interests and perceptions may change for a number of reasons.
One of the most important causes is purely economic: the availability of funds
to enable major research projects to take place. To an outside observer, the
U.S. appears to be amply endowed with funds for auditing research projects,
much as London must have appeared to be paved with gold to the medieval
English countryman. In the U.S., not only is there Peat Marwick Mitchell's
ROA program (which is well into the second million dollars of financial support
for auditing projects), but there are also doctoral and other programs
supported by large firms and a generous supply of funds for colloquia,
symposia, and ad hoc projects available from accounting firms, large and small.
Contrast this with the situation in the U.K. Steele (1983) reviewed a fouryear period of ESRC grants running from October 1979 and concluded that,
whereas approximately £150,000 of public money went into accounting
projects, not a single project in the area of auditing could be identified. The
Programme for Research of the ICAEW is being run on a shoestring budget
with only about £40,000 per annum with which to cover the whole range of
accounting research relevant to the profession. Much of this total has been
devoted to the priority area of the inflation accounting debate, which despite,
or because of, recently reduced levels of inflation, is still a matter of
considerable controversy.
Direct sponsorship from the professional firms is equally rare. There are
isolated examples, e.g., Professor Skerratt at Durham University has carried
out a study for Spicer and Pegler on the application of Bayesian methods to
auditing, and Arthur Young McClelland Moores sponsor the research fellow
ship at Southampton which has recently been filled by Raymond Johnson of
Portland State University (although the fellowship is not restricted to those
intending to carry out auditing research). However, overall the attitude of the
professional firms was admirably summed up by Graham Stacy, Price Waterhouse's national technical partner, who in his paper at the above-mentioned
Deloittes/SSRC conference (Hopwood et al, 1982) identified the auditing
research needs of the professional firms as follows:
'The audit research needs of a professional firm can, I suggest, be
grouped under three broad headings:
1) the need to establish and maintain existing standards,
2) the need to adapt to the external changes which affect its
clients, and,
3) the need to keep up with, and develop new audit techniques.'
Stacy is of the opinion that for a professional firm these needs can be satisfied
almost entirely from its own resources and, for a variety of reasons (familiarity
with specific firm procedures, applicability to "real-world" auditing, and
competitive confidentiality), he believes that most firms do indeed prefer to
carry out their own research.
The reluctance of U.K. professional firms to provide academic researchers
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access to "real" audit data (including audit working papers) has, in itself, been
an obstacle to the development of U.K. auditing research. Traditionally,
barriers to third parties gaining access to actual audit data derive from the
desire of the firm to protect the confidentiality of its relationship with its client.
There may also be a "defensive" aspect to this reluctance to release working
papers, i.e., a wish not to expose too widely auditing practices which might be
at odds with those prescribed in the firm's audit manual and/or by professional
standards. In the U.S. in recent years, there does appear to have been a
degree of relaxation of this stance and, increasingly, research papers are being
published based on access to real data, such as about the detection and
treatment of matters requiring audit adjustments, the investigation of actual
error characteristics in audit populations etc.
Why then is the situation different in the U.S. where the professional firms
do dispose of considerable sums for the support of academic auditing research
and may also provide additional support in terms of access to personnel, data,
and introductions to clients? Presumably, the question is one of costs and
benefits. The perceived benefits (benefits which may have only a tenuous
connection with the results of the research) may be greater, and the cost
structures may be different, e.g., it may be cheaper for U.S. firms to employ
external rather than internal researchers.
With regard to the benefits, the interest of large U.S. accountingfirmsin
auditing research may be conditioned as much by factors such as recruitment,
image, and publicity as by any expected return from the results of the research
work carried out. Particularly with regard to recruitment, the structures of the
U.K. and U.S. university and professional training differ in a way suggesting
that the U.S. professional firms have more to lose by not having a "high
profile" on campus. One cost-effective means by which to achieve the desired
profile may be to sponsor research activities by university teachers with the
incidental expectation of some usable results. In contrast, while a graduate
qualification is normal (although not necessary) to train and qualify as an
accountant in the U.K., the majority of graduates recruited will not have
studied any accounting topics in their degree course. The impact of any
university support by firms on recruitment is, therefore, likely to be much
lower.

External Influence
Moreover, the 1970s were a period of considerable unease for the U.S.
auditing profession; indeed, one past president of the AICPA christened them
"the years of trial" (Olson, 1982). (This is not a universally held view, for
Burton and Fairfield (1982) consider these years to have been part of a period
in which "the auditing profession has experienced growing economic pros
perity in a sheltered environment.") Criticism directed at the profession from
within the business community and from farther afield following a series of
spectacular business and audit failures culminated in investigations by Congres
sional committees and increasingly aggressive action by the SEC. The
provision of a significant amount of resources (such as the Peat Marwick
Mitchell ROA Program) to an essentially public-spirited activity such as
auditing research has helped, no doubt, to restore the public image of the
profession.
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It is true that the U.K. also experienced a significant number of major
corporate failures in the early 1970s, particularly those associated with the
1973 collapse in property values, and that in a number of these cases
subsequent Department of Trade investigations asked searching questions as
to whether suitable audit procedures had been used and appropriate judgments
made.
Nevertheless, public reaction against the auditing body as a whole was
more muted than that in the U.S., and any governmental anxiety was paraded
far less publicly. Consequently, the U.K. profession may not have seen any
compelling reason to invest substantial sums in auditing research.
Similarly, one might surmise that in the U.S. the costs of audit failure in
terms of litigation and adverse publicity are greater than in the U.K. and that
the U.S. firms see auditing research as both helping to prevent such failures
and also as a useful "back-up" should it be necessary to defend in court
specific procedures such as statistical sampling techniques and analytical
reviews.

In-House v Academic Research
Turning to the relative costs of "in-house" and academic research, it is not
clear, within the rather limited role for auditing research envisaged by Stacy,
that academics have any comparative advantage. However, one would antici
pate that where more rigorous study was necessary, the skills and training of
academic researchers would allow results with greater validity to be obtained
at less expense than by the use of in-house personnel with limited recent
research experience. Nevertheless, U.K. firms may not see sufficient benefits
to overcome their reluctance to give "outsiders" access to confidential data.
One reason for this perspective may be that U.K. firms do not have the U.S.
experience of peer review and are much less used to having nonfirm personnel
investigating their working practices and methods.
Finally, one has to allow for the differences in the "culture of giving"
between U.K. and U.S. business organizations. Not only is the tax treatment
of charitable (including educational) giving much less favourable in the U.K.,
there is generally a weaker sense of obligation to provide large amounts of
"good citizen" support. It is interesting to note that in a recent report into the
funding of the ESRC (Rothschild, 1982) which explored, inter alia, the extent
to which accounting and business research could be funded by the accounting
profession, the response of the profession to this suggestion was that
government funding should continue as such research was of wide social
importance and the profession had inadequate resources to pay for it (para.
3.17).
To summarize, there has been no growth in U.K. auditing research in the
last decade to match the great expansion of interest that has occurred in the
U.S. academic community. A lack of numbers, interest, and expertise among
U.K. researchers has been matched by a lack of tangible support from the
U.K. profession which has largely remained skeptical of the benefits of
sponsoring research. There are, however, signs of a change of attitude and
that interest is now developing.

139

To What Extent Is U.S. Research
Directly Applicable To The U.K.?
This question is important for two reasons. First, where the results of the
U.S. research are directly transferable to the U.K., then a priori it might be
sensible for U.K. academics and professional firms to leave such research in
American hands and to employ their limited resources in other, more profitable
areas. Second, where the results are not directly transferable, a danger exists
that U.S. firms may mistakenly "export" approaches and techniques that will
be ineffective, or inefficient, outside the U.S. context—in such cases, research
is needed in the U.K. to complement the U.S. work.
The approach currently being followed in the U.K., both by the professional
bodies and by the individual firms, is largely to rely on U.S. work. This posture
is not limited to auditing but applies also to accounting research and can be
illustrated by two examples: in the case of the professional bodies, the
monitoring by the ICAEW of the FASB's conceptual framework project: and,
in the case of an individual firm, the adoption by Peat Marwick Mitchell in the
U.K. of the SEADOC method of documenting and evaluating systems of
internal control.
With regard to the "conceptual framework," given the need to allocate
their limited resources to the specific priority of inflation accounting and given,
in any case, the absolute impossibility of matching or emulating the scale of the
FASB's financial commitment to its conceptual framework project, the ASC
commissioned a report (Macve, 1981) which relied heavily upon surveying the
results as then available of the FASB's work. One does not have to be skeptical
of the ultimate value of the conceptual framework project to appreciate the
appeal of a low cost monitoring exercise of this nature.
The introduction by Peat Marwick Mitchell in the U.K. of SEADOC is a
good example of the manner in which the major U.K. accounting firms rely
heavily upon their North American counterparts for the development of new
audit techniques, e.g., the introduction of standardized audit sampling ap
proaches, the introduction of methods of documenting and assessing internal
control, and, perhaps most significantly, the introduction of audit manuals
intended to be operational on a worldwide basis.
The manner in which SEADOC was developed, tested, and introduced in
the U.S. has been reported by Mock and Willingham (1983). SEADOC was
developed out of research work on the variability of auditors' judgments with
regard to internal control, with the twin aim of introducing greater consensus in
such judgments within Peat Marwick Mitchell and of providing a more efficient
set of procedures for internal control documentation than those in use.
In such circumstances, an important question arises: To what extent is it
necessary for U.K. firms to test and validate the conclusions of U.S. research
in U.K. conditions? Indeed, this question is especially pertinent because it is
not always clear whether such "imports" primarily benefit the U.K. firm
(which can take advantage of the development costs incurred in the U.S.) or
whether the changes in audit procedures and techniques in the U.K. are
instigated by U.S. firms so as to ensure 1) compliance with U.S. auditing
standards, SEC requirements, etc. for multinational companies and 2) also to
obtain the benefits deriving from standardized procedures of quality control and
freer movement of staff between countries.
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As far as I am aware, no research has specifically addressed the issue, but
it is important to ask what differences there may be between the U.K. and the
U.S. auditing environments.
The similarities are perhaps more obvious than the differences. Both
economies are "mixed" in the sense of having significant private and public
sectors operating alongside each other, albeit in rather differing proportions.
As well, both economies are developed in the sense of having an advanced
industrial base and a sophisticatedfinancialcommunity, although again the U.S.
has a much greater GNP both absolutely and proportional to population.
The development of multinational companies and, in particular, of U.S.
subsidiaries operating in the U.K. together with the relatively free flow of
capital between the two countries has helped to preserve the basic similarities
of the systems offinancialaccounting and reporting in the two countries and the
evolution of largely compatible sets of accounting and auditing standards.
Within the profession itself, the leading firms in North America are closely
identified with the leading firms in the U.K. Although, as noted above, there
are differences in recruitment and training policies, these may be diminishing as
the leading U.K. firms now almost exclusively recruit graduates, of whom a
steadily increasing proportion have accounting degrees. Communication be
tween offices and the transfer of personnel is greatly eased by the common
language.

Differences in Perceived Professional Responsibility
In terms of general attitudes towards business and business ethics, there
may be relevant differences, whether due to historical or other reasons. One
interesting question is whether U.S. auditors are expected to carry out their
duties of investor and creditor protection more rigorously than their U.K.
counterparts because of differences in the legal framework within which the
auditing profession operates. To take one example, to what extent is
compliance with professional standards a sufficient defense against allegations
of auditor negligence? In the (U.S.) Bar Chris case in 1968, the court stated:
"Accountants should not be held to a higher standard than that recognized in
their profession."
However, in the case of U.S. v Simon in 1969, a criminal liability case, the
judge stated that proof of compliance with generally accepted standards was
"evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he
acted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were not materially false or
misleading" (see, e.g., Arens & Loebbecke, 1980).
It seems unlikely that such a decision would be reached in the U.K. In the
case of the Royal Mail in 1931 (see, e.g., Hastings, 1949), the auditor, a
partner in Price Waterhouse, was acquitted of criminal charges in relation to
the use by the client, a major shipping company, of "secret reserve
accounting" (specifically the release of redundant provisions against excess
wartime taxes) which gave a misleading picture of the trading results. A major
part of the defense case was the fact that such practices were commonplace
and accepted by the profession.
Much more recently, the ASC obtained a written opinion from legal counsel
on the meaning of "true and fair" (Accountancy, November 1983). U.K. audit
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reports have to confirm that the accounts give a true and fair view of financial
position and results, rather as U.S. reports confirm "fair presentation." The
legal opinion was that "true and fair" in the eyes of the law is still essentially
defined for practical purposes by the accounting standards that are generally
accepted by the profession. One would expect, therefore, that a similar
attitude would be taken in regard to the role of the auditing standards in the
U.K. in setting out what may reasonably be expected of an auditor.
Apart from the question of whether compliance with professional standards
is sufficient to establish that the auditor has taken due skill and care in forming
his opinion, there is the question of whether these standards differ between the
U.S. and the U.K. It may be that the specific requirements in terms of the
codified auditing standards, together with more stringent interpretations by the
courts, suggest a requirement for a higher level of skill and care in the U.S.
than in the U.K. For example, for many years the U.K. professional bodies
lagged behind those in the U.S. in making audit procedures, such as attendance
at stocktaking, normal audit requirements. More generally, as noted above,
audit "failures" which might have aroused not only significant public concern in
the U.S. but also action by private investors and/or regulatory bodies against
the auditors appear to have been more readily condoned, if not accepted, in the
U.K.
Because of the very small number of recently decided U . K . cases
concerning auditor negligence, it is not easy to provide evidence to support the
assertion that a less exacting standard of skill and care is expected of the
auditor in the U . K . However, my surmise is that on the facts of the
"Hochfelder" case (Schnepper, 1977) a U.K. auditing firm would not have
been found negligent regardless of considerations as to whether a duty of care
was owed to the plaintiffs (although the recent Australian case Simonius
Vischer [Davison, 1982] appears to imply a similar need to identify internal
control weaknesses).
While U.K. courts might take a narrower view of what the auditor's duties
entail in relation to the formulation of an opinion, they probably take a wider
view as to whom these duties might be owed. In the New Zealand case of Scott
v Macfarlane in 1979 (Davison, 1982) and the U.K. cases of Jeb Fastners in
1981 and of Twomax in 1982 (Keenan, 1983), the courts found there to be a
duty of care to third parties who invested in the company on the strength of the
audited financial statements, even though those parties were unknown to the
auditor at the time of the audit.

Institutional Differences
Apart from legal differences, institutional differences exist between the
U.K. and the U.S. Whereas it is probably true that overall the government
intervenes more in the U.K. than in the U.S. economy, in the particular case of
accounting and auditing, intervention is less in the U.K. The U.K. has no
regulatory body with powers or influence comparable to that of the SEC. To
take one example, the U.K. profession was largely free of the pressures
generated in the U.S. by the passage of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act with the attendant suggestion, at the behest of the SEC, that there should
be increased auditor responsibility for reporting on whether clients' internal
142

control systems were sufficiently strong to highlight such improprieties
(Staats, 1981).
Standard setting in the U . K . is still solely within the province of the
professional bodies. Consequently, requirements for auditor independence, or
its appearance, are less detailed than in the U.S. No provisions for peer
review, mandatory or otherwise, exist; indeed, there have been no such
reviews in the U.K., and discussions with professional firms elicited consider
able antipathy to the idea.
The absence of direct government intervention and influence on the
workings of the U.K. accounting and auditing profession may well mean that
there is correspondingly less impetus to develop standards that are acceptable
throughout the profession or for the profession publicly to justify its perfor
mance.
Also, a number of specific practical differences in the audit environment are
pertinent. To take some examples:
• Even large listed U.K. companies do not have to publish quarterly
figures, and U.K. auditors do not have to associate themselves in any
manner with interim data.
• The U . K . statutory external audit requirement covers all active
limited companies, small or large.
• Partly because of the more extensive audit requirement, the range of
accounting systems encountered may be wider, e.g., more diverse
computer hardware and software and, in particular, greater use of
micro-computers.
• U.K. auditors are accustomed to giving opinions on "current cost"
accounts and, in certain circumstances, on profit forecasts.
These environmental differences may render certain results andfindingsof
U.S. research inappropriate in the U.K. For example, U.S. data related to such
issues as materiality levels, duties in connection with internal control, and
management impropriety might lead to uncompetitive "over auditing" if U.K.
courts are less disposed to support allegations of negligence. Conversely, U.K.
auditors may have to pay greater attention to the possible use of accounts by
third parties. On a much more practical level, the use of regression packages
for analytical review techniques may not be possible or efficient if detailed
quarterly and monthly data are not available.
One well known example of significant differences in thefindingsof similar
research carried out in both the U.K. and the U.S. is that of the effect of audit
qualifications on security market prices. Benston (1981) notes that "[s]tudies
with U.S., Australian and U.K. data reveal that auditors' qualifications and
exceptions generally do not appear to provide investors with information, with
the exception of one study of U.K. companies."
The study in question, that of Firth (1978)—to date the only empirical U.K.
study of this topic—found there to be an instantaneous day-of-the-announcement adverse price reaction to qualifications of a more serious nature, whereas
other studies essentially found either no reaction (Baskin, 1972; Ball, Walker
and Whittred, 1979) or that any reaction had been entirely subsumed by the
market prior to the qualification announcement (Davis, 1982). (It should be
noted, however, that the results obtained by Chow and Rice [1982] were more
akin to those of Firth.) Further research is needed to establish whether this
result reflects genuine differences in circumstances and perceptions (e.g., that
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U.K. financial markets, despite their extreme concentration, are less efficient
at acquiring and absorbing price sensitive information than those in other
countries), or whether the result is explicable in terms of differing meth
odologies between the various studies.

U.K. Research: Needs and Future Directions
I shall approach the question of future U.K. research needs in terms of
three different sections or "steps." The first step is the need to translate,
absorb, and, in one sense, catch up with the very considerable scope of U.S.
research work already carried out. The second step is to "fill-in" those areas
of U.S. research which need to be adapted to specific U.K. conditions. The
third step is to identify those topics and related questions which are of greater
interest in the U.K. than the U.S. and, accordingly, to develop appropriate
U.K. research work.

Translation of Existing Research
The principal current activity in this area is my survey, carried out on behalf
of the ICAEW and now nearly completed, of recently published and current
auditing research. This survey is primarily in the nature of a literature review
(including a bibliography) covering research published in the U.K., North
America, and Australasia, but it also includes reports of discussions with those
U.K. professional and academic accountants with an interest in auditing
research. It is intended to be a useful reference for researchers, sponsoring
bodies, and practicing firms.
To attempt to summarize the extensive and wide ranging literature on
auditing research is, however, an onerous task. Not only is the scale of the
research work that has been carried out very large, it is also diverse in both
content and methodology, and, in some instances, e.g., the research into
statistical sampling, very technical in nature. In other instances, distilling
practical implications is very difficult, especially where one suspects research
to be proceeding along the lines of "solutions looking for problems" rather
than vice versa. It is not, perhaps, surprising that the intention to include
sectional summaries in the American Accounting Association's bibliography of
auditing research has been abandoned.
Nevertheless, we believe that producing such a survey is a worthwhile
effort and, in particular, that it will be a valuable exercise in communication to
accounting practitioners and professional bodies. If academic research in
auditing is to have significant impact upon professional firms and practitioners,
it needs to be communicated in a manner and language to which they are
accustomed even if this "translation" requires some sacrifice of academic
rigor. The communication gap is probably even wider in the U.K. than in the
U.S., for the average senior practitioner has far less acquaintance with
academic theory and the methodology of accounting and auditing research than
his counterpart in the U.S. As yet in the U.K., there are no research journals in
either accounting or auditing including on a regular basis contributions from
both practitioners and academics such as Auditing: A Journal of Practice &
Theory.
In covering what is primarily U.S. research work from an essentially
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transatlantic viewpoint, our survey may have incidental benefits in terms of
highlighting certain areas of U.S. research where positive results have not yet
been achieved or where continued research is necessary to turn these results
into practical applications. To take two examples:
• Obtaining audit evidence by means of debtors and creditors circularizations:
In the 1970s, a number of U.S. research studies (e.g., Sauls
[1972], Hubbard & Bullington [1972], Warren [1974], Kinney and
Warren [1979]), investigated whether debtor and creditor circularizations produced reliable audit evidence and also which of the various
types of confirmation (positive, negative, or blank) were most cost
effective in gathering such evidence. Sorkin [1979] added an "ex
panded field" (essentially a multiple choice) type of confirmation.
This type of research is essentially practical in nature and, therefore,
of great interest to practitioners and audit standard setters. How
ever, before accepting unreservedly the apparent implications of
these studies (e.g., that of Kinney and Warren [1979] that, given
certain assumptions, negative circularizations are most cost effec
tive), practitioners would probably like to see further work carried
out to ensure that the costs of the various methods of circularization
and attendant follow-up work are in fact realistic and, also, to ensure
that the attributed costs of wrongly rejecting an accounts receivable
total that, in fact, contains no material error and those of accepting a
materially erroneous figure are related to those pertaining in prac
tice. Similarly, with regard to the improvements in response and
accuracy rates reported by Sorkin (1979) derived from the use of
"expanded field" circularizations, one would like further evidence on
how far the improvements are sustainable or are occasioned by the
novelty of the format to the respondents.
The studies also need to be further extended beyond their
present concentration on financial institutions and on quite small
personal balances "seeded" with errors of 10 percent or less. To
generalize the results to a wider range of audit conditions, it would be
desirable to examine circularizations in the context of manufacturing
and commercial organizations with large corporate debtors and
creditors (one immediate difference being the absence of direct
financial involvement of the respondent). It is interesting to note that
one study (Hubbard & Bullington, 1972) with a proportion of
corporate debtors suggested that both the response rate and the
accuracy of the response differed between corporate and individual
debtors, although the relatively small number of corporate debtors in
the sample prevents much reliance being placed upon this finding.
• Audit techniques for detecting management fraud:
This is another area of considerable practical interest, and one
which has been the subject of at least two major studies in recent
years, e.g., those of Albrecht et al (1980) and of Sorensen et al.
(1983). These studies have been painstakingly thorough: Albrecht et
al reviewed over 1500 literature sources and also wrote to over 400
prisons as well as to every state and federal probation and parole
department in the U.S. and Canada. Both studies make use of the
idea of "red flags" as indicators to the auditors of possible manage
ment impropriety (auditors have traditionally used "red flags," but in
a rather more ad hoc manner, e.g., greater audit care would be
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employed if the auditor knew management or key personnel to be in
personal financial difficulty, prone to gambling, drink, etc.).
However, at this stage of the development of these studies,
questions of the predictive power of "red flags" (individually or in
combination) and of the costs of obtaining suitable information have
not been addressed in a way which enables immediately practical
conclusions to be derived (e.g., if the managing director of a company
is a compulsive heavy gambler, this behavior might be a good
predictor of possible impropriety; however to ascertain, other than
by hearsay and chance, details of the private life of the managing
director is likely to necessitate the services of enquiry agents and to
be extremely expensive).
To illustrate this problem in the U.K. context, one of the most
successful schemes of management fraud this century was that
perpetrated by the chairman and secretary, Harold Jaggard, of the
Grays Building Society (Accountancy, July 1979). Until his suicide at
the age of 79, Jaggard had apparently systematically defrauded this
relatively small "savings and loan" society for 50 years to the extent
that at the time of his death there was a shortfall in the accounts of
nearly £7 million (approximately 50 percent of total investors' funds).
Although the exercise of proper auditing procedures would have
uncovered the misappropriations of cash at a much earlier stage, it is
not certain that the use of "red flags" with regard to the personal
habits of Mr. Jaggard would have initially indicated the possibilities of
fraud. The official enquiry (Davison and Stuart-Smith, 1979) con
cluded that the majority of the cash (£2 million) taken was lost in
unsuccessful gambling: "We believe it all went to his family in
relatively small amounts, and to bookmakers in large sums of cash."
However, to the auditors, Mr. Jaggard presented a rather colorless
character, and it is highly unlikely that his lifelong habit of consuming
a cheese roll and half a pint of light ale at lunchtime would have
alerted any suspicions or waved any "red flags."

Application of U.S. Research Findings to Specific
U.K. Circumstances
The second stage of U.K. research must be to complement that already
carried out or in progress in the U.S. so as to take into account the various
differences between the auditing environments outlined above and to explore
how these affect the valid application of U.S. research findings to U.K.
conditions. To take some examples:
• Agency theory and the role of auditing:
Historical studies of the development of voluntary and mandatory
auditing would both usefully supplement the work carried out in the
U.S. and also identify any factors peculiar to the U.K. The U.K. has
had a longer experience with a compulsory audit requirement. Such a
measure was first introduced in 1844, although it was withdrawn in
1855 and not fully reintroduced until 1900. These studies might
further investigate the role of "crises," e.g., nineteenth-century
bank and insurance failures contributing to the perception of the need
for government regulation (Tricker, 1982).
Work of this nature might also consider the widespread use of
"secret reserve" accounting in the U.K. in the 1920s—a phenome146

non apparently not paralleled in the U.S. The approval by auditors of
such practices appears at odds with their supposed role in ensuring
that management does not bias and coarsenfinancialinformation and,
perhaps, suggests that, at least at that time in the U.K., the auditor's
behavioral impact on the honesty and propriety of management
actions was seen to be of more importance than the information value
of the signed accounts.
More widely, examination of comparative sociological research
into the development of the professions in the two countries may give
further insights into differences in their role, social status, and
attitudes to professional standards.
• The impact of audit qualifications:
Given the different results obtained by Firth in his study of the
impact of audit qualifications on market prices as compared with the
majority of results obtained from similar studies in the U.S. and
Australia, further research work would be of benefit in determining
whether this difference was caused by environmental differences or
by reasons associated with the way in which the study was con
ducted. U.K. auditors attach great importance to decisions as to
whether or not to qualify a set of accounts, and it is possible, although
a priori not very probable, that this preference reflects a greater
economic importance of such decisions in the U.K. as exemplified by
market reactions.
• Duties in relation to fraud, bribery and client illegal acts:
If I am correct in suggesting that the public at large, the investing
public, and the courts in the U.K. take a less stringent view of the
auditor's responsibility for the detection of management fraud and of
the auditor's duty to uncover and draw attention to questionable
payments, then auditing techniques and levels of auditing appropriate
in the U.S. might be unsuitable in the U.K. Take for example the
"red flag" indicators referred to above. Whereas in the U.S. it may
in certain circumstances be considered cost effective for the auditors
to employ private investigators to obtain information regarding the
lifestyle and past history of key personnel, it is unlikely that this step
would be considered necessary in the U.K.
This area of auditors' duties and responsibilities is one of direct
interest to practitioners, and the topic of bribery in particular is to be
covered by the ICAEW as part of the "Programme for Research"
outlined above. The APC, which sponsored Professor Flint's study
on the question of fraud, is currently setting up a broad-based group
including practitioners, academics, and lawyers to consider further
the practical implications.
• Costs and benefits of U.S.-developed auditing techniques:
More generally, it is important that U.K. professional firms
explore in detail possible differences in the structure of costs and
benefits prior to the adoption of new audit procedures and techniques
"imported" from the U.S. Advances in such areas as sampling
techniques, analytical review, computer auditing and computer ap
plications, and circularization of confirmation requests need to be
critically reviewed in the context of (1) differing audit risks in the
U.K. (e.g., in terms of potential liability and damages), (2) differing
costs (e.g., it is probable that the relative cost of junior audit staff is
much less in the U.K. than the U.S.), (3) differing time pressures
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(e.g., U.K. companies may be prepared to accept a longer delay
between the end of the reporting period and the publication of audited
accounts), and (4) more limited availability of data which may restrict
the application of multiple regression-based analytical review tech
niques and similar procedures.
• Intercountry conformity:
Indeed, one important research topic in itself is that of determin
ing just how important are these differences and of investigating to
what level auditing practices can be and are being successfully
harmonized on a worldwide basis. A study (similar to that of Cushing
and Loebbecke comparing audit methodologies between firms) could
usefully be carried out comparing auditing practice between various
national offices of one firm. Such a study would be of particular
interest and value to those firms which have recently introduced or
are contemplating introducing "world" audit manuals and should
offer great potential for collaborative projects between U.S. and
U.K. researchers.

Areas of Specific U.K. Interest
For various historical, institutional, environmental, and other reasons,
there are a number of auditing areas of particular interest to the U.K., and it is
here that there is special scope for the U . K . to take initiative in the
identification of research topics and carrying out such research.
• The audit of small businesses:
Every U.K. company registered with limited liability requires
annual external audit (unless dormant). Page (1981b) suggests that
there are approximately 300,000 active small business entities
requiring external audit. Recently much debate has been occasioned
within the U.K. profession concerning the wisdom of such an allembracing audit requirement (APC, 1979), a requirement which
contrasts with that in the U.S. where only listed companies are
normally compelled to have an external audit. There is scope for
research, sponsored either by the profession or perhaps by the
collective organizations representing business interests (e.g., the
CBI and the Institute of Directors), to identify the particular needs of
small businesses and of their shareholders, creditors, and other
interested parties in terms of audited financial information and of
whether a "review" function might satisfy these needs more
appropriately than a full audit.
Such studies might also explore in the small business context the
relationship between the external audit function and the auditor's role
in the provision of management advice, assistance with the raising of
finance, the provision of taxation advice, and accounting services. In
essence, then, studies of this kind would follow forward on the work
begun by Page (1981a, 1981b).
The questions of how best to cater to the needs of small business
and how to overcome the particular problems associated with the
audit of small businesses (for example, reduced levels of internal
control/segregation of duties and excessive reliance on management
representations) are not, of course, specific to U.K. (the AICPA has
recently published a research monograph on the problems encoun
tered in such engagements [Raiborn, 1982]); however, the nature of
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the general U.K. audit requirement makes these matters of particu
larly pressing interest to U.K. researchers and professional firms.
• Association with forecast information:
This is an area of special interest to the U.K. profession, as
reports on profit forecasts made in takeover situations are already
required. While the formal report is currently limited to attesting that
the forecast calculations have been prepared in accordance with
reasonable and consistently applied accounting policies, in practice
the auditor will devote much time and effort to ensuring that all the
assumptions on which the forecast is based are reasonable. Now that
the SEC and the AICPA (1982) have relaxed their earlier restrictions
and some research has begun in the U.S. (e.g. Danos & Imhoff,
1982a, 1982b, 1983), research into the U.K. experience should be of
particular interest.
• Public sector auditing/"Value for Money" auditing:
U.K. auditing firms have, in recent years, become increasingly
involved in the work of auditing local government and public utilities
(such as the water boards) as an addition to their more traditional role
in the audit of nationalized industries and public corporations. Audits
of this nature, particularly those of the local authorities, contain
aspects of efficiency and value for money auditing in addition to the
requirements of a normalfinancialaudit. Consequently, there is an
incentive for the development of research studies in this area so as to
extend the work already carried out by Glynn, Tomkins, and others
(see Appendix 1).
There has been U.S. research work on these topics, e.g.,
Robertson & Clarke (1971); Smith, Lanier & Taylor (1972); Norgaard (1972); Uecker (1977); Churchill et al. (1978); Charnes &
Cooper (1980); however, it is probably fair to say that the issues
have not received the prominence in terms of academic attention and
publication in the major journals that other auditing issues have. This
may be a reflection of a lack of interest in these matters among the
U.S. professional firms, which has carried through to the teaching
curricula for university and professional examinations. As an illustra
tion, one might contrast the contents of two recent auditing text
books. In the U.S., Auditing: An Integrated Approach (Arens and
Loebbecke, 1980) contains 22 chapters, none of which consider in
detail the particular needs of public sector auditing, whereas, in the
U.K., Auditing and Accountability (Sherer and Kent, 1983) contains
15 (rather more brief) chapters, no less than seven of which
exclusively address topics concerning a wider role for auditing and
public sector auditing. Too much should not be read into this
comparison in that Sherer and Kent (aimed at university courses) is
not fully representative of the average U.K. textbook aimed at
professional courses. Books such as Woolf [1982], Pratt [1983], etc.
are predominantly system and technique oriented within the context
of auditing private sector clients. However, the contention that U.S.
research work has concentrated on areas other than those related to
public sector auditing would appear to be borne out by Richard
Brown's words at the last University of Kansas auditing symposium
(1982):
"I detect a great lack of interest at our univer
sities in addressing these kinds of issues in govern149

mental accounting and auditing. . . . The business
schools seem to have a preoccupation with public
accounting and with financial auditing, and do little or
nothing for the rest of us in accounting and auditing.
. . . Courses in performance and operational auditing
are lacking. A little attention may be given to man
agement or operational auditing, but there is almost
no coverage of program results or of effectiveness
auditing. . . . Indeed, the whole development of
performance auditing and evaluation in government
has been far more a spontaneous groundswell on the
part of policy makers than it has been a result of
academic attention."
• Reporting on current cost and inflation adjusted accounts:
In the U.K., the professional firms report on those accounts prepared in
accordance with Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16 which
requires companies of a certain size to prepare adjusted accounts reflecting
the effects of certain aspects of changes in the level of prices on their
business. Unlike the situation in the U.S., these inflation-adjusted accounts
may, at the client's discretion, be the only accounts produced, in which case
the auditor has to determine whether they show a "true and fair view." In
consequence, the U.K. professional firms have a direct interest in the
problems of auditing inflation-adjusted accounts, e.g., the use of appropriate
indices to obtain realistic current asset values and depreciation charges.
Research into their experiences in this field and in the more general
problems of this kind of attestation would add another perspective both to
the "inflation accounting" debate and to questions as to further extensions
of the auditor's attest function.

Summary and Conclusions
The U.K. has been an "underdeveloped area" in auditing research by
comparison with the U.S. While a number of factors have contributed to the
relative lack of interest both from academic researchers and from practicing
firms and professional bodies, in the last few years a change of attitude has
been observed, and interest is increasing.
It is pertinent to consider the similarities and differences between the
auditing environments in the two countries to assess the applicability of U.S.
research to the U.K. My impression is that there are differences both in the
general legal and regulatory framework within which auditing is practiced and
also in the specific details of cost structures, data availability, and scope of
work which need to be taken into account. This question itself deserves
systematic research. For example, the evidence on the stock-market impact of
audit qualifications in the two countries needs further investigation as does the
situation in each country as regards auditors' liability.
U.K. auditing research is, therefore, likely to develop on three main fronts.
Initially, a need exists to distill the essence of the U.S. research achievements
and to communicate these to U.K. researchers, practitioners, and professional
bodies. This is the objective of my current survey for the ICAEW. It will also
point up certain areas where further research in the U.S. is needed.
The second stage is to complement the U.S. research by exploring what
modifications of its results and implications are needed in the U.K. context,
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e.g., in understanding the history of the development of auditing and the
theoretical basis of its role in society; in allowing for different cost structures
facing audit firms; and in adapting techniques for the differences in the nature of
the work to be performed and of the evidence available. There is considerable
potential here for collaborative research between U.K. and U.S. researchers in
appraising the effectiveness of transatlantic harmonization of procedures and
standards.
Finally, U.K. research may be expected to explore areas where U.K.
auditing experience has differed from that in the U.S., e.g., in regard to the
public sector, small companies, forecasts, and current cost accounting.
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Appendix 1
Survey of Current U.K. Academic Research into Auditing
This appendix reports the results of a survey of auditing research interests in 57 U.K. academic
institutions. The initial survey was carried out in 1981, the institutions surveyed being those listed
in the AUTA (Association of University Teachers in Accounting) Directory in 1979 or 1980.
Consequently, the majority were universities although a number of the larger polytechnics were
also represented. Fifty-five responses were obtained from the initial survey. Follow-up procedures
based on the initial results and the AUTA directory for 1982 were carried out in 1984. (In 1984 the
name of the AUTA was changed to the "British Accounting Association" ["BAA"].)
U C W Aberystwyth: Currently carrying out a survey of audit research on behalf of the
ICAEW (D. Gwilliam and R. Macve). Interest and publications in the field of audit failures as
revealed by Department of Trade investigations (R. Macve). Research into the history of public
sector auditing and a comparison of U.S. and U.K. models (G. Williams).
U C N W Bangor: Current project on audit committees covering U.S. and Canadian experience
and a detailed survey of practice in the U.K. (C. Brown).
Bath: Interest and publications in the fields of value for money auditing in the public sector and
of public sector auditing in general (C. Tomkins and I. Colville). Completed M.Sc. thesis
"Comparative Study of Audit Methods and Procedures" (B. Emerton) and current research
project entitled "An International Comparison of State Audit Office Attitudes, Values and
Cultures" (P. Keemer).
Birmingham Polytechnic: Interest and publications in the field of management audit (J.
Santocki).
Buckingham: Research into the historical development of auditing and audit reports (J.
Mason).
UC Cardiff: Interest and publications in the field of current developments in audit techniques
and audit reporting (R. Chandler).
City University Business School: CUBS has an "audit unit" consisting of A. Chambers, G.
Selim, and G. Vintner. The unit is primarily concerned with internal auditing; however, there is
also interest and recent publications in the fields of the audit of management information systems
(A. Chambers and G. Selim) and public sector efficiency audit techniques (G. Vintner). Research
and publications in the field of auditor's "going concern qualifications" (R. Taffler). Postgraduate
research work includes the topics of systems audit and operational audit.
Durham: Research in collaboration with Spicer and Pegler on the application of Bayesian
methods in audit sampling (L. Skerratt); also research into the role of analytical review.
East Anglia: Completed ICAEW project on the impact of microprocessors on small and
medium sized practices (K. Bhaskar and B. Williams). Interest in a number of ideas concerned with
auditing EDP systems, e.g., the audit of data base accounting systems.
Edinburgh: Completd Ph.D. "An Identification, Evaluation and Development of the Theoretical Framework of U.K. Company Audit Practices" (R. Ferrier). Ph.D. in progress (J. Innes)
entitled "External Management Auditing." Research on the effect of external management audit
on bankers' lending decisions. Research report on "Materiality in Accounting and Auditing"
completed for APC (T. Lee).
Exeter: Project completed on "Value for Money" auditing (J. Glynn).
Glasgow: Survey on auditor responsibility with regard to the detection of fraud and
irregularities completed on behalf of the APC (D. Flint). Research interest and publications in the
fields of "value for money" audit, public sector auditing, peer review, auditing standards, audit
committees, auditing theory and the significance of the "true and fair view," and social and ethical
issues in auditing (D. Flint). Research interest and publications in the fields of auditing current cost
accounts, audit committees, international auditing standards, and audit reporting (J. Shaw).
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Heriot Watt: Completed project entitled "Audit Quality and Value for Money: Perceptions of
Company Financial Management" (N. Lothian, 1983).
Kent: Ph.D. completed entitled "Accountability and Audit in the Saudi Arabian Government"
(B. Quota, 1977). Completed empirical research project investigating current practices in private
sector management audits and consideration of future developments (P. Boys).
Lancaster: Completed ROA project relating to international auditing standards (E. Stamp, in
collaboration with M . Moonitz [Berkeley]). Recent paper on U.K. auditing research and publication
on the levels of assurance issue (A. Steele). "Accountants' Professional Negligence" (J. Pockson)
Macmillan, 1982.
Liverpool Polytechnic: Research into "Public Sector: Systems Audit" (K. Wade; Wade has
recently taken an appointment with the CIPFA).
Liverpool: Interest and publication in the field of the market for audit services (R. Morris).
Manchester: Research into the structure of the U.K. auditing profession (S. Turley and P.
Moizer). Research (sponsored by the ICMA) on the quality of audits of small companies (S.
Turley). Research on the use of procedures for establishing the extent of reliance to be placed on
the work of other auditors (S. Turley, P. Moizer, and D. Walker [seconded from PMM & Co.]).
M.Sc. research into materiality for audit purposes (K. Robson).
Middlesex Polytechnic: Coauthorship of a recent paper analyzing audit fees on an
international basis (P. Walton).
Oxford Centre for Management Studies: Research interest and publications in the field of
computer auditing (M. Earl and A. McCosh).
Oxford Polytechnic: Research interest and publications in the field of computer auditing,
particularly as applicable to local government (G. Holmberg).
Sheffield: Research interest in the field of computer auditing (E. Lowe).
Southampton: Research interest and publications in the field of auditing small companies (M.
Page; Page is currently on secondment to the ICAEW).
Strathclyde: Conference May 1984 entitled "Accountants' Professional Liability" (organized
by C. Nobes and E . Minnis).
Further information may be obtained either through:
David Gwilliam
The Department of Accounting,
The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth SY23 3DB, Wales, U . K .
or directly from the individuals and institutions concerned.

Appendix 2
Recent Auditing Articles in U.K. Research Journals

Accounting & Business Research
Issue
Authors

Title

Winter

1970

Peter Bird

The Scope of Company Audit.

Autumn

1971

David Flint

The Role of the Auditor in Modern Society:
An Exploratory Essay.

Spring

1973

G.W. Beck
(Australia)

The Role of the Auditor in
Modern Society.

Winter

1973
1975

Bruce Picking

Winter

Auditing Standards.
Linking Internal Control and Substantive
Tests: A Note.

David Hatherly

Spring

1976

C. Nottingham

Conceptual Framework for Computer Audits.

Summer

1976

Auditor's Report—Society's
Expectations and Realities.

Winter

1976

Autumn

1977

M . Knoll
(Israel)
J. Santocki
Ralph Estes &
Marvin Reimer
(U.S.)

Meaning and Scope of Management Audit.
A Study of the Effect of
Qualified Auditors' Opinions
on Bankers' Lending Decisions.
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Accounting & Business Research (continued)
Issue
Authors
Title
Spring

1978

G.D. Pound
(Australia)
David Hatherly
Ralph Estes &
Marvin Reimer
(U.S.)

Spring
Spring

1979
1979

Autumn

1979

C. Wayne Alderman
(U.S.)

An Empirical Analysis of the Impact
of Uncertainty Qualifications on the Market
Risk Components.

Summer

1980

The Auditor's Liability: A Myth.

Summer

1981

G.D. Pound &
J.K. Courtis
(Australia)
Michael Firth

Summer

1981

Frank Milne &
Ron Weber
(Australia)

Winter

1981

Edward Blocher
(U.S.)

Winter

1981

John Y. Lee
(U.S.)

Winter

1981

Martin E . Taylor
& Robert L . Baker
(U.S.)

Spring

1982

David Hatherly

Autumn

1982

Alan G. Davison
(Australia)

Winter

1982

Autumn

1983

J.W. Martin &
Gary J. Previts
(U.S.)
C.E. Arlington
W.A. Hillison &
P.F. Williams
(U.S.)

Winter

1983

A Review of EDP Auditing.
Segmentation and the Audit Process.
An Experimental Study of the Differential
Effect of Standard and Qualified Auditors'
Opinions on Investors' Price Decisions.

Auditor-Client Relationships and Their Impact
on Bankers' Perceived Lending Decisions.
Regulation and the Auditing Profession in the
U.S.A.: The Metcalf Sub-committee's
Recommendations Re-examined.
Assessment of Prior Distributions:
The Effect on Required Sample Size in
Bayesian Audit Sampling.
A New Approach to the Levels of
Assurance Issue in Auditing.
An Analysis of the External
Audit Fee.
Accounting and Auditing Standards:
Why They Are Inconsistent.
Auditors' Liability to Third Parties for
Negligence.
The Risk Preference Profiles of Practising
CPAs: Some Tentative Results.
The Psychology of Expectation Gaps:
Why is There So Much Dispute About
Auditor Responsibility?
Audit Reports: Their Impact on the Loan
Decision Process and Outcome. An
Experiment.

Keith Houghton
(Australia)

Accounting, Organizations and Society
1976- No. 4

C. Medawar

The Social Audit: A Political View.

1977- No. 1

W.C. Uecker
(U.S.)

1977-No. 1

K.A. Wilcox &
C. H. Smith
(U.S.)
J.G. Rhode
J.E. Sorensen &
E . E . Lowler III
(U.S.)

An Enquiry into the Need for Currently
Feasible Extensions of the Attest Function in
Corporate Annual Reports.
Role Discrepancies and the AuditorClient Relationship.

1977-No. 2

1977-No. 3

Sources of Professional Turnover
in Public Accounting Firms Revealed
by the Exit Interview.
Some Effects of the Perceived
Independence of the Auditor.

D. Lavin
(U.S.)

155

Accounting, Organizations and Society (continued)
Author
Title
Issue
1977-No. 3

W.C. Uecker &
W.R. Kinney Jr.

1977-No. 4

P. Welling
(U.S.)
J.F. Dillard &
K.R. Ferris

(U.S.)

1979-No. 3

(U.S.)
1979- No. 4

1980- No. 1

1980-No. 2

1980- No. 3
1981- No. 2

Judgemental Evaluation of Sample
Results: A Study of the Type and
Severity of Errors made by Practising CPAs.
A Goal Programming Model for Human
Resource Accounting in a CPA Firm.
Sources of Professional Staff Turnover
in Public Accounting Firms—Some
Further Evidence.
Consensus Views and Judgement Models in
Materiality Decisions.
Auditing and Accounting for Program
Efficiency and Management Efficiency
in Not-for-Profit Entities.

M . Firth
A. Charnes &
W.W. Cooper
(U.S.)
R.L. Benke Jr
& J.G. Rhode
(U.S.)
L.J. Brooks Jr.
(Canada)
J. Pratt &
J. Jiambalvo

The Job Satisfaction of Higher
Level Employees in Large Certified
Public Accounting Firms.
An Attitude Survey Approach to the
Social Audit: The Southam Press Experience.
Relationships Between Leader Behavior
and Audit Team Performance.

(U.S.)
1981-No. 4

1981- No. 4
1982- No. 1

An Examination of Professional
Commitment in Public Accounting.

N. Aranya
(Israel)
J. Pollock &
J. Amernic
(Canada)

Organizational Commitment and Performance in a Professional Accounting Firm
Perceived Environmental
Uncertainty, Organizational Adaptation and
Employee Performance: A Longitudinal Study
in Professional Accounting Firms.
Auditors' Prior Probability Distributions
for Account Balances.

K. Ferris
(U.S.)
K. Ferris
(U.S.)

1982-No. 1

I. Solomon
J. L . Krogstad
M.B. Romney &
L.A. Tomassini
(U.S.)

1982-No. 3

N. Aranya
(Israel)
R. Lachman &
J. Amernic
(Canada)
H.J. Dyhxhoorn &
K . E . Sinning
(U.S.)

1982-No. 4

1982- No. 4

1983- No. 1

J. Pratt &
J. Jiambalvo
(U.S.)
K. Ferris &
D. Larcker
(U.S.)

Accountants' Job Satisfaction:
A Path Analysis.

Perceptions of Auditor
Independence: Its Perceived Effect
on the Loan and Investment Decisions of
German Financial Statement Users.
Determinants of Leader Behavior
in an Audit Environment.
Explanatory Variables of
Auditor Performance in a
Large Public Accounting Firm.
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Accounting, Organizations and Society (continued)
Title
Author
Issue
1983-No. 1

J. Jiambalvo
D. Watson &
J. Baumler

1984-No. 2

T. Kida
(U.S.)

An Evaluation of Performance Decisions
in CPA Firm Sub-units.

(U.S.)
Performance Evaluation and Review
Meeting Characteristics in Public Accounting
Firms.

(The country identification relates to the apparent nationality of the author. Where there is no
identification, the author is of U.K. origin.)

Appendix 3
U.K. Institutions referred to by abbreviations
ASC

The Accounting Standards Committee of the CCAB (formerly the Accounting
Standards Steering Committee [ASSC]). Responsible for the development of accounting standards ("Statements of Standard Accounting Practice" [SSAPs]) in
Great Britain and Ireland.

APC

The Auditing Practices Committee of the CCAB. Responsible for the development of
auditing standards in Great Britain and Ireland.

CBI

The Confederation of British Industry. An association representing employers.

CCAB

The Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies. Represents the professional
accountancy bodies in Great Britain and Ireland, including the ICAEW.

CIPFA

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. The professional body
whose members are mainly employed in the public sector.

ESRC

The Economic and Social Research Council (formerly the Social Science Research
Council [SSRC]). One of the government funded research councils which supports
academic research on specific projects in the social sciences (including accounting).
The government's "block grants" to individual universities are intended to finance
teaching and the general research base.

ICAEW

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. The largest of the
professional bodies whose members are authorized to carry out audits under the
U.K. Companies Acts.
The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants. The professional body whose
members are employed mainly in industry.

ICMA
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Discussant's Response to
Current Developments in United Kingdom
Auditing Research
John H . Fitzgibbon III
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Gwilliam's paper is interesting for two reasons. First, it provides a good
account of the current status of auditing research in the U.K. and the reasons
why U.K. research has been more limited than U.S. research. Second, the
paper provides a basis for analyzing how future changes in the U.K. environ
ment might affect the level and nature of research performed.
The paper is divided into four sections:
• A summary of research that has been done,
• A discussion of why past research has been so limited,
• A discussion of what U.S. research might be applicable in the U.K.,
and
• A discussion of what research areas might be most beneficial for
U.K. researchers to pursue.
The primary focus of my discussion will be to expand on some of Gwilliam's
comments and to provide my own views on the relative importance of some of
the matters mentioned in the paper.

Why Has There Been So Little U.K. Auditing Research?
In some respects, the U.K. auditing environment is similar to the U.S.
environment approximately 15 years ago. There apparently is very little
external pressure on the profession to improve auditing techniques, and,
therefore, very little money and effort is being expended on auditing research.
Gwilliam's paper provides a comprehensive description of the characteris
tics of the U.K. and the U.S. auditing research environments. For conven
ience, I will group these characteristics into three categories—the academic,
the auditing firm, and the general business environments.
Academic Environment
Gwilliam points out that the U.K. academic environment is not as conducive
to auditing research as the U.S. environment. There are fewer accounting
faculty, they are not as research oriented, and they are not as well trained in
research techniques as their U.S. counterparts. Gwilliam also states that
auditing research is not considered to be a prestigious activity and that funding
for research is not generally available. All of these factors are disincentives to
conducting contemporary auditing research, particularly in "high-tech" areas
such as expert systems and decision aids.
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It struck me as ironic that one of the reasons contributing to the low level of
research in the U.K. is that many U.K. academics are former auditors who
have become disenchanted with auditing. I would have expected that aca
demics who are former auditors would be more interested in auditing research
than other academics because of their awareness of the problems and issues
facing auditors.
Auditing Firm Environment
Gwilliam points out that major U.K. auditing firms do not fund academic
research to the same degree that their U.S. counterparts do. Major U.S.
auditing firms provide a great deal of support for auditing research by funding
specific projects, contributing to university accounting programs, providing
support for doctoral students, and sponsoring research conferences. In the
U.K., auditingfirmsprovide very little such support.
Gwilliam's paper asserts that U.S firms receive recruiting and public
relations benefits from supporting academic auditing research and that funding
might be provided for this reason. When Peat Marwick introduced its Research
Opportunities in Auditing Program in 1976, its objective was to stimulate
interest in auditing research and, thereby, to improve the profession. This is
still the objective of the program, and significant progress has been made
toward its achievement. Any recruiting or public relations benefits that Peat
Marwick has received are fortunate side effects of sponsoring the ROA
program. Therefore, while I agree that firms receive public relations benefits
from sponsoring research, I do not think that these benefits are a primary
motivating factor in deciding to provide funding.
In the past, the U.K. and the U.S. used different approaches to profes
sional training. In the U.S., university graduates with majors in accounting
were hired. In the U.K., the typical recruit had a liberal arts degree and
received his accounting and auditing training after he was hired. The paper
points out that since auditing research is not usually conducted at the
universities where U.K. firms recruit, U . K . firms would not have been
motivated by recruiting benefits to fund academic auditing research. I agree
with Gwilliam's point. I also think it would be interesting to investigate the
reasons for and the ramifications of the two training methods.
As a part of his discussion of why U.S. accounting firms fund academic
research more than U.K. firms, Gwilliam discusses the possibility that it might
be less expensive for U.S. firms to pay academics to perform research than to
do it themselves. I suspect that this is true, but I do not think that it is a major
factor in funding decisions. Research grants are not usually restricted by the
donors, the results of the research are the property of the researchers, and
projects funded are selected based primarily on their academic merit. The
possibility of an immediate research benefit to the funding firm is usually not a
consideration. The lack of donor control indicated by these factors makes the
estimation of any direct economic benefits very difficult. Because of the
difficulty of measuring the benefits to the funding firm, I do not think that the
relative cost of the two alternatives is a significant determining factor in the
decision to fund academic research.
Another reason cited for the relatively low level of research in the U.K. is
the fact that researchers do not have access to audit working papers. It is true
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that audit working papers contain a great deal of researchable data. However,
the lack of working paper access does not explain the relatively low level of
U.K. research because U.S. researchers have only limited access to audit
working papers. Confidentiality of client data is one of the cornerstones of the
auditing profession, and it must not be compromised. Therefore, academic
access to working papers must continue to be limited. Occasionally, a firm
releases data collected in connection with an internal research project for
further analysis by the academic community, but such data are summarized or
client-specific information is deleted so that confidential client data are not
disclosed.
An alternative to using working paper data for research is to have auditors
provide judgments for cases based on hypothetical audit situations. In this
manner, researchers can find out what auditors do in the field without
reviewing working papers. Careful experimental design can help to ensure
adequate external and internal validity, and this method has the benefit of
providing information about how several auditors would react in similar
circumstances. This stability of circumstances would be impossible to duplicate
using client data from a number of different audit engagements. Research in the
U.S. is often carried out in this manner, and U.K. researchers could also
benefit from using this method.
Two factors that Gwilliam does not mention are the relative size of U.K.
and U.S. firms and the fact that the major international auditingfirmspractice in
both countries. The major U.K. firms are smaller than the major U.S. firms.
The major U.S. firms generally have larger staff operations than their U.K.
counterparts and can make a larger commitment to developing their audit
technology, becoming familiar with academic research activities, and funding
academic research projects. Also, since "The Big Eight" are principalfirmsin
both countries, the U.K. practices of thesefirmscan benefit directly from U.S.
research by adopting the technology of their U.S. practices. Both of these
factors would limit the incentive for U.K. firms to engage in or fund auditing
research.
Business Environment
The business environment in the U.K. is similar to that in the U.S. in many
ways. The two countries share a common language and similar accounting
practices, and both have well developed industrial bases andfinancialmarkets.
However, the practice of auditing in the U.K. is somewhat different. In the
U.K., a lower risk of litigation against auditors exists, there is less competition
among auditing firms, and the government is not concerned with auditing
matters.
Gwilliam indicates that these factors may contribute to a lower level of
concern in the U . K . about the efficiency and effectiveness of auditing
techniques. While this may be true, I think that U.K. firms are interested in
improving their auditing techniques. Even in the U.K. business environment,
firms that are more efficient or more effective than their competitors will obtain
competitive benefits in the long run.
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U.K. Research: Needs and Future Directions
A logical approach to conducting future auditing research in the U.K. is to
review what has already been done elsewhere, use what is directly applicable,
adapt what needs to be tailored to specific U.K. circumstances, and fill in any
gaps between existing research and U.K. needs. Gwilliam suggests that this
approach be used.
One of the examples given of the direct adoption of U.S. research is the use
of SEADOC by Peat Marwick's U.K. practice. SEADOC-Peat Marwick's
method of documenting internal accounting controls—was developed primarily
by its U.S. practice. However, Peat Marwick practices around the world were
involved in its development to ensure that it would be useful in their
environments. All audit decision aids used by Peat Marwick are developed
under the review of Peat Marwick's Accounting and Auditing Committee,
which includes representatives from major practices around the world. There
fore, at least in the case of Peat Marwick, all products of U.S. research which
are applied outside of the U.S. are carefully screened to ensure that they are
applicable.
Gwilliam identifies four areas as being of specific U.K. interest: audits of
small businesses, forecasts, audits of public sector entities, and reports on
inflation-adjusted balances. These areas were selected because the U . K .
accounting profession presently places greater emphasis on them than the U.S.
profession does. However, these areas are also of increasing importance to the
U.S. profession. If U.K. researchers do perform research in these areas, the
U.S. profession might reap some of the benefits of their efforts.

Conclusion
I hope that Gwilliam's paper will also be published in the U.K. and that
U.K. researchers and auditors will read it carefully. Researchers should use it
as a basis for determining which areas of research they should pursue. Auditors
should use the paper to assess their present research positions and to assess
whether, in the changing U.K. environment, they should increase their
commitment to auditing research. Gwilliam points out that auditing research in
the U.K. appears to be growing. His paper should provide a basis for guiding
this growth and for stimulating further growth in the future.

161

7
Let's Change GAAS!!! ??? *&#" @
Robert Mednick*
Arthur Andersen & Co.

Alan J. Winters*
Louisiana State University
How strange that when we hurl a man into the future, we take few pains to protect him from
the shock of change.
Alvin Toffler
Future Shock

This paper is about change, and change is almost always resisted and often
controversial. We believe that this is as it should be. Proposed changes should
not be blindly accepted nor casually dismissed. Rather, they should be exposed
for careful evaluation, critical debate, and, we hope, constructive criticism.
Consistent with that belief, we propose that the ten generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS)* be changed to prepare the auditor for the future and to
provide some protection from the shock of the changes that future will bring.
We think that this future has already struck auditing practice and is sending
tremors through its bedrock—GAAS. Our proposal explains why change is
necessary, what the change should be, and how it might be implemented.

Why Change GAAS?
Proposing to change GAAS (as the title punctuation suggests) is likely to
trigger varying reactions ranging from heated criticism to enthusiastic endorse
ment. Just where one falls on this continuum is determined by how strongly
one agrees with the following views: (1) GAAS continue to provide an ample
foundation for guidance on today's audit-related services, (2) audit services not
contemplated by GAAS are improper and should be prohibited, and (3) GAAS
are sacrosanct, i.e., standards by their nature are (or should be) immutable.
Those at one extreme of the continuum find changing the ten generally
accepted auditing standards repugnant and adhere tenaciously to one or more
* The authors are members of the Auditing Standards Board's Levels of Assurance Task Force.
Although some of the views the authors express in this paper were inevitably influenced by their
involvement with the task force, these views do not necessarily represent those of the task force,
Auditing Standards Board, or AICPA.
* Throughout the paper our use of the term "GAAS" is intended to refer only to the ten generally
accepted auditing standards. If the term is used in one of its broader connotations such as the ten
standards and the SASs, or the ten standards, SASs, and customs of auditing practice, it will be
specifically noted in the paper.
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of these precepts. Others along the continuum may be skeptical and likely to
hold one or more of these views but not as resolutely. Still further along the
continuum are the curious who are more open-minded and inquisitive about the
need to change GAAS, although they also may find any or all of these three
notions tenable. At the other extreme of the continuum are enthusiasts for
changing GAAS, of which we are two, who have views diametrically opposed to
the three above. In fact, it is our rejection of these three views that makes us
discontented with existing GAAS and prompts us to propose a change.

GAAS Are Not Ample
Our primary reason for advocating a change in GAAS is that those
standards no longer provide a sufficient foundation for guidance on today's
scope of audit services*. The current scope of audit services extends beyond
the bounds of the standards.
The proposition that the scope of audit services has outgrown GAAS is
easy to substantiate. GAAS were formally adopted by the profession 36 years
ago** as a public declaration of its conception of the auditor's responsibility for
a single professional service—audits of historical financial statements. Re
striction of GAAS to this single audit service is evident from the fact that the
evidential matter standard and three of the four reporting standards refer
specifically to financial statements. Even the context of the 43-page special
report that first introduced the standards to the profession relates entirely to
audits of historical financial statements.
In addition, the only audit service provided by the profession at the time the
standards were developed and introduced was an audit of historical financial
statements. These circumstances give historical legitimacy to the singular
object of GAAS and make it illogical to conclude that GAAS were intended, or
could be interpreted, to apply to any service other than audits of historical
financial statements.
Of course, GAAS have not shackled the expansion of audit services.
Assurance is now being expressed on a variety of representations other than
historical financial statements. This expansion also has taken a second course.
Forms and levels of assurance other than that provided for in GAAS are being
expressed. Examples of each of these expansions are abundant. CPAs audit
internal control systems, specific elements of a financial statement, financial
forecasts, computer software, Nielsen ratings, and various types of contests;
all of which are representations different than historicalfinancialstatements.
CPAs also provide assurance other than a positive opinion on such representa
tions as historicalfinancialstatements, compliance with contractual or regula
tory requirements, and internal accounting control.
The restricted governing power of GAAS coupled with this expansion of
audit services present four problems for the profession: (1) audit services exist
1

* The term "audit services" is used to denote services that involve the basic elements of an
audit—a CPA is engaged to examine and express assurance on the credibility of an assertion by one
party for use by another party. Thus the expansion referred to excludes the growth of such
services as tax and management consulting.
** The first nine of the 10 standards were officially adopted by the AICPA's membership in 1948.
The tenth standard (fourth reporting standard) was adopted one year later.
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for which there are no general standards, (2) supposedly authoritative guidance
(statements on auditing standards) has been established to implement some of
these extrinsic audit services on the basis of inapplicable general standards, (3)
inconsistencies exist among the presumedly authoritative statements on
auditing standards for those other audit services, and (4) no standards exist for
establishing guidance for future audit services. The gravity of these problems
warrants further elaboration.
Problem 1. GAAS were developed to provide standards for the audit of
only one specific type of representation—historicalfinancialstatements. They
were not fashioned in a manner that would restrict the types of other
representations a CPA could audit. Thus, current audit services have evolved
beyond the bounds of GAAS. Many of these services have no standards to
govern their conduct (e.g., reporting on computer software). If the profession
is to have a foundation from which to develop guidance for these services, new
standards will be necessary.
Problem 2. While some of these new audit services have no authoritative
implementation standards concerning them, the remainder are subject to SASs
of questionable authority. The Auditing Standards Board has issued a number
of SASs pertaining to audit services for representations other than historical
financial statements or for forms of assurance other than a positive opinion. For
example, statements on auditing standards currently recognize and provide
guidance for nearly 20 different limited assurance engagements with another
engagement proposed in an SAS exposure draft. These SASs are ostensibly
interpretations of GAAS but, in fact, concern audit services not contemplated
by those standards and as a result extend GAAS.
Some examples of SASs that have broadened GAAS are: SAS 14 concern
ing special reports on elements of financial statements, agreed-upon pro
cedures, and compliance with regulatory requirements; SAS 27 concerning
required supplementary information; SAS 30 concerning internal accounting
control; SAS 38 concerning comfort letters; SAS 42 concerning condensed
statements and selected data; and SAS 44 concerning internal control of
service organizations.
If pronouncements regarding audit services for other than historical
financial statements are to have legitimate authority, they must be based on a
set of standards that encompasses those services. Since GAAS do not apply to
those engagements, a new set of standards is necessary.
Problem 3. In addition to being of questionable authority, the SASs
pertaining to these other audit services also contain inconsistencies, ambigu
ities, and fragmented professional requirements that contradict one another.
These problems have occurred because GAAS were not intended to encom
pass these types of audit services and, therefore, do not embody all of the
concepts necessary for developing such guidance. Even though the Auditing
Standards Board and its predecessors tried to implicitly interpret how GAAS
should apply to these services, the standards they were interpreting were not
designed to apply to those situations. Because GAAS lack the necessary
conceptual foundation for such services, they have hindered the development
of logical, clear, consistent guidance for them and have promoted discrepancies
among SASs. If these discrepancies are to be reconciled, new standards will be
2
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necessary to provide an adequate conceptual basis for guidance on these other
audit services.
Problem 4. Since GAAS are limited to audits of historical financial
statements, they are impotent as authoritative guidance for future expansions
of the audit function. If new audit services relating to representations other
than historicalfinancialstatements are deemed appropriate, new standards will
be necessary to provide guidance and ensure quality. If restrictions are desired
on the types of representations on which auditors can express assurance, new
standards will have to provide the basis for those restrictions.

Audit Services Should Not Be Confined By GAAS
An argument sometimes mounted against changing GAAS is that the
profession should not provide any audit services other than those the standards
currently contemplate—examination of historical financial statements. If audits
were restricted to only that service encompassed by GAAS, no change in the
standards would be necessary.
Theoretically, this argument makes the profession forever hostage to
GAAS by restricting the audit services CPAs can provide solely to positive
opinions on historicalfinancialstatements. The restriction, however, ignores
the emergence of auditing as a distinct discipline with legitimate applications
beyond historicalfinancialstatements and flies in the face of existing practice
and demonstrated public demand for new audit services. The argument's most
damning flaw, however, is that its presumes that GAAS effectively put
restrictions on expansion of the audit function. Yet, as explained in the previous
section, neither GAAS nor any other professional standards limit the types of
audit services that can be performed by public accountants. Thus, proponents
of this argument would actually find it necessary to change GAAS to establish
their desired restriction.
Obviously, the profession has already sanctioned audit services beyond
positive opinions on historicalfinancialstatements. The SASs referred to in the
previous section illustrate how, by fiat, the Auditing Standards Board has
expanded the audit function beyond that single service. Furthermore, in the
absence of standards for determining appropriate expansions of the audit
function, CPAs have been free to provide, and have provided, whatever audit
services they deem consistent with their professional creed. Thus, the
decision has already been made, both at the profession level and by many of its
individual members, that audit services should be extended—possibly signifi
cantly—beyond examination of historicalfinancialstatements.
We concur with that decision. Auditing historicalfinancialstatements has
become the CPA's birthright and the emergence of auditing as a discipline
separate from accounting is the inherited legacy of that birthright. We believe
that auditing has many legitimate applications beyond historical financial
statements and that broader standards are necessary to assure the controlled
development of these new audit services and to provide guidance for them.
GAAS are powerless to provide that direction and guidance.

GAAS Are Not Sacrosanct.
Another argument that is sometimes raised in opposition to any proposed
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change in GAAS is that standards are too fundamental to be changed. The
essence of the argument is that, once established, standards become the
profession's constitution and that any tampering with that constitution erodes
the profession's credibility, implies that the previous standards were faulty,
and marks a change in the fundamental nature of the audit function.
No set of standards is immutable. Constitutions should be and have been
amended when the need is demonstrated and justified—so should GAAS. A
profession's standards and its services must be commensurate with each
other. In fact, it is the incongruity in these two areas that erodes credibility by
creating potential pitfalls in the performance of professional services. Stand
ards either must be broad enough to provide for the legitimate evolution of
professional services or evolve along with them. Our standards have remained
static while our audit services have mutated.
Changing GAAS would not imply that GAAS were faulty. Indeed, GAAS
admirably serve their intended purpose, and, if the audit function were to be
restricted to positive opinions on historical financial statements, we would not
propose any change in the standards. GAAS must be changed because they fail
to accommodate the legitimate expansion of audit services; not because they
are internally flawed.
Finally, new standards would not have to alter the fundamental nature of
auditing. They would simply align with (and perhaps reconcile) contemporary
practice and provide for the logical, controlled progression of auditing's role in
society. In fact, without new standards, auditing's future development will be
subject to caprice and improvisation, almost certainly altering its fundamental
nature in an undesirable manner.

What Should the Change Be?
Change can occur in a multitude of forms and degrees. While we advocate
the change in GAAS, we believe that GAAS provide a valid model for new
standards. Therefore, the changes we recommend are fundamentally revisions
and adaptations of GAAS to provide a framework comprehensive enough to
direct, accommodate, and endure the evolution of auditing into areas other than
positive opinions on historical financial statements.
We believe that sufficiently comprehensive standards must provide basic
guidance to the profession concerning the following questions.
1. Under what circumstances can an auditor provide assurance on an
assertion?
2. What form(s) of assurance can and should an auditor provide?
3. How many levels of assurance can and should an auditor provide?
4. Is there a minimum scope of involvement below which no assurance
should be permitted?
5. What scope of involvement is necessary to enable an auditor to provide
a given level of assurance?
6. What should be the structure and wording of an auditor's report in
specific assurance engagements?
7. What, if any, different requirements should exist for engagements
designed to provide assurance to the general public versus those solely
for the benefit of specified parties who participate in establishing the
terms of the engagement?
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The proposed attest standards (PAS) that follow are organized in the same
broad categories as GAAS. Some of the PAS are discussed only briefly because
they do not differ significantly from their GAAS counterpart. Therefore, we
believe, any objection to them would also pertain to GAAS.
Those PAS that do introduce potential controversy unique to their nature
are accorded more extensive discussion. The terms "attest" and "attester"
are used with some trepidation. We are aware that the terms imbue the
auditor's role with an aura of exactitude that the profession does not claim. We
use the term primarily as a means of distinguishing the auditor's role under
GAAS from his expanded role as a provider of various forms and levels of
assurance on various types of representations; not to impose a responsibility
for increased accuracy on the auditor. The Appendix contains a listing of PAS
and compares them with GAAS.

General Standards
(1) The Engagement Shall Be Performed by a Person or Persons Having
Adequate Technical Training and Proficiency as an Attester.
This is the existing first general standard modified to be appropriate for
different representations and levels of assurance. It recognizes attestation as a
separate discipline with a common body of knowledge. This standard protects
the client and user of the representation by requiring that the attester be
capable of providing the contracted service. It effectively requires that the
attester meet the uniform education, experience, and examination require
ments of the profession.
(2) The Engagement Shall Be Performed by an Attester or Attesters Commanding Competence in the Subject Matter of the Assertion on Which Assurance Is To
Be Provided.
This is a new general standard. It is necessary because, as the marketplace
extends and broadens the attest function into new areas, attesters will become
involved with representations that are outside today's most widely recognized
area of a public accountant's technical competence—accounting.
This standard would not necessarily require the attester to personally
acquire expert competence in the subject matter reported on. It requires that
the attester "command" that competence. Interpretive statements of this
standard could discuss the use of specialists in a manner similar to SAS 11 and
SAS 48 (revision of SAS 3 recently approved by the Auditing Standards Board).
The latter provides that an auditor with final responsibility for the engagement
must be sufficiently competent in EDP matters to (a) communicate the
objectives of the computer audit specialist's work and (b) review the results of
his work to assure that the objectives have been met.
The Auditing Standards Board (or another AICPA authorized body) also
could issue, from time to time, interpretive statements to indicate those
particular subjects which it believes attesters are in general competent (or
incompetent) to independently evaluate. This standard and the one that follows
are necessary to set general boundaries for the attest function. Without them,
such boundaries will be established solely by such external factors as the
marketplace, statutory or regulatory constraints, and general public policy.
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(3) The Attester Shall Accept an Attest Engagement Only If He or She Has
Reason To Believe the Following Two Conditions Exist:
• The assertions must be capable of evaluation against established and
recognized criteria or, in their absence, against reasonable criteria that
are stated in the presentation of the assertions in a sufficiently clear and
comprehensive manner for a reader to be able to understand them and
determine if they are relevant for his or her purposes.
• The assertions must be capable of reasonably consistent estimation or
measurement; that is, competent people using the same or similar
measurement or disclosure criteria should obtain materially similar
estimates or measurements.
This is a new general standard. It is necessary to ensure that attest
engagements are performed only when they can be effective and useful. It
requires attesters to have a reasonable basis for believing that they are capable
of providing meaningful assurance on the assertions before accepting an attest
engagement.
As the marketplace increasingly demands the expansion of the attest
function into new areas, situations will arise in which attesters are asked to
become associated with assertions on which they may not be capable of
providing assurance. This standard is desirable because it will force attesters
to focus on the question of their ability to provide meaningful assurance before
an engagement commences, thereby protecting the client, users, and the
public. For the same reason, it will help assuage potential fears of regulators
about imprudent expansions of the attest function.
The first condition in this standard requires the attester to have criteria
against which to evaluate assertions. However, in new attest areas, there may
be no established or recognized criteria for this purpose. Consequently, this
standard permits the attester to attest to assertions using stated criteria that
are clear and comprehensive enough to permit readers to understand them and
assess their relevance for their own purposes. Failing to permit this would
result in a standard so rigid that all experimentation in new attest areas would
effectively be prohibited. Indeed, such common existing services as compila
tion and review of financial forecasts and projections would have been
prohibited.
The second condition in this standard ensures that the assertion is capable
of reasonably consistent estimation or measurement. It also sets boundaries on
the types of assertions subject to the attest function.
This condition prohibits an attester from providing assurance on represen
tations that are so subjective that the attester's assurance would add no
credibility to the representation and thus be meaningless to an informed user.
(4) In All Matters Relating to the Attest Engagement, an Independence in
Mental Attitude Shall Be Maintained by the Attester or Attesters.
This is the existing second general standard with the words "assignment"
changed to "attest engagement," "is to" changed to "shall," and "auditor or
auditors" changed to "attester or attesters." It does not contain any
substantive differences from its GAAS counterpart.
(5) Due Professional Care Shall Be Exercised in the Performance of the
Engagement and the Preparation of the Report.
This is the existing third general standard with the words "is to" and
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"examination" changed to "shall" and "engagement." This standard recog
nizes the profession's obligations to users and does not substantively differ
from its GAAS counterpart.

Standards of Field Work
(1) The Work Shall Be Adequately Planned and Assistants, If Any, Shall Be
Properly Supervised.
This is the existing first standard of field work with the word "shall" used
in place of "is to" and "are to." Some would argue that this standard is
unnecessary because it is subsumed by the proposed second field work
standard and is, therefore, redundant. Those individuals also believe that this
standard is primarily related to efficiency and that, because the market forces
attesters to adequately plan their engagements to be as efficient as their
competition, this standard is unnecessary for purposes of protecting the users
of attest reports.
We believe, however, that a significant aspect of this standard relates to
the effectiveness of the attestation procedures. Requiring consideration of the
adequacy of procedures only near the end of an engagement (as the second
proposed field work standard requires) is not as useful in assuring the
effectiveness of the attest procedures as this standard.
(2) Sufficient Evidence Shall Be Obtained To Provide a Basis for the Assurance
That Is To Be Communicated in the Attest Report or To Comply with the
Arrangements Made with Specified Users.
This is the existing third standard of field work modified to be appropriate
for different levels of assurance and various types of assertions. It also covers
engagements tailored to meet the needs of specified users who have partici
pated (directly or through a designated representative) in the establishment of
the nature and scope of the engagement.
We believe this standard encompasses the study and evaluation of internal
control because this study is an element of accumulating sufficient evidence.
Thus, we do not deem it necessary to have a separate field work standard
concerning internal control.
Because this standard requires sufficient evidence, it raises the overriding
and complex question of what the scope of the attester's work should be on a
given attest engagement. Furthermore, this question is even more significant
today than in the past in view of the expansion of the attest function to new
types of assertions and different levels of assurance. Consequently, we will
discuss this standard in somewhat more depth than the previous ones.
The nature and extent of the procedures that may be applied on any
particular attest engagement is relatively broad. In establishing a proper mix to
appropriately restrict attestation risk,* the following generalizations about the
validity of evidential matter are cited in the existing auditing literature:
• Evidential matter obtained from independent sources outside an
entity provides greater assurance of reliability for the purposes of an
attest engagement than evidential matter secured solely within an
entity.
* Attestation risk is the risk that the attester may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or
her attest report on assertions that are materially misstated. It consists of (1) the risk (consisting
of inherent and control risk) that the assertion contains errors that could be material, and (2) the
risk (detection risk) that the attester will not detect such errors.
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• Assertions developed under effective internal controls are more
reliable than those developed in the absence of internal controls.
• The independent attester's direct personal knowledge, obtained
through physical examination, observation, computation, and inspec
tion, is more persuasive than information obtained indirectly.
Thus, in the hierarchy of available attest procedures, those that involve
search and verification (e.g., inspection, confirmation, observation, etc.),
particularly when using independent sources outside the entity, are generally
considered to be more reliable in reducing attestation risk than those involving
mere inquiries and comparisons of internal data (e.g., discussions with
individuals responsible for the assertion and analytical review). On the other
hand, the latter are generally less expensive to apply in practice.
The foremost objective in any attest engagement is to accumulate sufficient
evidence to limit attestation risk to a level that is, in the attester's professional
judgment, appropriate for the assurance to be provided. In positive opinion
engagements, such as audits of historical financial statements, this is accom
plished by applying the so-called risk model approach. This approach provides a
framework for risk assessment to aid the auditor in planning procedures to
reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level and allows the auditor the flexibility
of determining the mix of audit procedures that most effectively and efficiently
reduces audit risk to that level.
We concur that the risk model concept is appropriate for both positive
opinion and limited assurance engagements. However, we think more research
and experience in applying the risk model are necessary to determine if it can
be applied in limited assurance engagements the same way it is applied in
positive assurance engagements.
In positive opinion engagements, the risk model is applied on a case-bycase basis to specific attest engagements. The attester assesses inherent and
control risk (or makes assumptions about them) and designs substantive
procedures to limit attest risk to an acceptable level. We have concerns that a
case-by-case application of the risk model may not work as well in limited
assurance engagements.
Our concerns about the risk model are not based on any internal conceptual
flaws in the model. The problem lies elsewhere. In our view, the prerequisite
for applying the risk model—an acceptable level of attestation risk—may not be
susceptible to sufficiently precise definition and communication in limited
assurance engagements to allow it to be applied in the same manner as it is
used in positive opinion engagements.
To properly apply the risk model, the attester must know in advance the
appropriate level of assurance to be achieved in an attest engagement. By its
nature, the risk model requires that the assurance goal be specified independ
ently of the procedures to be performed to achieve that assurance.
By way of an explanatory analogy, one could say that the risk model is
similar to a compass. A compass is a useful navigational tool only when the
navigator has some fairly specific notion of the destination he is supposed to
reach. The risk model is a useful attest tool only when the attester has some
fairly specific notion of the assurance level he is supposed to reach. The
compass cannot decide the destination for the navigator; it can only help guide
him to that destination once it is specified. Similarly, the risk model cannot
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decide what the level of assurance should be for the attester; it can only help
guide him to that assurance once it is specified.
The appropriate assurance objective for any given category of limited
assurance engagements is a policy decision to be made at the profession level
by a standard-setting body such as the Auditing Standards Board. Such
decisions must be made at the profession level to ensure reasonable uniformity
in reported assurance among attesters for the same category of limited
assurance engagements.
If the standard-setting body is to define the assurance goal in limited
assurance engagements in terms usable in the risk model (i.e., independently
of procedures), it must do so in either quantitative or qualitative terms.
Currently, the profession is both unable and unwilling to quantify levels of
assurance because (1) existing attest methods lack the precision to produce
reliable quantification and (2) it is perceived that an unacceptable increase in the
attester's exposure to business risk may result from quantification.
Short of quantification, the level of assurance must be defined in qualitative
terms; for example, "moderate." However, these qualitative terms may
provide too vague an assurance target for attesters (e.g., does moderate mean
20 percent assurance, 70 percent assurance, between 30 to 50 percent, or
some other range?). Using such terms may fail to provide attesters and users
with enough guidance to interpret in a sufficiently clear manner just what level
of assurance the profession intends the attester to achieve. Without a more
refined definition of assurance, the risk model is powerless to prescribe the
necessary risk reduction, and the attester is left without adequate guidance for
determining the appropriate scope of work.
In existing limited assurance engagements, the profession has tried to
overcome the inability to adequately define a targeted level of assurance that is
independent of the risk model by authoritatively establishing one or more
required levels of procedures. This prescribed procedures approach does not
require an independent definition of assurance to be functional. Presumedly,
the intended level of assurance is defined by the procedures prescribed. Since
the scope of work for any given level of assurance is authoritatively defined,
the resulting level of assurance is considered to be defined as well.
Advocates of the procedures approach maintain that both attesters and
users are better able to interpret the assurance intended, that attesters have
guidance regarding the scope of work necessary to achieve the appropriate
level of assurance, and that a clear line is drawn between positive opinion and
limited assurance engagements.
In effect, the prescribed procedures approach is an application of the risk
model approach at the standard-setting level. The standard-setting body
establishes relatively uniform procedures that define the appropriate attesta
tion risk for a specific type of limited assurance engagement instead of
individual attesters applying the risk model on a case-by-case basis. In effect,
the standard setting body applies the risk model for attesters as a group.*
* Some would argue that the essence of the risk model approach is the flexibility it gives the
attester in designing procedures and that application of the risk model at the standard setting level
eliminates thatflexibilitythereby destroying the usefulness of the model. Others believe, however,
that the essence of the risk model is its ability to focus the attester's judgment on risk and the
effectiveness of the model is not destroyed if that judgment is exercised at the standard setting
level rather than by the individual attester.
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Returning to the compass analogy, the prescribed procedures approach is
similar to a navigational standard-setting body specifying the course to be
followed by all navigators for a particular trip. The individual navigators need
not know the precise destination in advance; they need only follow the
prescribed course to arrive at the destination. Indeed, some advocates of this
approach would maintain that the standard-setting body need not even know
the precise destination in prescribing the course. They can specify a course,
assess what destination the course leads to, and evaluae whether that
destination is approximately where they desire all navigators to reach.
We also have concerns about the prescribed procedures approach. Our
major concern is that the approach either ignores or assumes constant the
inherent and control risks in specific attest engagements. It implicitly assumes
that the application of relatively uniform categories of procedures, such as
inquiry and analytical review, will yield relatively uniform assurance levels in a
given category of limited assurance engagements.
In specific limited assurance engagements, just as in specific positive
assurance engagements, there are differences in inherent and control risk. If
prescribed procedures are applied without considering these risks, the as
surance levels achieved are likely to vary, perhaps widely.
In the final analysis, our concerns about both the risk model and the
prescribed procedures approach are rooted in the ability of either of them to
yield reasonably uniform assurance levels across a specific category of attest
engagements. We believe that reasonably uniform assurance levels are
essential to the acceptance and use of limited assurance reports. The
profession sorely needs a better understanding of the relative variation in
assurance levels under both approaches. Perhaps research and practical
experience will provide that understanding in the near future.
Of course, in connection with those engagements performed solely for the
benefit of specified users, the attester should be required to perform only
those procedures which have been designed, or agreed to, by such users. For
this purpose, specified users include those individuals and entities who have
participated in the establishment of the nature and scope of the attest
engagement either directly or through a designated representative. As a
result, such engagements can be tailored completely to the users need, and the
proposed attest standard would require the attester to merely comply with the
arrangements made with the specified users.

Standards of Reporting
(1) The Report Shall Identify the Assertions Being Reported on and State the
Character of the Attest Engagement and Its Conformity with These Standards
and with the Arrangements Made with Specified Users, If Any.
This standard is derived from the portion of the existing fourth reporting
standard that requires an auditor to indicate the character of the examination.
The standard has been modified to be generally applicable to different levels of
assurance on various representations and to recognize engagements agreed
upon by specific parties. The requirement to indicate the character of the
examination could be satisfied by either referring in the report to a specific
interpretive standard that describes the scope of the attest engagement or by
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delineating the scope of the engagement in the report itself. In the case of
engagements with specific parties, the attester would explicitly describe the
scope of work as agreed upon with the parties.
(2) The Report Shall State the Attester's Conclusion, in the Form of Either a
Positive Opinion or Negative Assurance, as to Whether the Assertions Are
Presented in Conformity with Established and Recognized Criteria or, in Their
Absence, Stated Reasonable Criteria for Reports Distributed to the Public, the
Conclusion Shall Provide the Highest Level of Assurance Permissible by
Authoritative Interpretive Standards Consistent with the Work Performed and the
Evidence Obtained.
This standard is derived from the first and fourth existing reporting
standards, modified to be generally applicable to different levels of assurance
on various types of representations. It permits only two forms of attest
assurance—positive opinions or negative assurance.
Obviously, there are other forms of assurance that we rejected. These
forms can be illustrated by reference to Figure 1.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates that the more corroborative evidence obtained
from the scope of an attest engagement, the greater the assurance that can be
expressed. Thus, one form for describing the specific level of assurance being
provided would be to indicate quantitatively where a particular engagement
falls on the diagonal line. For instance, a report might state that the attester
was Y percent confident that an assertion was within X percent of the dollars
represented (or some other unit of measure). We do not believe, however,
that the profession has achieved (nor that it may ever achieve) sufficient
sophistication in attest methods to permit reliable quantification of assurance
levels in public reports at this time.
Another possible form of assurance would differentiate qualitatively the
levels of assurance achieved in limited assurance engagements by varying the
strength of the words used in the attester's report. We believe, however, that
this alternative runs contrary to the profession's experience which seems to
indicate that it is unrealistic and inappropriate to expect users to distinguish
between different attest reports prepared by different attesters on the basis of
different descriptions of work performed and assurance provided. Conse
quently, we favor the use of only the positive and negative form of assurance
communicated in standard report language and reject attempts to communicate
subtle differences in levels of assurance by the use of different (and often hard
to define) qualitative terms.

Figure 1

Level
of
Assurance

C o r r o b o r a t i v e Evidence
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The specific wording of the report would be left to authoritative interpre
tive pronouncements. We believe, however, that the logical starting point
would be the development of a standard attest report that communicates the
highest level of assurance an attester would be permitted to provide on
whatever assertion he is reporting—the so-called "positive opinion."* After
that development, the standard report wording for negative assurance would
follow.
Unfortunately, although the form of reporting is one of the most sensitive
aspects of any attest engagement, the profession has probably done most
poorly in attempting to define consistent standards for limited assurance
engagements in this area. For instance, in some cases reports currently state
"nothing has come to our attention" (typical negative assurance language);
other reports indicate "we have no adjustments to propose" (sometimes
called positive limited assurance); and in still other engagements, no report is
given unless there is an exception to report (implicit negative assurance). In
addition to these forms of limited assurance, there is at least one engagement
in which the report states that specified data "is fairly stated in all material
respects" in relation to a bigger unit—the complete financial statements
(supplementary information in audit-submitted documents).
Again, we believe that only one form of assurance below a positive opinion
should be permitted. This form should be negative assurance because it can be
easily adapted to any kind of assertion (financial or otherwise) and is least
subject to misunderstanding by report readers.
Although this standard restricts the forms of assurance, it does not
explicitly place a limit on the number of different levels of assurance that could
be expressed. Even if only one form of limited assurance is permitted—
negative assurance—the actual level of assurance it provides will vary depend
ing on the scope of the engagement (which can theoretically vary from 1 to 99
percent of the assurance provided by a positive opinion).
This situation raises two additional considerations. The first is how many
different levels of negative assurance should be permitted for limited assurance
engagements. The second is whether there is some minimum level of
procedures which should always be performed (a floor) for an attester's
assurance to be professional and meaningful to users.
Regarding the first consideration, we believe that, where public reports are
involved, the number of appropriate levels of assurance should generally be
decided by the standard-setting body through interpretive statements. Al
though it is our opinion that currently the profession has not developed the
attest methods and communication devices to provide more than one level of
negative assurance in such circumstances, future developments in these areas
may one day make it feasible to provide more than one level of negative
assurance. Our proposed standards provide for that possibility.
Restricted reports issued solely to specified users pose a different
situation. Since such individuals will have directly participated in establishing
* Theoretically, the positive opinion is not the highest level of assurance that could be achieved. It
is based on a concept of reasonableness rather than precise accuracy. A positive opinion, if
illustrated on Figure 1, would be a horizontal line somewhere fairly close to the top of the existing
diagonal.
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the nature and scope of the engagement, the level of negative assurance
provided can and should be tailored to their particular needs.
As long as only one level of negative assurance is permitted in public
reports, the second consideration will not arise. That is, the authoritatively
defined level of assurance (through the risk model, prescribed procedures, or
some other approach) also will establish the minimum scope of attest work for a
public report. However, should future developments in attest methods make it
reasonable for more than one level of negative assurance to be expressed, we
would advocate a minimum scope of attest procedures below which no
assurance would be expressed.*
This standard also requires the attester's conclusion in public reports to be
commensurate with the work performed; that is, the attester is required to
express the highest level of assurance permitted by the standards that is
consistent with the extent of the work performed. This provision discourages
users from inferring more assurance than that specified in the attester's
report. This has been a problem in the past when users have asserted that a
report can be given greater weight because they know more work has been
done than the assurance in the report implies.
(3) The Report Shall State All of the Attester's Substantive Reservations About
the Engagement and Assertions.
This standard is also derived from the existing fourth reporting standard,
modified to be appropriate for different levels of assurance on various types of
representations. It applies equally to public-use and restricted-use reports.
The words "reservations about the engagement" refer to any problem that
the attester had in complying with the PAS or any interpretive statements or
with procedures agreed to by specific parties. The reference to "reservations
about assertions" pertains to any reservations about the conformity of the
presentation with established and recognized criteria (or stated criteria)
including required informative disclosures.*
(4) The Report Shall Contain a Statement of Limitations on the Use of the Attest
Report If It Is Intended Solely for Users Who Have Participated in the
Establishment of the Nature and Scope of the Engagement.
This is an additional standard created in recognition of the fact that the
attest function can encompass engagements to apply procedures agreed upon
by the asserter and user (directly or through a designated representative) for
their mutual benefit. Reports on such engagements should clearly indicate that
they are intended solely for the benefit of the specified parties and may not be
useful to anyone else.
* The appropriate minimum should be established by interpretive pronouncement since specific
types of engagements are likely to require different attest approaches.
Another issue related to this standard that should be dealt with by interpretive statements is
whether it is permissible to express separate conclusions on individual assertions within a
presentation of assertions or whether it is permissible to provide any assurance on an individual
assertion when the attester has either disclaimed an opinion or issued an adverse opinion on the
group of assertions taken as a whole.
* It should be noted that the existing second and third reporting standards are not contained in
PAS. Both standards (consistency and informative disclosure) are deemed to be encompassed by
the proposed third reporting standard that requires the attester to state a conclusion on conformity
with established and recognized criteria.
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How Should the Change Be Implemented?
We believe there are four approaches that could be taken to adopt the
proposed attest standards. While we discard two of these approaches as
unacceptable, we believe further study and consideration must be given to the
remaining two before the most appropriate means of adoption can be deter
mined. The four alternatives are:
• Adopt PAS as a replacement of GAAS at the same level of authority
following due process.
• Adopt PAS as authoritiative standards for all attest engagements,
including audits of historical financial statements, following due
process but without withdrawing GAAS—in effect, at a higher level
than GAAS.
• Adopt PAS as new standards for attest engagements not covered by
GAAS at the same level of authority as GAAS following due process.
• Adopt PAS as informal guidance to the Auditing Standards Board
without withdrawing GAAS.
The key differences between the four alternatives are (1) whether PAS will
replace or supplement GAAS, (2) whether PAS are intended to achieve
authoritativeness through due process procedures, and (3) whether PAS will
function at the same or at a higher level than GAAS.
We reject the third and fourth alternatives. The latter is rejected because it
would treat PAS as, at best, second-class recommendations which could be
effectively ignored not only by current and future boards but also by attesters
when it becomes desirable.
The third approach is unacceptable because, while PAS would be authorita
tive, this approach would draw a highly visible yet artificial distinction between
audits of historical financial statements and other attest engagements and,
thus, would be inconsistent with the basic skills and experience necessary to
perform all attest engagements. We believe that there is a common level of
skill, training, and experience necessary to perform any attest engagement
and, therefore, that PAS should apply to all such engagements.
While we believe that one of the first two alternatives should be adopted,
we are undecided as to which approach would be best. The first approach
would bring all attest engagements under the same set of standards, where we
believe they logically belong. In addition, it would eliminate the potential
confusion that might otherwise result from retaining GAAS but establish a
single, self-contained definition of the CPA-attester's role in society.
We also believe, however, that the second approach has merit because an
elimination of GAAS could dilute the importance of audits of historical financial
statements and, more importantly, create potentially serious problems in those
jurisdictions that have through statute or regulation granted CPAs a monopoly
in that type of attest service. Changing from GAAS to PAS could create
legislative problems potentially more serious than having two sets of stand
ards.

Call For Action
The time for change is ripe—perhaps overripe. Without it, the AICPA will
find it increasingly difficult to be responsive to the needs of practitioners, and
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the profession could lose credibility by failing to establish timely standards to
assure the quality of practice in new areas of service.
Inevitably, there will be some who pale at the thought of changing the
Decalogue; such a change is always difficult. However, GAAS are outdated.
The role of the attester in society has outgrown them, leaving large and
undesirable voids in professional standards. And this growth in attest services
will continue whether or not the AICPA and ASB acknowledge and accommo
date it within professional and ethical standards.
The reality is that the marketplace continues to demand new attest
services to meet the new and growing needs of users. This is a healthy and
progressive environment for a profession.
The proposed attest standards are designed merely to assure that this
expansion of services takes place in an orderly, controlled manner and within
professional guidelines that ensure consistency and quality in the delivery of
professional services. We need these standards now.

End Notes
1. "Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards—Their Generally Accepted Significance and
Scope," Special Report by the Committee on Auditing Procedure, AIA, 1947.
2. For a detailed analysis of these standards see "An Analysis of Professional Standards for
Limited Assurance Engagements," Alan J. Winters (an unpublished paper prepared for the
Auditing Standards Board).

Appendix
Comparison of Proposed Attest Standards and
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
Proposed Attest Standards

Generally Accepted Auditing Standards

General Standards

General Standards

1. The engagement shall be performed by a
person or persons having adequate technical
training and proficiency as an attester.

1. The examination is to be performed by a
person or persons having adequate technical
training and proficiency as an auditor.

2. The engagement shall be performed by an
attester or attesters commanding competence in the subject matter of the assertion
on which assurance is to be provided.
3. The attester shall accept an attest engagement only if he or she has reason to believe
the following two conditions exist:
•The assertions must be capable of evaluation against established and recognized
criteria or, in their absence, against reasonable criteria that are stated in the presentation of the assertions in a sufficiently
clear and comprehensive manner for a
reader to be able to understand them and
determine if they are relevant for his or her
purposes.
• The assertions must be capable of reasonably consistent estimation or measurement; that is, competent people using
the same or similar measurement or dis-
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Generally Accepted Auditing Standards

Proposed Attest Standards
closure criteria should obtain materially
similar estimates or measurements.
4. In all matters relating to the attest engagement, an independence in mental attitude
shall be maintained by the attester or attesters.
5. Due professional care shall be exercised in
the performance of the engagement and the
preparation of the report.

2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an
independence in mental attitude is to be
maintained by the auditor or auditors.

3. Due professional care is to be exercised in
the performance of the examination and the
preparation of the report.

Standards of Field Work

Standards of Field Work

1. The work shall be adequately planned and
assistants, if any, shall be properly supervised.

1. The work is to be adequately planned and
assistants, if any, are to be adequately
supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation
of the existing internal control as a basis for
reliance thereon and for the determination
of the extent of the tests to which auditing
procedures are to be restricted.

2. Sufficient evidence shall be obtained to provide a basis for the assurance that is to be
communicated in the attest report or to
comply with the arrangements made with
specified users.

3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to
be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a
reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the
financial statements under examination.

Standards of Reporting

Standards of Reporing

1. The report shall identify the assertions being reported on and state the character of
his attest engagement and its conformity
with these standards and with the arrangements made with specified users, if any.
2. The report shall state the attester's conclusion, in the form of either a positive opinion
or negative assurance, as to whether the
assertions are presented in conformity with
established and recognized criteria or, in
their absence, stated reasonable criteria.
For reports distributed to the public, the
conclusion shall provide the highest level of
assurance permissible by authoritative interpretive standards consistent with the
work performed and the evidence obtained.

1. The report shall state whether the financial
statements are presented in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.

2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in the
current period in relation to the preceding
period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial
statements are to be regarded as reasonably
adequate unless otherwise stated in the
report.
3. The report shall state all of the attester's
substantive reservations about the engagement and assertions.

4. The report shall either contain an express of
opinion regarding the financial statements,
taken as a whole, or an assertion to the
effect that an opinion cannot be expressed.
When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefor should be
stated. In all cases where an auditor's name
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Proposed Attest Standards

Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
is associated withfinancialstatements, the
report should contain a clear-cut indication
of the character of the auditor's examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility
he is taking.

4. The report shall contain a statement of
limitations on the use of the attest report if it
is intended solely for users who have participated in the establishment of the nature and
scope of the engagement.
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Discussant's Response to
Let's Change GAAS!!! ??? *&# @
William L . Felix, Jr.
University of Arizona
Periodic reevaluation and reexamination of all aspects of our professional
environment constitute an excellent idea. The authors of this paper are to be
complimented on their efforts to take ill-formed feelings of dissatisfaction with
current Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, identify a need for change, and
develop a response that should provide all of us here today a chance to think
and to argue about the changes to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards are
currently appropriate. I do agree, in general, with their argument that
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards need reevaluation and probably need
change.

General Observations
I also have two rather strong reservations on the content of their paper
which I will try to support with some of my more detailed comments later on.
There is considerable unevenness in the presentation in this paper, and many
of its views and positions are, at best, weakly supported. It is very distracting
to try to agree with a paper and the arguments in it when many of these
arguments are poorly supported. In addition, for a paper that is proposing basic
modifications to the conceptual criteria for professional auditing, there is very
little theory. In particular, I would like to have seen a careful identification of
the appropriate level and content of overall standards; that is, a thorough
discussion of the level of concept at which GAAS should exist. In addition, a
systematic argument from this concept or theoretical framework as to what the
specific standards ought to comprise is needed.
For example, there is no definition of the term "attestation." A wellthought-out definition that leads one to some of the constructs underlying this
service to society would seem essential. I usually think of "attestation" in
terms of third party assurance on the "quality" of reasonably objective
economic information. I would argue that "quality" criteria that would provide
a framework against which auditors could evaluate their performance should,
as the authors point out in a place or two, be established at a high level.
Detailed content specifying specific actions or lack of action should be avoided
and deferred to later interpretations of the basic criteria promulgated by the
appropriate senior committee of the AICPA. The definition given above would
suggest that the overall criteria ought to include a description of acceptable
third parties, general criteria for the process of forming a level of assurance,
reporting criteria, and possibly, although debatably, other criteria. After
developing such a setting, the paper could then move on to proposing specific
standards and to comparing them with existing GAAS in a logically coherent
fashion.
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As an aside, I found the authors a bit harsh in their implicit evaluation of the
Auditing Standards Board. They seemed to suggest that, in setting standards
for historicalfinancialstatements, the Auditing Standards Board is very faithful
in followig GAAS. On the contrary, when setting standards for services other
than audits of historical financial statements, the Auditing Standards Board is
pictured as charging off in all directions with very little discipline or careful
thought. I think neither extreme is accurate. One could hardly consider the
Auditing Standards Board as faithfully following GAAS when, in fact, they are
modifying GAAS in particular SASs. For example, a change in the second field
work standard is included in SAS 43. On the other hand, in setting standards
for internal control reports in SAS 30, one could argue that the Auditing
Standards Board was reasonably consistent, at least with the spirit of GAAS in
establishing both field work and reporting guidance for this type of service.

Some Detailed Comments
The introduction to this paper seems intended to create a splash. But it is
not clear to me that the changes proposed in this paper are really so dramatic.
The proposed standards seem quite consistent with what I would view as the
spirit of the original GAAS, and, in fact, later on in the paper, the authors
explicitly state that they are going to follow the framework of GAAS. Also, in
their zeal to present a strong case for their proposed modifications, the authors
seem to overdo their arguments. For example, note the logic in the opening
pages. The proposition here is that GAAS "no longer provide sufficient
foundation for guidance. . . . " In support for this proposition, the authors
indicate that GAAS are old (36-years old), that they are designed for audits of
historical financial statements, that they are restricted to these financial
statements because they are specifically mentioned in the standards, that
practice at the time involved only audits of historicalfinancialstatements, and
that since GAAS were not intended for other service, it is illogical to conclude
that they were intended or could be interpreted as applying to other services.
These arguments do not support the premise. They do nothing to demonstrate
that GAAS are, in any explicit sense, insufficient or inappropriate, other than
that they make specific reference to one narrow type of service. The resulting
standards that the authors develop may be reached by another argument. For
example, consider the view that the current standards are "in spirit" a
reasonable start. As mentioned above, the authors could use that framework
and a "qualitative criteria" objective to reach the proposed standards.
A bit further on in the paper, the authors point out four problems: 1) that
audit services exist for which there are no general quality criteria or standards,
2) that statements on auditing standards have been established "on the basis of
inapplicable general standards," 3) that statements of auditing standards for
new services are inconsistent, and 4) that there is no guidance for future
possible services. Let's discuss each of these in sequence.
Concerning problem 1, the authors point out that GAAS do not restrict new
services and that, as a result, new services beyond the boundaries of current
GAAS have been offered purportedly without any authoritative guidance.
Implicitly, they say, therefore, that new standards are necessary. Something is
left out. Two logical links that occur to a reader are as follows. The authors are
assuming 1) that no services should be offered without explicit or implicit
182

coverage in GAAS and 2) that no services should be offered beyond the
boundaries of such established GAAS. Neither of these premises is supported.
In discussing problem 2, where they believe that SASs have been
established on the basis of inapplicable general standards, they point out that
new services exist that have no basis in statements in auditing standards and
that other SASs supporting new services are of "questionable authority."
There seems to be underlying disposition, although not specifically stated and
argued, that all SASs must be derived from GAAS rather directly as a matter of
coherence and legality. This connection is mentioned in rule 202 but is not
especially clear elsewhere in our professional literature. While it may be
desirable, it would be of considerable interest to have the authors establish this
point. Also, it is not clear why SASs for other services that are in some sense
consistent with the underlying concepts in GAAS are of questionable authority.
In any case, based on these rather ill-supported arguments, the authors
conclude that new standards are necessary to legitimize Statements on
Auditing Standards.
In discussing problem 3, where they argue that the SASs are inconsistent
where not based on GAAS, they refer to inconsistencies, ambiguities, and
fragmented professional requirements without illustration and then suggest
that new standards would eliminate the problem. While I might agree that new
standards may help, a part of the problem to which they refer may be due to
other factors. For example, the abilities of the current board and auditing
division staff or the effects of the political process on standard setting may be
partial causes. In any case, the arguments for this problem are not convincing.
There are no specific problems described, nor are the reasons that new PAS
would eliminate (or reduce) the problem given.
In discussion problem 4—the need for guidance for future possible
services—they point out that, since GAAS is limited to audits of historical
financial statements, they are "impotent" as authoritative guidance for future
services. Based on this assertion, they state that new standards are neces
sary. There is, again, no argument or evidence given to support their view,
other than their assertion. Also, in this section, they point out that, if
restrictions are desired on new services, new standards should establish such
restrictions. There is no theory or argument given for the idea that future
services should be restricted.

Arguments for Proposed Changes
In this section of the paper, the authors begin by pointing out that existing
GAAS provide a valid model. Does this assertion suggest that there are
concepts underlying GAAS that continue to be useful? I believe such to be the
case. In fact, the argument here suggests that the previous positions are
overdone. I would also like to take issue with the point that sufficient
comprehensive standards must provide basic guidance. I am not sure what the
authors mean by basic guidance, but I prefer the term "quality criteria," since
it is my view that guidance carries with it the connotation of specific rules and
procedures for practitioners that are best left to Statements on Auditing
Standards or other rule-making derived from the general standards being
proposed.
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In reviewing the authors' list of items that specifically should be covered by
auditing standards, I am not clear whether or not the authors meant this list to
be comprehensive, but it is not, since personal standards and most of the field
work standards are omitted. The use of a list of imperatives suggests the need
for a complete list leading to the proposed standards.
At this point in the paper, the authors raise the issue of whether or not we
should call ourselves attesters or auditors. I have a bias towards retaining the
term "auditor." It seems to me that the term is understood broadly by the
general public and that there is no evidence that the general public restricts this
term to audits of historical financial statements. Also, the term "auditor" is
identified in statute and by the public, as a group who are expert at providing
assurance.

Comments on Specific Standards
Let's look, first, at the proposed second general standard on competence. I
found the term, "commanding competence," interesting. It seems to me that
society's expectation should control here. That is, some degree of competence
is likely to be required of and perceived by the public as residing with the
auditor or attester, regardless of any standards we establish. This leaves me
agreeing with the overall objective of the standard, but it is not clear how the
objective should be achieved. Will the word "commanding competence" be
understood? And is this standard really necessary, or might guidance better be
given in SASs?
The third general standard also seems okay in concept, but it is also too
detailed. I would leave for Statements on Auditing Standards the issues of
clarity and consistency in estimation. Such issues are subject to changing social
expectations and are better left to changeable interpretations of the basic
standards.
The second field work standard includes discussion that goes far beyond
that necessary to support the standard. The authors seem to have spent quite
a bit of time agonizing over the appropriateness of the audit risk model included
in SAS 47. I am not sure of the purpose of this discussion, but it is interesting
to note that the concept of the risk model is logically consistent with the
concept of assurance that is basic to the attest function. I was also somewhat
disturbed by the discussion of a need for reasonably uniform assurance levels
and the subsequent call for research. This discussion needs focus. It is very
likely that auditors currently provide different levels assurance in audited
financial statements. Is this bad, or is it even avoidable? I do not think so. Our
problem is a lack of agreement on the definition and use of the term assurance.
A better development of the idea of when and where assurance can vary and
how the variation should be reported would seem more precise for this section.
Reporting standards 3 and 4 discussed toward the paper's end seem
awfully detailed. Are they really needed? They sound like specific guidance
rather than criteria for auditors in the long run.

An Overview
This paper is clearly well designed to provide us with the substance for a
good discussion. The proposed standards, themselves, seem to be a good
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effort but may include too much detail. The paper supporting these standards
has too much of a flavor of a sales pitch and would have been much more
effective if framed in concept and theory. In addition, the legal and political
dimensions of the proposed changes are not made clearly in the paper and need
much more discussion.
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8
Self-Regulation: How It Works
R. K. Mautz*
University of Michigan
Member, Public Oversight Board
So that the academics in the audience may have some understanding of the
impact of the peer review process when it was rather suddenly self-imposed on
the accounting profession, I suggest you stretch your imaginations and
consider the following analogy to the peer review process as if it were a reality.

An Analogy to the Peer Review Program
Every three years, your department must engage an accounting depart
ment from another school, or an AAA appointed team, to review your
department's quality control system. In preparation for that review, you must
first file a quality control document that includes:
1. Factual information about the size of your department, students, and
faculty.
2. A statement of the goals of your department and how these
reconcile with and are supported by the goals of the college and
university.
3. Your department's policies and practices with respect to:
a. Recruiting faculty and students.
b. Faculty promotions, pay, and allocations of other re
sources.
c. Content of course outlines.
d. Selection of textbooks, including provisions for avoiding
any conflicts of interest.
e. Grading practices and provisions for faculty evaluation.
f. Nature, extent, cost, and relevance of research activities
of faculty members.
g. Allocation of committee activities and extent of academic
community service.
h. Nature and extent of, and rewards for, professional
service.
i. Nature and extent of faculty consulting, its relationship to
department goals, and controls exercised to prevent
excessive consulting.
The purpose of the independent review of your department by your peers
is to determine whether these policies and practices provide reasonable
* These remarks represent my personal views and are not offered as necessarily representive of
any official position of the Public Oversight Board.
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assurance of quality performance by your department from the standpoint of
the students and others who rely upon it. The review will also determine the
extent to which members of your faculty actually comply with those policies
and procedures and with any regulations imposed by your college, university,
regents, or other authorities.
In performing the review, the review team will visit classes, review syllabi,
meet with faculty members and students, examine any policy manuals or
handbooks used within your department or university, read examinations and
test the grading thereof, read faculty-authored publications, and take such
other steps as it considers necessary to form an opinion on the adequacy and
effectiveness of your quality control system.
The review team's conclusions will be expressed in a formal opinion
supplemented by a letter of comment noting ways in which your system of
quality control might be improved. This report and letter of comments will be
placed in a public file open to your dean, students, their parents, alumni, and
anyone else interested.
You will pay for the review at standard consulting rates and from your own
departmental budget. You may or may not have an opportunity to make similar
reviews of other departments. No reciprocal reviews are permitted.
This is at least a rough analogy to the peer review program adopted by the
AICPA—with what some members thought was excesssive haste. The
leadership of the profession both believed in what they were imposing upon
their own and other firms and also felt that they had no viable alternative. The
practitioners who had little or nothing to do with the big decisions but whose
lives and pocketbooks were directly affected by those decisions did not
welcome the results with great enthusiasm.

The Nature of Professional Regulation
Discussing professional regulation with you involves two difficulties. First,
it is still developing so that there is no way to bring you the final word, if there
ever will be one. Second, our time is limited and the subject is complex. Hence,
I can give you no more than a summary treatment of the subject.
You may find it helpful to think of professional regulation in terms of one
goal, two approaches, and three levels.
Stated in simple terms, the goal is to protect the public against audit and
accounting failures.
The two approaches are punishment and education. Some believe strongly
that the greatest incentive to quality work is the sure knowledge that failure to
comply with standards is prompt and appropriate punishment. Almost every
one believes that there are at least some cases in which punishment is
appropriate and that punishing the wrongdoer does, indeed, have some
deterrent effect on those who otherwise might be tempted to indulge in the
same improper practice.
Others believe that education is the best possibility for improvement of
professional performance. They hold that as many practitioners as possible
should be educated to the existence of standards and how to meet them in the
belief that most practitioners, indeed most people, desire to perform well. As
you might surmise, a combination of these two approaches provides the best
hope of adequate performance.
188

These two approaches are closely related to the three levels of regulation.
Taking a broad view of professional regulation, one finds it applied by three
authorities. Public regulation is applied by governmental bodies or agencies, is
directed at punishing those who fall below minimum acceptable behavior, and
has the full authority and power of the state for enforcement purposes. Most
governmental regulation is concerned with conformity with legally established
rules and regulations or with alleged breach of contract. In this country and
many others, the government provides rules of discovery, subpoena, judicial
review, appeal, and other measures intended to assure equitable treatment for
both parties to any dispute. Punishment or damages that shift resources from
one party to another may result.
Peer regulation is performed through professional organizations which do
not have either the power or authority of government. Their primary activity is
to establish professional standards—such as generally accepted auditing stand
ards, generally accepted accounting principles, standards of quality control, and
rules of ethics—and to encourage members to accept and comply with them.
The most that voluntary organizations can do in the way of punishment or
enforcement is to censure or expel nonconforming members. Those who do
not wish to comply either do not join the organization or drop out in protest
against requirements they believe to be improper. Thus, peer regulation is a
voluntary matter.
Private regulation occurs within firms, to some extent within every firm,
and, therefore, is the most pervasive form of regulation. The motivation is
based on professional pride and enlightened self-interest. If a firm is to remain
competitive, it cannot tolerate incompetent, careless, or untrustworthy em
ployees. Furthermore, these are the kinds of employees most likely to make
the mistakes that lead to litigation, a very undesirable event.
Management of a firm does not have the authority or power of government,
but it is far more powerful than a professional organization. The power to
terminate employment is a strong one just as is the power to reward excellent
performance both financially and with promotions into new opportunities.
These options make private regulation extremely important in the overall
regulatory process.
Neither of the two approaches and no one of the three levels of regulation is
sufficient by itself. If a profession is to be well regulated, public, professional,
and private regulation must all be employed, most desirably with some degree
of coordination and cooperation. Each of them has the potential for, and usually
employs, both punishment and education to some extent, but public regulation
tends to stress punishment whereas peer and private regulation emphasize
education.

The AICPA's Self-Regulatory Program
Until 1977, the AICPA had been an organization offering personal member
ships only. No provision of any kind was made for membership or activity by
firms. Under pressure from Congress, in that year the AICPA made a rather
remarkable change in its organization. It established a division for firms
consisting of two sections, a Private Companies Practice Section and an SEC
Practice Section. Any firm could join either or both of these sections.
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Each section is governed by an executive committee appointed by the
AICPA chairman with the approval of the AICPA Board of Directors. My
discussion is concerned only with the SEC Practice Section.
Serving under the executive committee are a peer review committee and a
special investigations committee which are responsible for much of the work of
the section. A Public Oversight Board (POB) of five members has been
established to represent the public interest and to monitor the work of the
section. It has no line authority, serving only in an oversight and advisory role.
It does have considerable influence.
The original POB was chaired by Mr. John McCloy, a man of very broad
experience and great public service. Included in the membership were Arthur
Woods and John Harper, retired chief executive officers of Sears and Alcoa,
respectively, and Ray Garrett and William Carey, both former SEC chairmen.
Both Mr. Garrett and Mr. Carey have since died, and Mr. McCloy resigned
very recently. Al Sommers, formerly a member of the SEC, has been added to
the Board's membership, and I was added earlier as the first and so far the only
accountant on the Board. It has been a very interesting assignment.

The Peer Review Process
Under the supervision of the executive committee, the peer review
committee and the special investigations committee direct most of the work of
the section. Peer review is the heart of the self-regulatory program. It consists
of a quality compliance review of each member firm every three years to be
performed by peers; that is, by partners and managers from other firms.
A quality compliance review is based on a set of standards that cover all
aspects of a firm's accounting and auditing services. Nine elements of quality
control have been identified. These are:
• Independence
• Assigning personnel to engagements
• Consultation
• Supervision
• Hiring
• Professional development
• Advancement
• Acceptance and continuation of clients
• Inspection
The section's Peer Review Manual explains the nature and scope of each of
these elements. The establishment of this set of quality control standards
represents a considerable achievement. A significant part of their development
had been accomplished by the Institute's Committee on Auditing Procedure
before 1977 and was available for the section to develop further when the need
arose. They now provide to member firms an indication of what is expected of
them in the way of quality assurance and the standards against which they will
be measured during a compliance review.
The compliance (peer) review team may come from another firm (engaged
by the firm to be reviewed), or it may be a team selected by the peer review
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committee for the purpose. The firm to be reviewed makes that choice. The
review team is headed by a team captain who directs the work and writes the
final report.
In preparation for a compliance review, a firm prepares a quality control
document which describes its policies and procedures for all the nine elements
of quality control described previously. This document is supplied to the review
team which reviews it for adequacy and compliance with professional standards
and, during the course of the review, considers the appropriateness of the
described policies and procedures for the firm under review.
In performing the review, the review team reads the firm's policy and
procedure manuals, studies its guides and check-lists, examines the technical
library for adequacy, selects and examines work papers from audit engage
ments, and interviews selected people from the professional staff. The Peer
Review Manual provides guides regarding the number of accounting and audit
engagement hours that should be tested by the review team and the number of
offices to be visited in a multi-office practice.
At the conclusion of the review, the team captain discusses with his team
members the type of report to be issued. It may be unqualified; unqualified with
a letter of comments about ways in which the quality control policies and
procedures of the firm can be improved; modified and accompanied by a letter
of comments; or adverse.
At the conclusion of every compliance review, including compliance
reviews of each office covered in a multi-office engagement, the review team
captain and possibly his team members meet with the management of the
reviewed firm or office to discuss theirfindingsand conclusions, including the
nature of the report. When a modified report or even a report with significant
recommendations in the letter of comments is planned, the discussion in such
an exit conference can become heated indeed. Professional pride on the part of
the reviewed firm is such that an adverse report, a modified report, or even
strong comments are not well received. At the same time, the reviewers also
take some pride in their ability to improve any system they find. Whatever
report is finally issued, together with any letter of comments, goes into a public
file at the AICPA offices available to anyone interested in seeing it.
The peer review committee will accept unqualified reports without a letter
of comments for direct filing in the public file unless it has some reason to
question the propriety of the report. Any report accompanied by a letter of
comments will receive the committee's attention. Its question is whether the
comments suggest the necessity of a modified or adverse report rather than an
unqualified or modified report, respectively. In some cases, the peer review
committee will detail one or more of its members to discuss with the team
captain and any others involved any reservations which it may have. It may
even send the review team back for more work, if it feels this is necessary, or
schedule an additional or accelerated peer review to assure that recommended
quality control improvements are actually implemented. Once the peer review
committee is satisfied, a majority vote then accepts the report for public file
purposes.
In addition to the review by the peer review committee, the staff of the
Public Oversight Board also reviews the quality compliance review work
papers, attends the exit conference, or reads the report and letter of
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comments. Finally, on a sampling basis and with the identity of the audit
engagement work papers masked, representatives of the SEC Office of the
Chief Accountant also review the peer review work papers and report.

The Work of the Special Investigations Committee
As mentioned, the peer review process works on a triennial rotation basis
and on a sampling basis for each firm. Thus, there is no way a compliance
review can assure freedom from error. In addition, compliance review is
concerned with the reviewed firm's system of quality control policies and
procedures. When litigation against a member firm concerning the propriety of
its accounting or auditing findings is initiated, there immediately exists an
implication that the quality control system is not adequate. Of course,
allegations in litigation proceedings are no more than allegations until actually
tested by the legal process. Nevertheless, the possibility that they might be
found valid raises questions about the system of quality control.
The special investigations committee was established to inquire into such
possibilities. Each member firm must report all litigation involving audits of
SEC clients within 30 days. The special investigations committee then can call
for whatever information it considers necessary to discover whether the firm's
quality control situation is adequate or not. It typically begins by reading the
allegations and reviewing the financial statements to which they relate. It may
also obtain the latest peer review report and letter of comments, consult with
members of the review team and reviewed firm, and take whatever other steps
are necessary to determine whether the allegations indicate a significant
weakness in the firm's quality control.
Allegations charged in litigation may be:
• Frivolous.
• Made in error relative to the role and responsibility of the independ
ent accountant.
• Valid but the result of personnel failure rather than failure of the
quality control system.
• Valid and the result of a weakness in the quality control system:
Which the firm has already corrected.
Which still needs to be strengthened.
In almost half the cases that are reported, the committee finds the charges
to be frivolous or based on error. These cases are promptly closed. When it
finds what appear to be valid allegations with the likelihood that personnel
failure is at fault, the committee leaves the matter to public regulation which is
much better equipped to determine responsibility andfixpunishment, if any is
called for. If the allegations appear valid and imply a significant system
weakness, the committee will call for a special review under its direct control.
Such a review may be directed at specific offices of the firm, at the work of
specific individuals, or at the services performed by the firm in a given industry
or industries as seems necessary. The approach followed is one of seeking to
find weaknesses that may exist so they can be remedied and the public
protected.
If the firm management has already looked into the possibilities and taken
the necessary action, the committee desires assurance that this has really
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happened and then will take no further action other than to add a report to that
effect to the public file. If nothing has been done, it will insist that the member
firm take appropriate action.
When notification of litigation is first received, a staff summary is prepared
and supplied to all (nine) members of the committee. The chairman will appoint
one or more members as a task force to direct the staff in obtaining whatever
additional information is needed. Until the task force members are themselves
satisfied that the case should be closed and can influence the rest of the
committee to agree, the case will remain open. The committee's desire, of
course, is to reach the most effective conclusion as soon as possible, an
effective conclusion being one that provides adequate protection to the public
without undue cost to the member firm.

The Executive Committee
The executive committee supervises the peer review committee and the
special investigations committee, providing general guidance as necessary. It
also has final authority for the imposition of sanctions. These are provided for in
general terms within the rules and membership requirements of the section
which are necessarily limited in scope and authority. The self-regulatory
program in no way replaces or substitutes for either public or private
regulation. Firms or individuals found guilty of breaking the law or of breach of
contract will be punished by our public regulatory process. Those found guilty
of negligence, irresponsibility, or other inadequacies are likely to be dealt with
by their employers in a manner that seems appropriate to them in the
circumstances. Sanctions most likely to be imposed by the executive commit
tee would be for failure to comply with membership requirements, including
refusal to cooperate with either the peer review or the special investigations
committee. The executive committee also has the authority to determine
whether sanctions should be publicized.
Sanctions mentioned in the Peer Review Manual include:
• Corrective measures by the firm, including consideration by the firm
of appropriate actions with respect to individual firm personnel.
• Additional requirements for continuing professional education.
• Accelerated or special peer reviews.
• Monetary fines.

Role of the Public Oversight Board
In its guardianship of the public interest, the POB serves in an oversight
capacity only. It has no line authority. Members of the staff and of the Board
attend meetings of other components of the self-regulatory process, always
have the privilege of entering into the discussion, sometimes meet with specific
components or their leadership for discussion purposes, and do not hesitate to
comment either critically or constructively as necessary. Responsiveness to
Board comments has been gratifying.
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Conclusion
This paper provides no more than a quick introduction to the AICPA's
program, but there are three thoughts I hope you will take with you. First,
over time self-regulation should have a significant effect on the quality of audit
service provided by independent accounting firms. It is a remarkably effective
educational device. Second, self-regulation replaces nothing; it is an addition,
not a substitution. Public and private regulation are still in place and effective.
All three aspects of regulation are necessary to get the job done well. Third, as
devised and as functioning, the present program is a remarkable addition to the
regulatory mechanism previously in existence, so far as we can determine,
unmatched in any other profession.
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